Contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes esse contrarias quia nil prohibet duo bona esse ad invicem contraria, sicut calidum et frigidum, quorum unum est bonum igni, alterum aquae.
It happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to another because nothing prevents one good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is the good of fire, the latter, of water.
Sed hoc in bono virtutis esse non potest, quia bonum virtutis non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum: scilicet rationem.
That this is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good is not received except through conformity to some one thing: namely, formal aspect.
Delectatio se habet in affectibus animae, sicut quies naturalis in corporibus, est enim in aliquo convenienti et quasi connaturali.
Delight, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies, because its object is something befitting and connatural, so to speak.
Dicuntur autem duae quietes esse contrariae, quae sunt in contrariis terminis; sicut "quies quae est sursum, ei quae est deorsum", ut dicitur V Physic.
Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6).
Ea in quibus delectamur, cum sint obiecta delectationis, non solum faciunt differentiam materialem, sed etiam formalem, si sit diversa ratio delectabilitatis. Diversa enim ratio obiecti diversificat speciem actus vel passionis, ut ex supradictis patet.
The things in which we take delight, since they are the objects of delight, cause not only a material, but also a formal difference, if the formal aspect of delectability be different. Because difference in the formal aspect of the object causes a specific difference in acts and passions, as stated above (q23, a1,a4; q30, a2).
Quaedam delectationes se invicem impediunt ut dicitur in X Ethic.
Some pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5.