Saturday, February 28, 2009

Q79 A7: Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?

No. Memory in the intellectual part is not a power distinct from the intellect because intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.

Memoria partis intellectivae non est alia potentia ab intellectu quia intelligentia oritur ex memoria, sicut actus ex habitu; et hoc modo etiam aequatur ei, non autem sicut potentia potentiae.

As has been said above (Q77, A3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects, since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object:

Sicut supra dictum est, potentiae animae distinguuntur secundum diversas rationes obiectorum, eo quod ratio cuiuslibet potentiae consistit in ordine ad id ad quod dicitur, quod est eius obiectum:

With regard to its formal aspect, the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species.

De ratione memoriae est, quod sit thesaurus vel locus conservativus specierum.

It has also been said above (Q59, A4) that if any power by its formal aspect be directed to an object according to the common formal aspect of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common formal aspect of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white.

Dictum est etiam supra quod, si aliqua potentia secundum propriam rationem ordinetur ad aliquod obiectum secundum communem rationem obiecti, non diversificabitur illa potentia secundum diversitates particularium differentiarum: sicut potentia visiva, quae respicit suum obiectum secundum rationem colorati, non diversificatur per diversitatem albi et nigri.

Now, the intellect regards its object under the common formal aspect of being, since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality". Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of beings.

Intellectus autem respicit suum obiectum secundum communem rationem entis, eo quod intellectus possibilis est "quo est omnia fieri". Unde secundum nullam differentiam entium, diversificatur differentia intellectus possibilis.

Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers.

Praeteritum et praesens possunt esse propriae differentiae potentiarum sensitivarum diversificativae, non autem potentiarum intellectivarum.

Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect, because as regards the same object, the active power which [formally] makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is [formally] moved by the object existing in act.

Diversificatur tamen potentia intellectus agentis, et intellectus possibilis, quia respectu eiusdem obiecti, aliud principium oportet esse potentiam activam, quae facit obiectum esse in actu; et aliud potentiam passivam, quae movetur ab obiecto in actu existente.

Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act.

Et sic potentia activa comparatur ad suum obiectum, ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia; potentia autem passiva comparatur ad suum obiectum e converso, ut ens in potentia ad ens in actu.

Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect, for it belongs to the formal aspect of its passive power to retain as well as to receive.

Sic igitur nulla alia differentia potentiarum in intellectu esse potest, nisi possibilis et agentis. Unde patet quod memoria non est alia potentia ab intellectu, ad rationem enim potentiae passivae pertinet conservare, sicut et recipere.

Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent."

Quamvis in III dist. I Sent. dicatur quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sint tres vires, tamen hoc non est secundum intentionem Augustini, qui expresse dicit in XIV de Trin., quod "si accipiatur memoria, intelligentia et voluntas, secundum quod semper praesto sunt animae, sive cogitentur sive non cogitentur, ad solam memoriam pertinere videntur. Intelligentiam autem nunc dico qua intelligimus cogitantes; et eam voluntatem, sive amorem vel dilectionem, quae istam prolem parentemque coniungit."

Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers: but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.

Ex quo patet quod ista tria non accipit Augustinus pro tribus potentiis: sed memoriam accipit pro habituali animae retentione, intelligentiam autem pro actu intellectus; voluntatem autem pro actu voluntatis.

Friday, February 27, 2009

Q79 A6: Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?

Yes. Memory does belong to the intellectual part of the soul because whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration.

Memoria pertinet ad partem animae intellectivam quia sciens in habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu.

The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act.

Species intelligibilis aliquando est in intellectu in potentia tantum, et tunc dicitur intellectus esse in potentia. Aliquando autem secundum ultimam completionem actus, et tunc intelligit actu. Aliquando medio modo se habet inter potentiam et actum, et tunc dicitur esse intellectus in habitu. Et secundum hunc modum intellectus conservat species, etiam quando actu non intelligit.

Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united, since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect."

Memoria, secundum quod est conservativa specierum, non est nobis pecoribusque communis. Species enim conservantur non in parte animae sensitiva tantum, sed magis in coniuncto, cum vis memorativa sit actus organi cuiusdam. Sed intellectus secundum seipsum est conservativus specierum, praeter concomitantiam organi corporalis. Unde philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod "anima est locus specierum, non tota, sed intellectus".

For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect.

Quod enim recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo secundum modum recipientis. Intellectus autem est magis stabilis naturae et immobilis, quam materia corporalis. Si ergo materia corporalis formas quas recipit, non solum tenet dum per eas agit in actu, sed etiam postquam agere per eas cessaverit, multo fortius intellectus immobiliter et inamissibiliter recipit species intelligibiles, sive a sensibilibus acceptas, sive etiam ab aliquo superiori intellectu effluxas.

Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object to be something past, as past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For the past, as past, is something individual, since it signifies being under a particular condition of fixed time.

Sic igitur, si memoria accipiatur solum pro vi conservativa specierum, oportet dicere memoriam esse in intellectiva parte. Si vero de ratione memoriae sit quod eius obiectum sit praeteritum, ut praeteritum, memoria in parte intellectiva non erit, sed sensitiva tantum, quae est apprehensiva particularium. Praeteritum enim, ut praeteritum, cum significet esse sub determinato tempore, ad conditionem particularis pertinet.

The condition of past may be referred to two things: namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present sensible, wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing.

Praeteritio potest ad duo referri, scilicet ad obiectum quod cognoscitur; et ad cognitionis actum. Quae quidem duo simul coniunguntur in parte sensitiva, quae est apprehensiva alicuius per hoc quod immutatur a praesenti sensibili, unde simul animal memoratur se prius sensisse in praeterito, et se sensisse quoddam praeteritum sensibile.

But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man; and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow.

Sed quantum ad partem intellectivam pertinet, praeteritio accidit, et non per se convenit, ex parte obiecti intellectus. Intelligit enim intellectus hominem, inquantum est homo; homini autem, inquantum est homo, accidit vel in praesenti vel in praeterito vel in futuro esse. Ex parte vero actus, praeteritio per se accipi potest etiam in intellectu, sicut in sensu. Quia intelligere animae nostrae est quidam particularis actus, in hoc vel in illo tempore existens, secundum quod dicitur homo intelligere nunc vel heri vel cras.

And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect (Q76, A1); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future.

Et hoc non repugnat intellectualitati, quia huiusmodi intelligere, quamvis sit quoddam particulare, tamen est immaterialis actus, ut supra de intellectu dictum est; et ideo sicut intelligit seipsum intellectus, quamvis ipse sit quidam singularis intellectus, ita intelligit suum intelligere, quod est singularis actus vel in praeterito vel in praesenti vel in futuro existens.

In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the past as something "here" and "now."

Sic igitur salvatur ratio memoriae, quantum ad hoc quod est praeteritorum, in intellectu, secundum quod intelligit se prius intellexisse, non autem secundum quod intelligit praeteritum, prout est hic et nunc.

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory, understanding, and will are one mind."

Augustinus dicit, X de Trin., quod "memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una mens".

Thursday, February 26, 2009

Q79 A5: Whether the active intellect is one in all?

No. The same active intellect is not in various men because it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances.

Non est idem intellectus agens in diversis hominibus quia non potest esse quod una et eadem virtus numero sit diversarum substantiarum.

If the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above (Q76, A2).

Si autem intellectus agens sit aliquid animae, ut quaedam virtus ipsius, necesse est dicere quod sint plures intellectus agentes, secundum pluralitatem animarum, quae multiplicantur secundum multiplicationem hominum, ut supra dictum est.

The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (Q79, A4). For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all.

Veritas huius quaestionis dependet ex praemissis. Si enim intellectus agens non esset aliquid animae, sed esset quaedam substantia separata, unus esset intellectus agens omnium hominum. Et hoc intelligunt qui ponunt unitatem intellectus agentis.

All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect.

Omnia quae sunt unius speciei, communicant in actione consequente naturam speciei, et per consequens in virtute, quae est actionis principium, non quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Cognoscere autem prima intelligibilia est actio consequens speciem humanam. Unde oportet quod omnes homines communicent in virtute quae est principium huius actionis, et haec est virtus intellectus agentis.

But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light.

Non tamen oportet quod sit eadem numero in omnibus. Oportet tamen quod ab uno principio in omnibus derivetur. Et sic illa communicatio hominum in primis intelligibilibus, demonstrat unitatem intellectus separati, quem Plato comparat soli; non autem unitatem intellectus agentis, quem Aristoteles comparat lumini.

The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things enlightened.

Philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est sicut lumen. Non autem est idem lumen in diversis illuminatis.

The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by "abstracting" it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it "abstracts" the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.

Intellectus agens causat universale "abstrahendo" a materia. Ad hoc autem non requiritur quod sit unus in omnibus habentibus intellectum, sed quod sit unus in omnibus secundum habitudinem ad omnia a quibus "abstrahit" universale, respectu quorum universale est unum. Et hoc competit intellectui agenti inquantum est immaterialis.

The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than the patient."

Philosophus probat intellectum agentem esse separatum, per hoc quod possibilis est separatus; quia, ut ipse dicit, "agens est honorabilius patiente".

Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a separate substance.

Intellectus autem possibilis dicitur separatus, quia non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. Et secundum hunc modum etiam intellectus agens dicitur separatus, non quasi sit aliqua substantia separata.

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Q79 A4: Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?

Yes. In the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms, and we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible; but the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul, because no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein, as we have said above of the passive intellect (Q76, A1).

In ipsa sit aliqua virtus derivata a superiori intellectu, per quam possit phantasmata illustrare, et hoc experimento cognoscimus, dum percipimus nos abstrahere formas universales a conditionibus particularibus, quod est facere actu intelligibilia; oportet virtutem quae est principium huius actionis, esse aliquid in anima, quia nulla actio convenit alicui rei, nisi per aliquod principium formaliter ei inhaerens, ut supra dictum est, cum de intellectu possibili ageretur.

There must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.

Oportet ergo esse aliquem altiorem intellectum, quo anima iuvetur ad intelligendum.

Some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible.

Posuerunt ergo quidam hunc intellectum secundum substantiam separatum, esse intellectum agentem, qui quasi illustrando phantasmata, facit ea intelligibilia actu. Sed, dato quod sit aliquis talis intellectus agens separatus, nihilominus tamen oportet ponere in ipsa anima humana aliquam virtutem ab illo intellectu superiori participatam, per quam anima humana facit intelligibilia in actu.

But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (Q90, A3; I-II, Q3, A7). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Psalm 4:7, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us."

Sed intellectus separatus, secundum nostrae fidei documenta, est ipse Deus, qui est creator animae, et in quo solo beatificatur, ut infra patebit. Unde ab ipso anima humana lumen intellectuale participat, secundum illud Psalmi IV, "signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, domine."

That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power.

Illa lux vera illuminat sicut causa universalis, a qua anima humana participat quandam particularem virtutem, ut dictum est.

Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.

Cum essentia animae sit immaterialis, a supremo intellectu creata, nihil prohibet virtutem quae a supremo intellectu participatur, per quam abstrahit a materia, ab essentia ipsius procedere, sicut et alias eius potentias.

The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species.

Anima intellectiva est quidem actu immaterialis, sed est in potentia ad determinatas species rerum.

Phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter, which power is called the "active intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect", by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.

Phantasmata autem, e converso, sunt quidem actu similitudines specierum quarundam, sed sunt potentia immaterialia. Unde nihil prohibet unam et eandem animam, inquantum est immaterialis in actu, habere aliquam virtutem per quam faciat immaterialia in actu abstrahendo a conditionibus individualis materiae, quae quidem virtus dicitur intellectus agens; et aliam virtutem receptivam huiusmodi specierum, quae dicitur intellectus possibilis, inquantum est in potentia ad huiusmodi species.

The active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act, for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions.

Nunc autem non se habet ut obiectum, sed ut faciens obiecta in actu, ad quod requiritur, praeter praesentiam intellectus agentis, praesentia phantasmatum, et bona dispositio virium sensitivarum, et exercitium in huiusmodi opere; quia per unum intellectum fiunt etiam alia intellecta, sicut per terminos propositiones, et per prima principia conclusiones.

The human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power, a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act.

Anima autem humana intellectiva dicitur per participationem intellectualis virtutis, cuius signum est, quod non tota est intellectiva, sed secundum aliquam sui partem. Pertingit etiam ad intelligentiam veritatis cum quodam discursu et motu, arguendo. Habet etiam imperfectam intelligentiam; tum quia non omnia intelligit, tum quia in his quae intelligit, de potentia procedit ad actum.

The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active intellect, "to be in the soul."

Philosophus dicit, III de anima quod "necesse est in anima has esse differentias", scilicet intellectum possibilem, et agentem.

Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active intellect is a "substance in actual being."

Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus agens est "substantia actu ens".

Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light. Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii.

Aristoteles comparavit intellectum agentem lumini. Plato autem intellectum separatum imprimentem in animas nostras, comparavit soli; ut Themistius dicit in commentario tertii de anima.

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Q79 A3: Whether there is an active intellect?

Yes. We must assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions, because nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act, as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible.

Oportebat ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus quia nihil autem reducitur de potentia in actum, nisi per aliquod ens actu, sicut sensus fit in actu per sensibile in actu.

Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive.

Sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam, et ideo non oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva, omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et aliquid passivum.

Light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing.

Lumen requiritur ad visum, ut faciat colores actu visibiles. Et secundum hoc, similiter requiritur, et propter idem, intellectus agens ad intelligendum, propter quod lumen ad videndum.

The intelligible in act is not something existing in nature, if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.

Intelligibile autem in actu non est aliquid existens in rerum natura, quantum ad naturam rerum sensibilium, quae non subsistunt praeter materiam. Et ideo ad intelligendum non sufficeret immaterialitas intellectus possibilis, nisi adesset intellectus agens, qui faceret intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis.

According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible, but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect. For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible, since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial.

Secundum opinionem Platonis, nulla necessitas erat ponere intellectum agentem ad faciendum intelligibilia in actu, sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti ... Posuit enim Plato formas rerum naturalium sine materia subsistere, et per consequens eas intelligibiles esse, quia ex hoc est aliquid intelligibile actu, quod est immateriale.

And he called such forms "species" or "ideas", from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species; and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things.

Et huiusmodi vocabat "species", sive "ideas", ex quarum participatione dicebat etiam materiam corporalem formari, ad hoc quod individua naturaliter constituerentur in propriis generibus et speciebus; et intellectus nostros, ad hoc quod de generibus et speciebus rerum scientiam haberent.

But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible, it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible.

Sed quia Aristoteles non posuit formas rerum naturalium subsistere sine materia, formae autem in materia existentes non sunt intelligibiles actu, sequebatur quod naturae seu formae rerum sensibilium, quas intelligimus, non essent intelligibiles actu.

The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things."

Philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod "sicut in omni natura ita et in anima est aliquid quo est omnia fieri, et aliquid quo est omnia facere".

Monday, February 23, 2009

Q79 A2: Whether the intellect is a passive power?

Yes. The intellect is a passive power and it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive" because whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected.

Intellectus est potentia passiva et patet quod intelligere nostrum est quoddam pati quia omne quod exit de potentia in actum, potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur.

The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing; but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole of universal being; while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular being, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active one.

Agens est nobilius patiente, si ad idem actio et passio referantur; non autem semper, si ad diversa. Intellectus autem est vis passiva respectu totius entis universalis. Vegetativum autem est activum respectu cuiusdam entis particularis, scilicet corporis coniuncti. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi passivum esse nobilius tali activo.

The intellect, as we have seen above (Q78, A1), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being; and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act.

Intellectus enim, sicut supra dictum est, habet operationem circa ens in universali. Considerari ergo potest utrum intellectus sit in actu vel potentia, ex hoc quod consideratur quomodo intellectus se habeat ad ens universale. Invenitur enim aliquis intellectus qui ad ens universale se habet sicut actus totius entis; et talis est intellectus divinus, qui est Dei essentia, in qua originaliter et virtualiter totum ens praeexistit sicut in prima causa. Et ideo intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed est actus purus.

But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole of universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible (by reason of its very existence as created) but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act.

Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest se habere ut actus respectu totius entis universalis; quia sic oporteret quod esset ens infinitum. Unde omnis intellectus creatus (per hoc ipsum quod est) non est actus omnium intelligibilium, sed comparatur ad ipsa intelligibilia sicut potentia ad actum.

Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act, as with the matter of the heavenly bodies (Q58, A1). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated.

Potentia autem dupliciter se habet ad actum. Est enim quaedam potentia quae semper est perfecta per actum, sicut diximus de materia corporum caelestium. Quaedam autem potentia est, quae non semper est in actu, sed de potentia procedit in actum; sicut invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus.

Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above.

Intellectus igitur angelicus semper est in actu suorum intelligibilium, propter propinquitatem ad primum intellectum, qui est actus purus, ut supra dictum est.

But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written", as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually.

Intellectus autem humanus, qui est infimus in ordine intellectuum, et maxime remotus a perfectione divini intellectus, est in potentia respectu intelligibilium, et in principio est "sicut tabula rasa in qua nihil est scriptum", ut philosophus dicit in III de anima. Quod manifeste apparet ex hoc, quod in principio sumus intelligentes solum in potentia, postmodum autem efficimur intelligentes in actu.

The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is in a way to be passive." To be passive may be taken in three ways.

Philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod "intelligere est pati quoddam". Pati tripliciter dicitur.

Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination; as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad.

Uno modo, propriissime, scilicet quando aliquid removetur ab eo quod convenit sibi secundum naturam, aut secundum propriam inclinationem; sicut cum aqua frigiditatem amittit per calefactionem, et cum homo aegrotat aut tristatur.

Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved.

Secundo modo, minus proprie dicitur aliquis pati ex eo quod aliquid ab ipso abiicitur, sive sit ei conveniens, sive non conveniens. Et secundum hoc dicitur pati non solum qui aegrotat, sed etiam qui sanatur; non solum qui tristatur, sed etiam qui laetatur; vel quocumque modo aliquis alteretur vel moveatur.

Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything.

Tertio modo, dicitur aliquid pati communiter, ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia ad aliquid, recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abiiciatur.

"Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of "passive intellect" to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the two first senses, inasmuch as this so-called "intellect" is the act of a corporeal organ.

"Intellectus passivus" secundum quosdam dicitur appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt animae passiones; qui etiam in I Ethic. dicitur "rationalis per participationem", quia "obedit rationi". Secundum alios autem "intellectus passivus" dicitur virtus cogitativa, quae nominatur "ratio particularis". Et utroque modo "passivum" accipi potest secundum primos duos modos passionis, inquantum talis "intellectus" sic dictus, est actus alicuius organi corporalis.

But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense, because it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible.

Sed intellectus qui est in potentia ad intelligibilia, quem Aristoteles ob hoc nominat intellectum "possibilem", non est passivus nisi tertio modo, quia non est actus organi corporalis. Et ideo est incorruptibilis.

Sunday, February 22, 2009

Q79 A1: Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?

Yes. The intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul, because in God alone is His intellect His essence; while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power.

Intellectus sit aliqua potentia animae, et non ipsa animae essentia quia in solo Deo intellectus est eius essentia; in aliis autem creaturis intellectualibus intellectus est quaedam potentia intelligentis.

For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its be-ing; for as power is to operation as to its act, so is the essence to be-ing. But in God alone His action of understanding is His very be-ing.

Tunc enim solum immediatum principium operationis est ipsa essentia rei operantis, quando ipsa operatio est eius esse, sicut enim potentia se habet ad operationem ut ad suum actum, ita se habet essentia ad esse. In solo Deo autem idem est intelligere quod suum esse.

In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powers.

In Angelis non est alia vis nisi intellectiva, et voluntas, quae ad intellectum consequitur. Et propter hoc Angelus dicitur "mens" vel "intellectus", quia tota virtus sua in hoc consistit. Anima autem habet multas alias vires, sicut sensitivas et nutritivas, et ideo non est simile.

The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; rather, through its immateriality it has the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.

Ipsa immaterialitas substantiae intelligentis creatae non est eius intellectus; sed ex immaterialitate habet virtutem ad intelligendum. Unde non oportet quod intellectus sit substantia animae, sed eius virtus et potentia.

Q79: The intellectual powers

  1. Is the intellect a power of the soul, or its essence?
  2. If it be a power, is it a passive power?
  3. If it is a passive power, is there an active intellect?
  4. Is it something in the soul?
  5. Is the active intellect one in all?
  6. Is memory in the intellect?
  7. Is the memory distinct from the intellect?
  8. Is the reason a distinct power from the intellect?
  9. Are the superior and inferior reason distinct powers?
  10. Is the intelligence distinct from the intellect?
  11. Are the speculative and practical intellect distinct powers?
  12. Is "synderesis" a power of the intellectual part?
  13. Is the conscience a power of the intellectual part?

Saturday, February 21, 2009

Q78 A4: Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?

Yes. Because the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them.

Cum potentia sensitiva sit actus organi corporalis, oportet esse aliam potentiam quae recipiat species sensibilium, et quae conservet.

If an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror.

Si animal moveretur solum propter delectabile et contristabile secundum sensum, non esset necessarium ponere in animali nisi apprehensionem formarum quas percipit sensus, in quibus delectatur aut horret.

But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy; and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest.

Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta, sicut ovis videns lupum venientem fugit, non propter indecentiam coloris vel figurae, sed quasi inimicum naturae; et similiter avis colligit paleam, non quia delectet sensum, sed quia est utilis ad nidificandum.

Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions.

Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior. Et huius perceptionis oportet esse aliquod aliud principium, cum perceptio formarum sensibilium sit ex immutatione sensibilis, non autem perceptio intentionum praedictarum.

Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper sense" and (1) the "common sense" are appointed.

Sic ergo ad receptionem formarum sensibilium ordinatur sensus proprius et communis.

The interior sense is called "common" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.

Sensus interior non dicitur communis per praedicationem, sicut genus; sed sicut communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum.

The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between two things must know both.

Sensus proprius iudicat de sensibili proprio, discernendo ipsum ab aliis quae cadunt sub eodem sensu, sicut discernendo album a nigro vel a viridi. Sed discernere album a dulci non potest neque visus neque gustus, quia oportet quod qui inter aliqua discernit, utrumque cognoscat.

Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.

Unde oportet ad sensum communem pertinere discretionis iudicium, ad quem referantur, sicut ad communem terminum, omnes apprehensiones sensuum; a quo etiam percipiantur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in sensu communi, qui visionem percipit.

But for the retention and preservation of these forms, (2) the "phantasy" or "imagination" is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses.

Ad harum autem formarum retentionem aut conservationem ordinatur phantasia, sive imaginatio, quae idem sunt, est enim phantasia sive imaginatio quasi thesaurus quidam formarum per sensum acceptarum.

Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, (3.a) the "estimative" power is appointed.

Ad apprehendendum autem intentiones quae per sensum non accipiuntur, ordinatur vis aestimativa.

Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.

Licet intellectus operatio oriatur a sensu, tamen in re apprehensa per sensum intellectus multa cognoscit quae sensus percipere non potest. Et similiter aestimativa, licet inferiori modo.

And for the preservation thereof, (4.a) the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise.

Ad conservandum autem eas, vis memorativa, quae est thesaurus quidam huiusmodi intentionum. Cuius signum est, quod principium memorandi fit in animalibus ex aliqua huiusmodi intentione, puta quod est nocivum vel conveniens.

And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.

Et ipsa ratio praeteriti, quam attendit memoria, inter huiusmodi intentiones computatur.

Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of a certain collation.

Considerandum est autem quod, quantum ad formas sensibiles, non est differentia inter hominem et alia animalia, similiter enim immutantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Sed quantum ad intentiones praedictas, differentia est, nam alia animalia percipiunt huiusmodi intentiones solum naturali quodam instinctu, homo autem etiam per quandam collationem.

Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called (3.b) the "cogitative," which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head; for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions.

Et ideo quae in aliis animalibus dicitur aestimativa naturalis, in homine dicitur cogitativa, quae per collationem quandam huiusmodi intentiones adinvenit. Unde etiam dicitur ratio particularis, cui medici assignant determinatum organum, scilicet mediam partem capitis; est enim collativa intentionum individualium, sicut ratio intellectiva intentionum universalium.

As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also (4.b) "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions.

Ex parte autem memorativae, non solum habet memoriam, sicut cetera animalia, in subita recordatione praeteritorum; sed etiam reminiscentiam, quasi syllogistice inquirendo praeteritorum memoriam, secundum individuales intentiones.

The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.

Illam eminentiam habet cogitativa et memorativa in homine, non per id quod est proprium sensitivae partis; sed per aliquam affinitatem et propinquitatem ad rationem universalem, secundum quandam refluentiam. Et ideo non sunt aliae vires, sed eaedem, perfectiores quam sint in aliis animalibus.

So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part--namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.

Et sic non est necesse ponere nisi quatuor vires interiores sensitivae partis, scilicet sensum communem et imaginationem, aestimativam et memorativam.

Friday, February 20, 2009

Q78 A3: Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?

Yes. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is no other besides the five senses." The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and "per se."

Philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod "non est alter sensus praeter quinque". Accipienda est ratio numeri et distinctionis exteriorum sensuum, secundum illud quod proprie et per se ad sensum pertinet.

Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is "per se" perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.

Est autem sensus quaedam potentia passiva, quae nata est immutari ab exteriori sensibili. Exterius ergo immutativum est quod per se a sensu percipitur, et secundum cuius diversitatem sensitivae potentiae distinguuntur.

Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration.

Est autem duplex immutatio, una naturalis, et alia spiritualis. Naturalis quidem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse naturale, sicut calor in calefacto. Spiritualis autem, secundum quod forma immutantis recipitur in immutato secundum esse spirituale; ut forma coloris in pupilla, quae non fit per hoc colorata. Ad operationem autem sensus requiritur immutatio spiritualis, per quam intentio formae sensibilis fiat in organo sensus. Alioquin, si sola immutatio naturalis sufficeret ad sentiendum, omnia corpora naturalia sentirent dum alterantur.

For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect.

Non enim potentiae sunt propter organa, sed organa propter potentias, unde non propter hoc sunt diversae potentiae, quia sunt diversa organa; sed ideo natura instituit diversitatem in organis, ut congruerent diversitati potentiarum. Et similiter diversa media diversis sensibus attribuit, secundum quod erat conveniens ad actus potentiarum. Naturas autem sensibilium qualitatum cognoscere non est sensus, sed intellectus.

Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper sensibles," which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses.

Magnitudo et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia propria, quae sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo et per se immutant sensum; cum sint qualitates alterantes. Sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero, patet quod sunt species quantitatis. Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem; cum consistat ratio figurae in terminatione magnitudinis. Motus autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod subiectum uno modo vel pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subiecti vel localis distantiae, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem; vel etiam secundum sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis, et sic sentire motum et quietem est quodammodo sentire unum et multa. Quantitas autem est proximum subiectum qualitatis alterativae, ut superficies coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis; ut superficies ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt sensibilia per accidens, quia huiusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione sensus.

Thursday, February 19, 2009

Q78 A2: Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?

Yes. The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said (Q78 A1), has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required.

Tres sunt potentiae vegetativae partis. Vegetativum enim, ut dictum est, habet pro obiecto ipsum corpus vivens per animam, ad quod quidem corpus triplex animae operatio est necessaria.

One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the "generative" power.

Una quidem, per quam esse acquirat, et ad hoc ordinatur potentia generativa.

Another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the "augmentative" power.

Alia vero, per quam corpus vivum acquirit debitam quantitatem, et ad hoc ordinatur vis augmentativa.

Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the "nutritive" power.

Alia vero, per quam corpus viventis salvatur et in esse, et in quantitate debita, et ad hoc ordinatur vis nutritiva.

We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul.

Est tamen quaedam differentia attendenda inter has potentias. Nam nutritiva et augmentativa habent suum effectum in eo in quo sunt, quia ipsum corpus unitum animae augetur et conservatur per vim augmentativam et nutritivam in eadem anima existentem.

But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii).

Sed vis generativa habet effectum suum, non in eodem corpore, sed in alio, quia nihil est generativum sui ipsius. Et ideo vis generativa quodammodo appropinquat ad dignitatem animae sensitivae, quae habet operationem in res exteriores, licet excellentiori modo et universaliori, supremum enim inferioris naturae attingit id quod est infimum superioris, ut patet per Dionysium, in VII cap. de Div. Nom.

Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to "produce another like unto itself." And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive.

Et ideo inter istas tres potentias finalior et principalior et perfectior est generativa, ut dicitur in II de anima, est enim rei iam perfectae "facere alteram qualis ipsa est". Generativae autem deserviunt et augmentativa et nutritiva, augmentativae vero nutritiva.

The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf. De Anima iii, 9) "growth."

Philosophus dicit, in II de anima, quod opera huius animae sunt "generare, et alimento uti, et iterum augmentum facere".

Wednesday, February 18, 2009

Q78 A1: Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?

Yes. There are five genera of powers of the soul because the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects.

Quinque sunt genera potentiarum animae, quae numerata sunt, quia genera potentiarum animae distinguuntur secundum obiecta.

But the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called "vegetative" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more universal object--namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a still more universal object--namely, not only the sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner.

Obiectum autem operationis animae in triplici ordine potest considerari. Alicuius enim potentiae animae obiectum est solum corpus animae unitum. Et hoc genus potentiarum animae dicitur vegetativum, non enim vegetativa potentia agit nisi in corpus cui anima unitur. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit universalius obiectum, scilicet omne corpus sensibile; et non solum corpus animae unitum. Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae, quod respicit adhuc universalius obiectum, scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed universaliter omne ens. Ex quo patet quod ista duo secunda genera potentiarum animae habent operationem non solum respectu rei coniunctae, sed etiam respectu rei extrinsecae. Cum autem operans oporteat aliquo modo coniungi suo obiecto circa quod operatur, necesse est extrinsecam rem, quae est obiectum operationis animae, secundum duplicem rationem ad animam comparari.

First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers --namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less common object--the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard to the most common object--universal being.

Uno modo, secundum quod nata est animae coniungi et in anima esse per suam similitudinem. Et quantum ad hoc, sunt duo genera potentiarum, scilicet sensitivum, respectu obiecti minus communis, quod est corpus sensibile; et intellectivum, respectu obiecti communissimi, quod est ens universale.

Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one--the "appetitive"--in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the other--the "locomotive" power--in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions.

Alio vero modo, secundum quod ipsa anima inclinatur et tendit in rem exteriorem. Et secundum hanc etiam comparationem, sunt duo genera potentiarum animae, unum quidem, scilicet appetitivum, secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem extrinsecam ut ad finem, qui est primum in intentione; aliud autem motivum secundum locum, prout anima comparatur ad rem exteriorem sicut ad terminum operationis et motus; ad consequendum enim aliquod desideratum et intentum, omne animal movetur.

The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power--namely, men. But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii, 3).

Modi vero vivendi distinguuntur secundum gradus viventium. Quaedam enim viventia sunt, in quibus est tantum vegetativum, sicut in plantis. Quaedam vero, in quibus cum vegetativo est etiam sensitivum, non tamen motivum secundum locum; sicut sunt immobilia animalia, ut conchilia. Quaedam vero sunt, quae supra hoc habent motivum secundum locum; ut perfecta animalia, quae multis indigent ad suam vitam, et ideo indigent motu, ut vitae necessaria procul posita quaerere possint. Quaedam vero viventia sunt, in quibus cum his est intellectivum, scilicet in hominibus. Appetitivum autem non constituit aliquem gradum viventium, quia in quibuscumque est sensus, est etiam appetitus, ut dicitur in II libro de anima.

The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive, and the intellectual."

Philosophus dicit, in II de anima, "potentias autem dicimus vegetativum, sensitivum, appetitivum, motivum secundum locum, et intellectivum."

Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes of living.

Tres vero dicuntur animae. Quatuor vero dicuntur modi vivendi.

Q78: The specific powers of the soul

  1. The powers of the soul considered generally
  2. The various species of the vegetative part
  3. The exterior senses
  4. The interior senses

Tuesday, February 17, 2009

Q77 A8: Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?

No. The body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain because accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject.

Defuncta carne, potentiae sensitivae non manent quia destructo subiecto, non potest accidens remanere.

Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root.

Unde, corrupto coniuncto, non manent huiusmodi potentiae actu; sed virtute tantum manent in anima, sicut in principio vel radice.

All the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle.

Omnes potentiae animae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad principium.

But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject: the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body.

Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subiectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. Et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore destructo.

But other powers are subjected in the composite: all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts.

Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae.

These powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.

Talium potentiarum nulla est actio nisi per organum corporeum.

Monday, February 16, 2009

Q77 A7: Whether one power of the soul arises from another?

Yes. One power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another because those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle.

Una potentia animae ab essentia animae procedit mediante alia quod potentiae animae quae sunt priores secundum ordinem perfectionis et naturae, sint principia aliarum per modum finis et activi principii.

As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another.

Sicut potentia animae ab essentia fluit, non per transmutationem, sed per naturalem quandam resultationem, et est simul cum anima; ita est etiam de una potentia respectu alterius.

The essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together with the body; and the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect.

Essentia animae comparatur ad potentias et sicut principium activum et finale, et sicut principium susceptivum, vel seorsum per se vel simul cum corpore; agens autem et finis est perfectius, susceptivum autem principium, inquantum huiusmodi, est minus perfectum.

Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses.

Potentiae cognoscuntur per actus. Sed actus unius potentiae causatur ab alio; sicut actus phantasiae ab actu sensus.

For we see that the senses are for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect.

Videmus enim quod sensus est propter intellectum, et non e converso. Sensus etiam est quaedam deficiens participatio intellectus, unde secundum naturalem originem quodammodo est ab intellectu, sicut imperfectum a perfecto.

But considered as receptive principles, the more imperfect powers, conversely, are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence.

Sed secundum viam susceptivi principii, e converso potentiae imperfectiores inveniuntur principia respectu aliarum, sicut anima, secundum quod habet potentiam sensitivam, consideratur sicut subiectum et materiale quoddam respectu intellectus.

On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man.

Et propter hoc, imperfectiores potentiae sunt priores in via generationis, prius enim animal generatur quam homo.

The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things.

Potentiae animae opponuntur ad invicem oppositione perfecti et imperfecti; sicut etiam species numerorum et figurarum. Haec autem oppositio non impedit originem unius ab alio, quia imperfecta naturaliter a perfectis procedunt.

Sunday, February 15, 2009

Q77 A6: Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?

Yes. The powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause because the composite is actual by the soul.

Potentiae animae procedunt ab eius essentia sicut a causa quia compositum est in actu per animam.

All the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle.

Omnes potentiae animae, sive subiectum earum sit anima sola, sive compositum, fluunt ab essentia animae sicut a principio.

From the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers, and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.

Ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae potentiae; tum propter ordinem potentiarum, tum etiam secundum diversitatem organorum corporalium.

The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4).

Potentiae animae sunt quaedam proprietates naturales ipsius. Sed subiectum est causa propriorum accidentium, unde et ponitur in definitione accidentis, ut patet in VII Metaphys.

The accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality.

Accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.

Now it is clear, from what has been said (Q77, A5), that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (Q77, A1, RO6); or else this subject is the composite.

Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod potentiarum animae subiectum est vel ipsa anima sola, quae potest esse subiectum accidentis secundum quod habet aliquid potentialitatis, ut supra dictum est; vel compositum.

The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects.

Forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et partim differunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu. Differunt autem in duobus.

First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential.

Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum.

But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being.

Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens, subiectum enim eius est ens in actu.

Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject, and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its subject.

Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto, et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto.

On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject.

Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali, unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti.

So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form; but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only: the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent.

Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis; inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum. Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente; nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum: productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum.

Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject.

Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia, cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti.

The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another.

Emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem, sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem; sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat.

From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients.

Ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere ordine quodam. Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium.

The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident.

Subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis.

From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof.

Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarundam autem sicut susceptivum.

Saturday, February 14, 2009

Q77 A5: Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?

No. The soul alone is not the subject of all the powers because the subject of operative power is that which is able to operate (for every accident denominates its proper subject).

Non sola anima est subiectum omnium potentiarum suarum quia illud est subiectum operativae potentiae, quod est potens operari (omne enim accidens denominat proprium subiectum).

All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations.

Omnes potentiae dicuntur esse animae, non sicut subiecti, sed sicut principii, quia per animam coniunctum habet quod tales operationes operari possit.

The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that "sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite." Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its subject.

Philosophus dicit, in libro de somno et vigilia quod "sentire non est proprium animae neque corporis, sed coniuncti". Potentia ergo sensitiva est in coniuncto sicut in subiecto.

Now the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia.

Idem autem est quod potest operari, et quod operatur. Unde oportet quod eius sit potentia sicut subiecti, cuius est operatio; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in principio de somno et vigilia.

Some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers which are the principles of these operations are in the soul as their subject.

Quaedam operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur sine organo corporali, ut intelligere et velle. Unde potentiae quae sunt harum operationum principia, sunt in anima sicut in subiecto.

But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of such operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone.

Quaedam vero operationes sunt animae, quae exercentur per organa corporalia; sicut visio per oculum, et auditus per aurem. Et simile est de omnibus aliis operationibus nutritivae et sensitivae partis. Et ideo potentiae quae sunt talium operationum principia, sunt in coniuncto sicut in subiecto, et non in anima sola.

Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now, in many things relating to philosophy, Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body.

Opinio Platonis fuit quod sentire est operatio animae propria, sicut et intelligere. In multis autem quae ad philosophiam pertinent, Augustinus utitur opinionibus Platonis, non asserendo, sed recitando: Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima quaedam sentit non per corpus, immo sine corpore, ut est timor et huiusmodi; quaedam vero sentit per corpus.

When it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways.

Hoc quod dicitur anima quaedam sentire cum corpore et quaedam sine corpore, dupliciter potest intelligi.

Firstly, the words "with the body or without the body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ.

Uno modo, quod hoc quod dico "cum corpore vel sine corpore", determinet actum sentiendi secundum quod exit a sentiente. Et sic nihil sentit sine corpore, quia actio sentiendi non potest procedere ab anima nisi per organum corporale.

Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing something.

Alio modo potest intelligi ita quod praedicta determinent actum sentiendi ex parte obiecti quod sentitur. Et sic quaedam sentit cum corpore, idest in corpore existentia, sicut cum sentit vulnus vel aliquid huiusmodi, quaedam vero sentit sine corpore, idest non existentia in corpore, sed solum in apprehensione animae, sicut cum sentit se tristari vel gaudere de aliquo audito.

All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.

Omnes huiusmodi potentiae per prius sunt in anima quam in coniuncto, non sicut in subiecto, sed sicut in principio.