1a 2ae q35 a8: Whether there are only four species of sadness? Yes.

Et hoc modo loquendi assignantur hic species tristitiae, per applicationem rationis tristitiae ad aliquid extraneum. Quod quidem extraneum accipi potest vel ex parte causae, obiecti; vel ex parte effectus. Proprium enim obiectum tristitiae est proprium malum.

The species of sadness are reckoned by an application of the formal aspect of sadness to something foreign to it, because this foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect: for the proper object of sadness is "one's own evil."

Unde extraneum obiectum tristitiae accipi potest vel secundum alterum tantum, quia scilicet est malum, sed non proprium, et sic est misericordia, quae est tristitia de alieno malo, inquantum tamen aestimatur ut proprium.

Hence sadness may be concerned for an object foreign to it, either through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we have "pity" which is sadness for another's evil, considered, however, as one's own.

Vel quantum ad utrumque, quia neque est de proprio, neque de malo, sed de bono alieno, inquantum tamen bonum alienum aestimatur ut proprium malum, et sic est invidia.

Or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we have "envy."

Proprius autem effectus tristitiae consistit in quadam fuga appetitus. Unde extraneum circa effectum tristitiae, potest accipi quantum ad alterum tantum, quia scilicet tollitur fuga: et sic est anxietas quae sic aggravat animum, ut non appareat aliquod refugium; unde alio nomine dicitur angustia.

The proper effect of sadness consists in a certain "flight of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sadness, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible; hence it is also called "perplexity."

Si vero intantum procedat talis aggravatio, ut etiam exteriora membra immobilitet ab opere, quod pertinet ad acediam; sic erit extraneum quantum ad utrumque, quia nec est fuga, nec est in appetitu. Ideo autem specialiter acedia dicitur vocem amputare, quia vox inter omnes exteriores motus magis exprimit interiorem conceptum et affectum, non solum in hominibus, sed etiam in aliis animalibus, ut dicitur in I Polit.

If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated in Polit. i, 1.

Delectatio causatur ex bono, quod uno modo dicitur. Et ideo delectationis non assignantur tot species sicut tristitiae, quae causatur ex malo, quod "multifariam contingit", ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning. And so pleasure is not divided into several species as sadness is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways", as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

1a 2ae q35 a7: Whether outward pain is greater than interior sadness? No.

Tristitia cordis omnem plagam exteriorem excedit quia tristitia interior non procedit ex similitudine rei apprehensa, sicut ex causa: non enim homo tristatur interius de ipsa similitudine apprehensa, sed de re cuius est similitudo.

Sadness of the heart surpasses every outward wound because inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents.

Quae quidem res tanto perfectius apprehenditur per aliquam similitudinem, quanto similitudo est magis immaterialis et abstracta.

And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract.

Et ideo dolor interior, per se loquendo, est maior, tanquam de maiori malo existens, propter hoc quod interiori apprehensione magis cognoscitur malum.

Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, inasmuch as evil is better known by an inward apprehension.

1a 2ae q35 a6: Whether sadness is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought? No.

Appetitus delectationis est fortior quam fuga tristitiae quia naturaliter maior est appetitus delectationis quam fuga tristitiae.

The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sadness because desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sadness.

Cuius ratio est, quia causa delectationis est bonum conveniens, causa autem doloris sive tristitiae est aliquod malum repugnans. Contingit autem aliquod bonum esse conveniens absque omni dissonantia, non autem potest esse aliquod malum totaliter, absque omni convenientia, repugnans. Unde delectatio potest esse integra et perfecta, tristitia autem est semper secundum partem.

The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is a conforming good; while the cause of pain or sadness is an unconforming evil. Now it happens that a certain good is conforming without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unconforming as not to be conforming in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect, whereas sadness is always partial.

Alia vero ratio est, quia bonum, quod est obiectum delectationis, propter seipsum appetitur, malum autem, quod est obiectum tristitiae, est fugiendum inquantum est privatio boni. Quod autem est per se, potius est illo quod est per aliud.

Another reason is because the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought for its own sake; whereas the evil, which is the object of sadness, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that which is, by reason of itself, is stronger than that which is by reason of something else.

Bonum est fortius quam malum, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv).

1a 2ae q35 a5: Whether there is any sadness contrary to the pleasure of contemplation? No.

Nulla tristitia est quae sit contraria delectationi contemplationis quia delectatio contemplationis non causatur ex hoc quod excluditur aliqua molestia, sed ex hoc quod est secundum seipsam delectabilis: non est enim generatio, sed operatio quaedam perfecta, ut dictum est.

There is no sadness contrary to the pleasure of contemplation because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming," but a perfect operation, as stated above (q31 a1).

Contemplatio, secundum se, nunquam habet rationem mali, cum contemplatio nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri, quod est bonum intellectus; sed per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet contemplatio vilioris impedit contemplationem melioris; vel ex parte rei contemplatae, ad quam inordinatae appetitus afficitur.

Contemplation, in itself, never has the formal aspect of evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect; it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e., insofar as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached.

Ea quae sunt contraria in rerum natura, secundum quod sunt in mente, non habent contrarietatem. Non enim rationes contrariorum sunt contrariae, sed magis unum contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud.

Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind. For things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in formal aspect; indeed rather is one contrary the formal aspect for knowing the other.

Dicitur Sap. VIII, "non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius," scilicet sapientiae, "nec taedium convictus eius, sed laetitiam et gaudium".

It is written (Wisdom 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness."

Dicit Gregorius Nyssenus, "ei delectationi quae est secundum contemplationem, non opponitur aliqua tristitia".

According to Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sadness contests the pleasure which is from contemplation".

1a 2ae q35 a4: Whether all sadness is contrary to all pleasure? No.

Non omnis tristitia omni delectationi contrariatur quia tristitia et delectatio, cum sint passiones, specificantur ex obiectis.

Not every sadness is contrary to every pleasure because sadness and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects.

Et quidem secundum genus suum, contrarietatem habent, nam unum pertinet ad prosecutionem, aliud vero ad fugam, "quae se habent in appetitu sicut affirmatio et negatio in ratione", ut dicitur in VI Ethic.

According to their respective genera, they are contrary to one another, since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2).

Et ideo tristia et delectatio quae sunt de eodem, habent oppositionem ad invicem secundum speciem. Tristitia vero et delectatio de diversis, si quidem illa diversa non sint opposita, sed disparata, non habent oppositionem ad invicem secundum rationem speciei, sed sunt etiam disparatae; sicut tristari de morte amici, et delectari in contemplatione.

Consequently sadness and pleasure in respect of the same object, are opposite to one another according to species, whereas sadness and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary but disparate, are not opposite to one another according to the formal aspect of species, but are also disparate; for instance, sadness at the death of a friend, and pleasure in contemplation [of his life].

Si vero illa diversa sint contraria, tunc delectatio et tristitia non solum non habent contrarietatem secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam habent convenientiam et affinitatem: sicut gaudere de bono et tristari de malo.

If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and sadness are not only contrary according to the formal aspect of species, but they also have a certain [mutual] conformity and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to be sad about evil.

Etsi non omnis tristitia contrarietur omni delectationi secundum speciem, tamen quantum ad effectum contrariantur: nam ex uno confortatur natura animalis, ex alio vero quodammodo molestatur.

Although not every sadness is contrary to every pleasure according to species, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort.

1a 2ae q35 a3: Whether sadness or pain is contrary to pleasure? Yes.

Laetitia et tristitia sunt contraria quia cum obiecta delectationis et tristitiae, seu doloris, sint contraria, scilicet bonum praesens et malum praesens, sequitur quod dolor et delectatio sint contraria.

Joy and sadness are contrary to one another because since the objects of pleasure and sadness (i.e., pain), viz. present good and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another.

Sicut philosophus dicit X Metaphys., contrarietas est differentia secundum formam. Forma autem, seu species, passionis et motus sumitur ex obiecto vel termino.

As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. But the form (i.e., species) of a passion or movement is taken from the object or term.

Dolor ipse potest esse delectabilis per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam admirationem, ut in spectaculis; vel inquantum facit recordationem rei amatae, et facit percipere amorem eius, de cuius absentia doletur. Unde, cum amor sit delectabilis, et dolor et omnia quae ex amore consequuntur, inquantum in eis sentitur amor, sunt delectabilia. Et propter hoc etiam dolores in spectaculis possunt esse delectabiles: inquantum in eis sentitur aliquis amor conceptus ad illos qui in spectaculis commemorantur.

Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally, insofar as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or insofar as it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, inasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage: insofar as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented.

Voluntas et ratio supra suos actus reflectuntur, inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione boni vel mali. Et hoc modo tristitia potest esse materia delectationis, vel e converso, non per se, sed per accidens: inquantum scilicet utrumque accipitur in ratione boni vel mali.

The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered under the formal aspect of good or evil. In this way, sadness can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially, but accidentally: that is, insofar as either of them is considered in the formal aspect of good or evil.

Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod "laetitia est voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus, tristitia autem est voluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus".

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the will consenting to the things we will, and sadness is the will dissenting from the things we do not will".

1a 2ae q35 a2: Whether sadness is the same as pain? Yes.

Si dolor accipiatur communiter, sic dolor est genus tristitiae, quia quaecumque cadunt sub exteriori apprehensione, cadunt sub interiori, sed non e converso: sicut illa delectatio quae ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, delectatio quidem nominatur, non autem gaudium; ita ille dolor qui ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, nominatur quidem dolor, non autem tristitia.

If pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sadness, because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely: just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure, but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed, but not sadness.

Sensus exterior non percipit nisi praesens; vis autem cognitiva interior potest percipere praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Et ideo tristitia potest esse de praesenti, praeterito et futuro; dolor autem corporalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem sensus exterioris, non potest esse nisi de praesenti.

External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. Consequently sadness is able to be about present, past and future; whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can only be about something present.

1a 2ae q35 a1: Whether pain is a passion of the soul? Yes.

Dolor, secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae, quia omnis motus appetitus sensitivi dicitur passio, ut supra dictum est, et praecipue illi qui in defectum sonant.

Pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul, because every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as stated above (q22, a1,a3), and especially those which tend to some defect.

Dolor dicitur esse corporis, quia causa doloris est in corpore: puta cum patimur aliquod nocivum corpori. Sed motus doloris semper est in anima, nam "corpus non potest dolere nisi dolente anima", ut Augustinus dicit.

We speak of pain as of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).

Sicut ad delectationem duo requiruntur (scilicet coniunctio boni, et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis), ita etiam ad dolorem duo requiruntur: scilicet coniunctio alicuius mali (quod ea ratione est malum, quia privat aliquod bonum), et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis.

Just as two things are requisite for pleasure (namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction), so also two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is evil by the formal aspect that it deprives one of some good), and perception of this conjunction.

Quidquid autem coniungitur, si non habeat, respectu eius cui coniungitur, rationem boni vel mali, non potest causare delectationem vel dolorem. Ex quo patet quod aliquid sub ratione boni vel mali, est obiectum delectationis et doloris. Bonum autem et malum, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt obiecta appetitus. Unde patet quod delectatio et dolor ad appetitum pertinent.

Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the formal aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that something under the formal aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite.

Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit dolorem inter passiones animae, inducens illud Virgilii, "hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque dolentque".

Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the passions of the soul, quoting Virgil: "hence wild desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears" (Aeneid, vi, 733) [Translation: Conington.]

1a 2ae q35: Pain or sorrow, in itself

1. Is pain a passion of the soul?
2. Is sorrow the same as pain?
3. Is sorrow or pain contrary in pleasure?
4. Is all sorrow contrary to all pleasure?
5. Is there a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
6. Is sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
7. Is exterior pain greater than interior?
8. The species of sorrow

1a 2ae q34 a4: Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil? Yes.

Secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus vel malus, quia est bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum, malus autem qui in operibus malis.

Man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will, because that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue, and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.

Omnis delectatio in hoc est uniformis, quod est quies in aliquo bono, et secundum hoc potest esse regula vel mensura. Nam ille bonus est cuius voluntas quiescit in vero bono; malus autem, cuius voluntas quiescit in malo.

All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good, and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good; and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.

Delectationes autem appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas malorum.

On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice, since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in conformity with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.

Cum delectatio perficiat operationem per modum finis, ut supra dictum est, non potest esse operatio perfecte bona, nisi etiam adsit delectatio in bono, nam bonitas rei dependet ex fine. Et sic quodammodo bonitas delectationis est causa bonitas in operatione.

Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above (q33 a4), an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good, because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.

1a 2ae q34 a3: Whether any pleasure is the greatest good? Yes.

Aliqua delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona humana quia ultimus finis hominis dici potest vel ipse Deus, qui est summum bonum simpliciter, vel fruitio ipsius, quae importat delectationem quandam in ultimo fine.

A certain delight of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods because man's last end may be said to be either God Who is the Supreme Good simply, or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain delight in the last end.

Plato non posuit omnes delectationes esse malas, sicut Stoici, neque omnes esse bonas, sicut Epicurei; sed quasdam esse bonas, et quasdam esse malas; ita tamen quod nulla sit summum bonum, vel optimum.

Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all delights are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that all delights are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good.

1a 2ae q34 a2: Whether every pleasure is good? No.

Non omne delectabile est bonum bonitate morali (quae attenditur secundum rationem) quia delectabile dicitur secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendit quod non est conveniens rationi.

Not every delight is good with moral goodness (which depends on the order of formal aspect) because the delectable depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which does not conform with formal aspect.

Honestum et utile dicuntur secundum rationem, et ideo nihil est honestum vel utile, quod non sit bonum.

The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with formal aspect, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being good.

Sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas. Qui ex hoc decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguebant inter id quod est bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quoad hunc.

While some of the Stoics maintained that all delights are evil, the Epicureans held that delight is good in itself, and that consequently all delights are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual.

Ideo delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, quia est quies in fine. Finem autem contingit esse bonum et malum; quamvis nunquam sit finis nisi secundum quod est bonum quoad hunc. Ita etiam est de delectatione.

The reason why delight is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except insofar as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with regard to delight.

Hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum; ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona.

All things seek delight in the same way as they seek good, since delight is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself good and truly good; so not every delight is of itself good and truly good.

1a 2ae q34 a1: Whether every pleasure is evil? No.

Aliquas delectationes sunt bonas, et aliquas sunt malas, quia est delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et consequens aliquam operationem.

Some pleasures are good, and some are evil, because pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from some operation.

Temperatus non fugit omnes delectationes, sed immoderatas, et rationi non convenientes.

The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and not conforming to reason.

In moralibus est quaedam delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei.

In the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God.

Operationibus autem magis sunt affines delectationes, quae sunt eis coniunctae, quam concupiscentiae, quae tempore eas praecedunt. Unde, cum concupiscentiae bonarum operationum sint bonae, malarum vero malae, multo magis delectationes bonarum operationum sunt bonae, malarum vero malae.

Pleasures which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil, much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions evil.

In concubitu coniugali delectatio, quamvis sit in eo quod convenit rationi, tamen impedit rationis usum, propter corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Sed ex hoc non consequitur malitiam moralem; sicut nec somnus, quo ligatur usus rationis, moraliter est malus, si sit secundum rationem receptus: nam et ipsa ratio hoc habet, ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur.

In conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times.

1a 2ae q34: The goodness and badness of pleasures

1. Is every pleasure evil?
2. If not, is every pleasure good?
3. Is any pleasure the greatest good?
4. Is pleasure the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?

1a 2ae q33 a4: Whether pleasure perfects operation? Yes.

Delectatio operationem perficit quia operatio causat delectationem sicut causa efficiens; delectatio autem perficit operationem per modum finis.

Pleasure perfects operation because operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause.

Delectatio perficit operationem inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito.

Pleasure perfects operation inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed.

Perficit delectatio operationem, inquantum scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius eam operatur.

Pleasure perfects operation inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care.

Delectationes adaugent proprias operationes, et impediunt extraneas.

Pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that are not appropriate.

Delectatio autem quae consequitur actum rationis, fortificat rationis usum.

Pleasure that arises from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.

1a 2ae q33 a3: Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason? Yes.

Usus rationis requirit debitum usum imaginationis et aliarum virium sensitivarum, quae utuntur organo corporali; et ideo ex transmutatione corporali usus rationis impeditur, impedito actu virtutis imaginativae et aliarum sensitivarum.

The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through a bodily organ; consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers.

Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod "delectatio corrumpit existimationem prudentiae".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence".

Est ergo quaedam delectatio quae habetur de ipso actu rationis, sicut cum aliquis delectatur in contemplando vel ratiocinando. Et talis delectatio non impedit usum rationis, sed ipsum adiuvat, quia illud attentius operamur in quo delectamur, attentio autem adiuvat operationem.

There is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning. And such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it, because we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.

1a 2ae q33 a2: Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself? Yes.

Omnes fere delectationes corporales faciunt sui ipsarum sitim, quousque consummentur, eo quod tales delectationes consequuntur aliquem motum: sicut patet in delectationibus ciborum.

Nearly all bodily delights cause thirst for [more of] themselves, until they are fully realized, because of the fact that delights of this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in the delights of food.

Si vero per sitim vel desiderium intelligatur sola intensio affectus, tollens fastidium, sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum. Delectationes enim corporales, quia augmentatae, vel etiam continuatae, faciunt superexcrescentiam naturalis habitudinis, efficiuntur fastidiosae; ut patet in delectatione ciborum. Et propter hoc, quando aliquis iam pervenit ad perfectum in delectationibus corporalibus, fastidit eas, et quandoque appetit aliquas alias.

On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, [the sort of emotion] that excludes distaste, thus, more than all others, spiritual delights cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because bodily delights, when they are increased or even when they are protracted, become distasteful by causing an excess in the natural state of affairs; as is evident in the case of the delights of food. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in bodily delights, he loses taste for them, and sometimes desires another kind.

Sed delectationes spirituales non superexcrescunt naturalem habitudinem, sed perficiunt naturam. Unde cum pervenitur ad consummationem in ipsis, tunc sunt magis delectabiles: nisi forte per accidens, inquantum operationi contemplativae adiunguntur aliquae operationes virtutum corporalium, quae per assiduitatem operandi lassantur.

Spiritual delights, on the contrary, do not exceed a natural state of affairs, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except, perchance, accidentally, insofar as the [spiritual] activity of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from protracted activity.

1a 2ae q33 a1: Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure? Yes.

Desiderium habet quidem aliquam ampliationem ex imaginatione rei desideratae, sed multo magis ex praesentia rei iam delectantis: quia magis praebet se animus rei iam delectanti, quam rei non habitae desideratae, cum delectatio sit finis desiderii.

Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the presence of the delightful object: because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking delight in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since delight is the end of desire.

Latitudo est quaedam dimensio magnitudinis corporalis, unde in affectionibus animae non nisi secundum metaphoram dicitur. Dilatatio autem dicitur quasi motus ad latitudinem. Et competit delectationi secundum duo quae ad delectationem requiruntur.

Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs to delight in respect of the two things requisite for delight.

Quorum unum est ex parte apprehensivae virtutis, quae apprehendit coniunctionem alicuius boni convenientis. Ex hac autem apprehensione apprehendit se homo perfectionem quandam adeptum, quae est spiritualis magnitudo, et secundum hoc, animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari, seu dilatari.

One of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some befitting good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be magnified (i.e., expanded) by delight.

Aliud autem est ex parte appetitivae virtutis, quae assentit rei delectabili, et in ea quiescit, quodammodo se praebens ei ad eam interius capiendam. Et sic dilatatur affectus hominis per delectationem, quasi se tradens ad continendum interius rem delectantem.

The other requisite for delight is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the delightful object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by delight, as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its delight.

Ad delectationem vero pertinet dilatatio, inquantum aliquid in seipso ampliatur, ut quasi capacius reddatur.

Expansion pertains to delight, insofar as a thing becomes wider in itself so as to become more capacious.

1a 2ae q33: The effects of pleasure

1. Is expansion an effect of pleasure?
2. Does pleasure cause thirst or desire for itself?
3. Does pleasure hinder the use of reason?
4. Does pleasure perfect operation?

1a 2ae q32 a8: Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure? Yes.

Admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet ignorantiam, sed inquantum habet desiderium addiscendi causam, et inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem non aestimabat.

Wonder gives delight, not because it implies ignorance, but insofar as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and insofar as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he had thought it to be.

Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa delectationis, inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat.

Wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge, a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of delight, insofar as it includes an adjunct hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have.

Philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod admiratio est delectationis causa.

The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is a cause of delight.

1a 2ae q32 a7: Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure? Yes.

Similitudo est causa delectationis quia similitudo est causa amoris, ut dictum est supra, et amor est causa delectationis.

Likeness is a cause of delight because likeness is a cause of love, as above stated (q27, a3), and love is the cause of delight.

Illi qui patiuntur tristitias, maxime sequuntur delectationes, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.

Those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek delights, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14).

Et ideo appetitur delectatio ab his qui in tristitia sunt, ut conferens ad proprium bonum, inquantum est medicativa contrarii. Et ista est causa quare delectationes corporales, quibus sunt contrariae quaedam tristitiae, magis appetuntur, quam delectationes intellectuales, quae non habent contrarietatem tristitiae, ut infra dicetur.

Wherefore the sorrowful man seeks delight as making for his own good, insofar as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily delights, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought than intellectual delights, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall state later on (q35, a5).

Exinde etiam est quod omnia animalia naturaliter appetunt delectationem, quia semper animal laborat per sensum et motum. Et propter hoc etiam iuvenes maxime delectationes appetunt: propter multas transmutationes in eis existentes, dum sunt in statu augmenti. Et etiam melancholici vehementer appetunt delectationes, ad expellendum tristitiam, quia corpus eorum quasi pravo humore corroditur, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.

And this explains why all animals naturally desire delight, because animals ever work through sense and movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined to seek delights: on account of the many changes to which they are subject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong desire for delights, in order to drive away sorrow, because his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.

Bona corporalia in quadam mensura consistunt, et ideo superexcessus similium corrumpit proprium bonum. Et propter hoc efficitur fastidiosum et contristans, inquantum contrariatur bono proprio hominis.

Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure, wherefore surfeit of such similar things destroys the proper good, and consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the proper good of man.

1a 2ae q32 a6: Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure? Yes.

Omnia enim quae facimus vel patimur propter amicum, delectabilia sunt, quia amor praecipua causa delectationis est.

Whatever we do or suffer for a friend is delightful, because love is the principal cause of delight.

Benefacere alteri, potest tripliciter esse delectationis causa. Uno modo, per comparationem ad effectum, quod est bonum in altero constitutum. Et secundum hoc, inquantum bonum alterius reputamus quasi nostrum bonum, propter unionem amoris, delectamur in bono quod per nos fit aliis, praecipue amicis, sicut in bono proprio.

Doing good to another may give delight in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take delight in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good.

Alio modo, per comparationem ad finem; sicut cum aliquis, per hoc quod alteri benefacit, sperat consequi aliquod bonum sibi ipsi, vel a Deo vel ab homine. Spes autem delectationis est causa.

Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when someone, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either from God or from man: for hope is a cause of delight.

Tertio modo, per comparationem ad principium. Et sic hoc quod est benefacere alteri, potest esse delectabile per comparationem ad triplex principium.

Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle.

Quorum unum est facultas benefaciendi: et secundum hoc, benefacere alteri fit delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini quaedam imaginatio abundantis boni in seipso existentis, ex quo possit aliis communicare. Et ideo homines delectantur in filiis et in propriis operibus, sicut quibus communicant proprium bonum.

One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing good to another becomes delightful, insofar as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take delight in their children, and in their own works, as being things on which they bestow a share of their own good.

Aliud principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem benefacere fit alicui connaturale. Unde liberales delectabiliter dant aliis.

Another principle is [a man's] habitual inclination [to do good,] according to which doing good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes delight in giving to others.

Tertium principium est motivum: puta cum aliquis movetur ab aliquo quem diligit, ad benefaciendum alicui.

The third principle is motive: for instance when someone is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone.

Philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod "largiri et auxiliari amicis aut extraneis, est delectabilissimum".

The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most delightful to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers".

1a 2ae q32 a5: Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us? Yes.

Operationes aliorum etsi non procedant ex habitibus qui in me sunt, causant tamen in me aliquid delectabile; vel faciunt mihi aestimationem sive apprehensionem proprii habitus; vel procedunt ex habitu illius qui est unum mecum per amorem: quia operatio alterius potest esse mihi coniuncta vel per effectum, sicut in primo modo; vel per apprehensionem, sicut in secundo modo; vel per affectionem, sicut in tertio modo.

Although the actions of another do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that gives delight; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love: because another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way; or by knowledge, as in the second way; or by affection, as in the third way.

Homines delectantur in hoc quod laudantur vel honorantur ab aliis, quia scilicet per hoc accipiunt aestimationem in seipsis aliquod bonum esse. Et quia ista aestimatio fortius generatur ex testimonio bonorum et sapientum, ideo in horum laudibus et honoribus homines magis delectantur. Et quia adulator est apparens laudator, propter hoc etiam adulationes quibusdam sunt delectabiles.

Men take delight in being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing in themselves. And since this appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater delight in being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is delightful to some.

Et quia amor est alicuius boni, et admiratio est alicuius magni, idcirco amari ab aliis, et in admiratione haberi, est delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini aestimatio propriae bonitatis vel magnitudinis, in quibus aliquis delectatur.

And as love is for something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is delightful to be loved and admired by others, inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through his giving delight to others.

Dicitur in II Ethic., quod "signum generati habitus oportet accipere fientem in opere delectationem".

Aristotle says in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon the delight which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us."

1a 2ae q32 a4: Whether sadness causes pleasure? Yes.

Tristitia potest esse delectationis causa, quia tristitia siquidem in actu existens est causa delectationis, inquantum facit memoriam rei dilectae, de cuius absentia aliquis tristatur, et tamen de sola eius apprehensione delectatur.

Sadness can cause delight because sadness, as actually existing, causes delight, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives delight.

Memoria autem tristitiae fit causa delectationis, propter subsequentem evasionem. Nam carere malo accipitur in ratione boni; unde secundum quod homo apprehendit se evasisse ab aliquibus tristibus et dolorosis, accrescit ei gaudii materia.

The recollection of sadness becomes a cause of delight, on account of the deliverance which ensued, because absence of evil is looked upon under the formal aspect of good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason has he to rejoice.

Augustinus dicit in VIII Confess. dicit quod "quanto maius fuit periculum in proelio, tanto maius erit gaudium in triumpho".

Augustine (Confess. viii, 3) says that "the more peril there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the triumph."

1a 2ae q32 a3: Whether hope and memory causes pleasure? Yes.

Memoria et spes sunt causa delectationis quia delectatio causatur ex praesentia boni convenientis, secundum quod sentitur, vel qualitercumque percipitur.

Memory and hope do cause delight because delight is caused by the presence of a befitting good, insofar as it is felt, or perceived in any way.

Spes et memoria sunt quidem eorum quae sunt simpliciter absentia; quae tamen secundum quid sunt praesentia: scilicet vel secundum apprehensionem solam; vel secundum apprehensionem et facultatem, ad minus aestimatam.

Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent; and yet those are, after a fashion, present: i.e., either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.

Nihil prohibet idem, secundum diversa, esse causam contrariorum. Sic igitur spes, inquantum habet praesentem aestimationem boni futuri, delectationem causat; inquantum autem caret praesentia eius, causat afflictionem.

Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a present appraising of a future good, causes delight; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.

Amor et concupiscentia delectationem causant. Omne enim amatum fit delectabile amanti, eo quod amor est quaedam unio vel connaturalitas amantis ad amatum. Similiter etiam omne concupitum est delectabile concupiscenti, cum concupiscentia sit praecipue appetitus delectationis.

Love and concupiscence also cause delight. For everything that is loved becomes delectable to the lover, since love is a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is delightful to the one that desires, since desire is chiefly a craving for delight.

Sed tamen spes, inquantum importat quandam certitudinem realis praesentiae boni delectantis, quam non importat nec amor nec concupiscentia, magis ponitur causa delectationis quam illa. Et similiter magis quam memoria, quae est de eo quod iam transiit.

However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the delightful good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference to them as causing delight; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed away.

1a 2ae q32 a2: Whether movement is a cause of pleasure? Yes.

Motus etiam efficitur delectabilis, inquantum per ipsum fit aliquid conveniens quod prius conveniens non erat, vel desinit esse, quia ex parte nostra qui delectamur, transmutatio efficitur nobis delectabilis propter hoc, quod natura nostra transmutabilis est, et propter hoc, quod est nobis conveniens nunc, non erit nobis conveniens postea; sicut calefieri ad ignem est conveniens homini in hieme, non autem in aestate.

Movement becomes the cause of delight, insofar as through it something which previously was unbefitting, becomes befitting or ceases to be, because as far as we who take delight are concerned, change is delightful to us because our nature is changeable, for which reason that which is befitting to us at one time is not befitting at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is befitting to man in winter but not in summer.

Ex parte vero boni delectantis quod nobis coniungitur, fit etiam transmutatio delectabilis. Quia actio continuata alicuius agentis auget effectum: sicut quanto aliquis diutius appropinquat igni, magis calefit et desiccatur. Naturalis autem habitudo in quadam mensura consistit. Et ideo quando continuata praesentia delectabilis superexcedit mensuram naturalis habitudinis, efficitur remotio eius delectabilis.

Again, on the part of the delightful good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now our natural state of affairs consists in a certain measure. And therefore when the continued presence of a delightful object exceeds the measure of one's natural state of affairs, the removal of that object becomes delightful.

Ex parte vero ipsius cognitionis, quia homo desiderat cognoscere aliquod totum et perfectum. Cum ergo aliqua non poterunt apprehendi tota simul, delectat in his transmutatio, ut unum transeat et alterum succedat, et sic totum sentiatur.

On the part of the knowledge itself, [change becomes delightful] because man desires to know something whole and perfect. When therefore something cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is delightful, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived.

Motus laborem et lassitudinem inducit, secundum quod transcendit habitudinem naturalem. Sic autem motus non est delectabilis, sed secundum quod removentur contraria habitudinis naturalis.

Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural state of affairs. It is not thus that it causes delight, but by removing the obstacles to our natural state of affairs.

Id quod est consuetum, efficitur delectabile, inquantum efficitur naturale, nam consuetudo est quasi altera natura. Motus autem est delectabilis, non quidem quo receditur a consuetudine, sed magis secundum quod per ipsum impeditur corruptio naturalis habitudinis, quae posset provenire ex assiduitate alicuius operationis. Et sic ex eadem causa connaturalitatis efficitur consuetudo delectabilis, et motus.

What is customary becomes delightful, insofar as it becomes natural, because custom is like a second nature. But the movement which gives delight is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which in itself prevents the corruption of the natural state of affairs, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturality, both custom and movement become delightful.

1a 2ae q32 a1: Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?

Omnis delectatio in operationem reducitur sicut in causam quia operationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt proportionatae et connaturales operanti.

Every delight is traced to some operation as its cause because operations are delectable, insofar as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent.

Ipsa obiecta operationum non sunt delectabilia, nisi inquantum coniunguntur nobis: vel per cognitionem solam (sicut cum delectamur in consideratione vel inspectione aliquorum); vel quocumque alio modo simul cum cognitione (sicut cum aliquis delectatur in hoc quod cognoscit se habere quodcumque bonum: puta divitias vel honorem vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae quidem non essent delectabilia, nisi inquantum apprehenduntur ut habita).

The objects themselves of operations are not delectable, save inasmuch as they are united to us: either by knowledge alone (as when we take delight in thinking of or looking at certain things); or in some other way together with knowledge (as when a man takes delight in knowing that he has something good: e.g., riches, honor, or the like, which would not be delectable unless they were apprehended as possessed).

Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Polit., "magnam delectationem habet putare aliquid sibi proprium, quae procedit ex naturali amore alicuius ad seipsum". Habere autem huiusmodi nihil est aliud quam uti eis, vel posse uti. Et hoc est per aliquam operationem.

For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take great delight in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such like things is nothing else but to use them, or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation.

Philosophus dicit, VII et X Ethic., quod "delectatio est operatio connaturalis non impedita".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that "delight is a connatural operation that is uninterrupted".

1a 2ae q32: The causes of pleasure

1. Is operation the proper cause of pleasure?
2. Is movement a cause of pleasure?
3. Do hope and memory cause pleasure?
4. Does sadness cause pleasure?
5. Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure to us?
6. Is doing good to another a cause of pleasure?
7. Is likeness a cause of pleasure?
8. Is wonder a cause of pleasure?

1a 2ae q31 a8: Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another? Yes.

Contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes esse contrarias quia nil prohibet duo bona esse ad invicem contraria, sicut calidum et frigidum, quorum unum est bonum igni, alterum aquae.

It happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to another because nothing prevents one good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is the good of fire, the latter, of water.

Sed hoc in bono virtutis esse non potest, quia bonum virtutis non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum: scilicet rationem.

That this is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good is not received except through conformity to some one thing: namely, formal aspect.

Delectatio se habet in affectibus animae, sicut quies naturalis in corporibus, est enim in aliquo convenienti et quasi connaturali.

Delight, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies, because its object is something befitting and connatural, so to speak.

Dicuntur autem duae quietes esse contrariae, quae sunt in contrariis terminis; sicut "quies quae est sursum, ei quae est deorsum", ut dicitur V Physic.

Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6).

Ea in quibus delectamur, cum sint obiecta delectationis, non solum faciunt differentiam materialem, sed etiam formalem, si sit diversa ratio delectabilitatis. Diversa enim ratio obiecti diversificat speciem actus vel passionis, ut ex supradictis patet.

The things in which we take delight, since they are the objects of delight, cause not only a material, but also a formal difference, if the formal aspect of delectability be different. Because difference in the formal aspect of the object causes a specific difference in acts and passions, as stated above (q23, a1,a4; q30, a2).

Quaedam delectationes se invicem impediunt ut dicitur in X Ethic.

Some pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5.

1a 2ae q31 a7: Whether any pleasure is not natural? Yes.

Secundum utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales, simpliciter loquendo, sed connaturales secundum quid, quia contingit in aliquo individuo corrumpi aliquod principiorum naturalium speciei: et sic id quod est contra naturam speciei, fieri per accidens naturale huic individuo; sicut huic aquae calefactae est naturale quod calefaciat.

Under each kind of delights, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some respect, because it happens in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted: so that something which is contrary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual; thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat.

Ita igitur contingit quod id quod est contra naturam hominis, vel quantum ad rationem, vel quantum ad corporis conservationem, fiat huic homini connaturale, propter aliquam corruptionem naturae in eo existentem.

Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to formal aspect, or in regard to the preservation of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of some corruption of nature existing in him.

Quae quidem corruptio potest esse vel ex parte corporis: sive ex aegritudine (sicut febricitantibus dulcia videntur amara et e converso); sive propter malam complexionem (sicut aliqui delectantur in comestione terrae vel carbonum, vel aliquorum huiusmodi); vel etiam ex parte animae (sicut propter consuetudinem, aliqui delectantur in comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, aut aliorum huiusmodi, quae non sunt secundum naturam humanam).

And this corruption may be either on the part of the body: from some ailment (thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, and vice versa); or from an evil temperament (thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like); or on the part of the soul (thus from custom, some take pleasure in cannibalism, or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, or other such things, which are not in accord with human nature).

Philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod quaedam delectationes sunt aegritudinales et contra naturam.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some delights are "diseased and contrary to nature".

1a 2ae q31 a6: Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses? Yes.

Delectatio tactus est maxima ratione utilitatis, delectatio autem visus ratione cognitionis; si quis utramque comparare velit, inveniet simpliciter delectationem tactus esse maiorem delectatione visus, secundum quod sistit infra limites sensibilis delectationis, quia manifestum est quod id quod est naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum (huiusmodi autem delectationes tactus sunt ad quas ordinantur concupiscentiae naturales, sicut cibi, et venerea, et huiusmodi); sed si consideremus delectationes visus, secundum quod visus deservit intellectui, sic delectationes visus erunt potiores, ea ratione qua et intelligibiles delectationes sunt potiores sensibilibus.

The delight afforded by touch is the greatest according to the formal aspect of usefulness, and the delight afforded by sight the greatest according to the formal aspect of cognition; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the delight of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the delight of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure, because it is evident that in everything, that which is natural is most powerful (and it is to these delights of the touch that the natural desires, such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained); if, however, we consider the delights of sight, inasmuch as sight is the handmaid of the intellect, then the delights of sight will be more powerful, by that formal aspect by which intellectual delights are more powerful than sensible.

Utilitas enim sensibilium attenditur secundum ordinem ad conservationem naturae animalis. Ad hanc autem utilitatem propinquius se habent sensibilia tactus, est enim tactus cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus consistit animal, scilicet calidi et frigidi, et huiusmodi. Unde secundum hoc, delectationes quae sunt secundum tactum, sunt maiores, quasi fini propinquiores.

The usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their ordination to the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this usefulness, for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like. Wherefore in this respect, the delights of touch are greater, as being more closely related to the end.

Et propter hoc etiam, alia animalia, quae non habent delectationem secundum sensum nisi ratione utilitatis, non delectantur secundum alios sensus, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus: "neque enim odoribus leporum canes gaudent, sed cibatione; neque leo voce bovis, sed comestione", ut dicitur in III Ethic.

For this reason, too, other animals, which do not experience sensible delight save according to the formal aspect of usefulness, derive no delight from the other senses, except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, 10).

Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod maximae delectationes sunt secundum tactum.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.

Alio modo delectatio est causa amoris carnalis, et alio modo visio. Nam delectatio, et maxime quae est secundum tactum, est causa amicitiae delectabilis per modum finis; visio autem est causa sicut unde est principium motus, inquantum per visum amabilis imprimitur species rei, quae allicit ad amandum et ad concupiscendum eius delectationem.

Delight causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in another. For delight, especially that which is afforded by the touch, is the final cause of the [type of] friendship which is for the sake of delight; whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of the thing, which entices him to love it and to seek its delight.

Visus maxime diligitur propter cognitionem, eo quod multas rerum differentias nobis ostendit.

The sight is loved most, "on account of cognition, because it helps us to distinguish many things (Metaph. i, 1).

Sed delectatio naturalis maxime pertinet ad tactum.

But natural pleasure belongs principally to the touch.

1a 2ae q31 a5: Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures? No.

Non est dubium quod multo sunt maiores delectationes intelligibiles quam sensibiles, quia multo magis delectatur homo de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid intelligendo, quam de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid sentiendo; quia intellectualis cognitio et perfectior est, et etiam magis cognoscitur (quia intellectus magis reflectitur supra actum suum quam sensus).

Without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures, because man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense; because intellectual knowledge is more perfect, and it is even better known (since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does).

Est etiam cognitio intellectiva magis dilecta; nullus enim est qui non magis vellet carere visu corporali quam visu intellectuali, eo modo quo bestiae vel stulti carent, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei.

Moreover intellectual cognition is more beloved; for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily vision rather than his intellectual vision, in the way that beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (cf. De Trin. xiv, 14 [PL 42: 1051]).

Ideo plures sequuntur delectationes corporales, quia bona sensibilia sunt magis et pluribus nota. Et etiam quia homines indigent delectationibus ut medicinis contra multiplices dolores et tristitias; et cum plures hominum non possint attingere ad delectationes spirituales, quae sunt propriae virtuosorum, consequens et quod declinent ad corporales.

The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensory goods are known better and more generally. And, again, because men need delights as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness; and since the majority cannot attain spiritual delights, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.

1a 2ae q31 a4: Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite? Yes.

Delectatio potest esse in appetitu intellectivo quia delectatio quaedam sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Ad apprehensionem autem rationis, non solum commovetur appetitus sensitivus, per applicationem ad aliquid particulare; sed etiam appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas. Et secundum hoc, in appetitu intellectivo, sive in voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non autem delectatio corporalis.

Delight can be in the intellectual appetite because a certain delight arises from the apprehension of formal aspect. Now on apprehension of formal aspect, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.

Hoc tamen interest inter delectationem utriusque appetitus, quod delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali, delectatio autem appetitus intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis. Et secundum hoc Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod cupiditas et laetitia non est aliud quam voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus.

However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish."

Delectatio habet rationem passionis, proprie loquendo, inquantum est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et sic non est in appetitu intellectivo, sed secundum simplicem motum; sic enim etiam est in Deo et in Angelis. Unde dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod Deus una simplici operatione gaudet. Et Dionysius dicit, in fine Cael. Hier., quod "Angeli non sunt susceptibiles nostrae passibilis delectationis, sed congaudent Deo secundum incorruptionis laetitiam".

Delight has the formal aspect of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement; for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of incorruption."

In nobis non solum est delectatio in qua communicamus cum brutis, sed etiam in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Unde ibidem Dionysius dicit quod "sancti homines multoties fiunt in participatione delectationum angelicarum". Et ita in nobis est delectatio non solum in appetitu sensitivo, in quo communicamus cum brutis; sed etiam in appetitu intellectivo, in quo communicamus cum Angelis.

In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.

1a 2ae q31 a3: Whether delight differs from joy? Yes.

Non est idem gaudium et delectatio quia nomen gaudii non habet locum nisi in delectatione quae consequitur rationem; unde gaudium non attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectationis.

Joy is not the same as delight because we do not speak of "joy" except when delight follows formal aspect; and so we do not ascribe joy to brute animals, but only "delight".

Sicut Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt, "quaedam sunt corporales, quaedam animales".

As Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul".

Similis differentia invenitur etiam in concupiscentiis, ita quod delectatio respondeat concupiscentiae (et gaudium respondeat desiderio), quod magis videtur pertinere ad concupiscentiam animalem. Et sic secundum differentiam motus, est etiam differentia quietis.

A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also, so that delight corresponds to concupiscence (while joy corresponds to desire), which seems to pertain more to animal concupiscence. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of movement.

Alia nomina ad delectationem pertinentia, sunt imposita ab effectibus delectationis; nam laetitia imponitur a dilatatione cordis, ac si diceretur latitia; exultatio vero dicitur ab exterioribus signis delectationis interioris, quae apparent exterius, inquantum scilicet interius gaudium prosilit ad exteriora; iucunditas vero dicitur a quibusdam specialibus laetitiae signis vel effectibus. Et tamen omnia ista nomina videntur pertinere ad gaudium, non enim utimur eis nisi in naturis rationalibus.

Other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which appear outwardly insofar as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of beings with formally aspectual natures.

1a 2ae q31 a2: Whether delight is in time? No.

Delectatio secundum se quidem non est in tempore, quia est delectatio in bono iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus.

Delight, of itself indeed, is not in time, because it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement.

Sed si illud bonum adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.

But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time incidentally. But if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either essentially, or incidentally.

Sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, qui est "actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi": et talis motus est successivus, et in tempore.

As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time.

Alius autem motus est "actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu"; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in tempore.

Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This sort of movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.

Aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non esse in tempore.

Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the formal aspect of imperfect movement in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.

Philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod "secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."

1a 2ae q31 a1: Whether delight is a passion? Yes.

Delectatio est passio animae quia delectatio est motus in appetitu animali consequens apprehensionem sensus.

Delight is a passion of the soul because delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense.

Quamvis nomen passionis magis proprie conveniat passionibus corruptivis et in malum tendentibus (sicut sunt aegritudines corporales, et tristitia et timor in anima), tamen etiam in bonum ordinantur aliquae passiones, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc delectatio dicitur passio.

Although the name of passion is [customarily considered as being] more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency (such as bodily ailments, and also sadness and fear in the soul), yet some passions are ordered to something good, as stated above (q23, a1,a4). And in this sense delight [a.k.a., pleasure,] is called a passion.

Augustinus, in IX et XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit delectationem, sive gaudium vel laetitiam, inter alias passiones animae.

Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight (i.e., joy, or happiness) among the other passions of the soul.

Motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur, sicut supra dictum est. Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem necesse est competere delectationi.

The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above (q22, a3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight.

Sicut contingit in rebus naturalibus aliqua consequi suas perfectiones naturales, ita hoc contingit in animalibus. Et quamvis moveri ad perfectionem non sit totum simul, tamen consequi naturalem perfectionem est totum simul. Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales, quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt. Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu sensitivo; et iste motus est delectatio.

Just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight.

In animali duplex motus considerari potest: unus secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum; alius secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem.

A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation.

Licet ergo in eo qui iam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset motus executionis, quo tenditur ad finem; non tamen cessat motus appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius desiderabat non habitum, ita postea delectatur in habito.

And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses.

Licet enim delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod appetitui satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab appetibili: ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est.

For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite; nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object: the formal aspect by which delight is a kind of movement.

Philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., "delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem".

According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing."

Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod delectatio est "motus animae", ponitur in genere.

By saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus.

Per hoc autem quod dicitur constitutio in existentem naturam (idest in id quod existit in natura rei), ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet praesentia connaturalis boni.

By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping with an existing nature," i.e., (with that which exists in the nature of thing), we assign the cause of delight, viz., the presence of a connatural good.

Per hoc autem quod dicitur simul tota, ostendit quod constitutio non debet accipi prout est in constitui, sed prout est in constitutum esse, quasi in termino motus: non enim delectatio est generatio, ut Plato posuit, sed magis consistit in factum esse, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.

By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the be-ing of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete [act of] be-ing," as stated in [Aristotle's] Ethic. vii, 12.

Per hoc autem quod dicitur sensibilis, excluduntur perfectiones rerum insensibilium, in quibus non est delectatio.

Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things, wherein there is no delight.

Sic ergo patet quod, cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens apprehensionem sensus, delectatio est passio animae.

It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul.

Operatio connaturalis non impedita, est perfectio secunda, ut habetur in II de anima. Et ideo, quando constituitur res in propria operatione connaturali et non impedita, sequitur delectatio, quae consistit in perfectum esse, ut dictum est. Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam.

Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion of [the act] of be-ing, as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.

1a 2ae q31: Pleasure considered in itself

1. Is pleasure a passion?
2. Is pleasure subject to time?
3. Does it differ from joy?
4. Is it in the intellectual appetite?
5. The pleasures of the higher appetite compared with the pleasure of the lower
6. Sensible pleasures compared with one another
7. Is any pleasure non-natural?
8. Can one pleasure be contrary to another?