Sunday, June 06, 2010

1a 2ae q34 a2: Whether every pleasure is good? No.

Non omne delectabile est bonum bonitate morali (quae attenditur secundum rationem) quia delectabile dicitur secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendit quod non est conveniens rationi.

Not every delight is good with moral goodness (which depends on the order of formal aspect) because the delectable depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which does not conform with formal aspect.

Honestum et utile dicuntur secundum rationem, et ideo nihil est honestum vel utile, quod non sit bonum.

The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with formal aspect, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being good.

Sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas. Qui ex hoc decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguebant inter id quod est bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quoad hunc.

While some of the Stoics maintained that all delights are evil, the Epicureans held that delight is good in itself, and that consequently all delights are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual.

Ideo delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, quia est quies in fine. Finem autem contingit esse bonum et malum; quamvis nunquam sit finis nisi secundum quod est bonum quoad hunc. Ita etiam est de delectatione.

The reason why delight is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except insofar as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with regard to delight.

Hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum; ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona.

All things seek delight in the same way as they seek good, since delight is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself good and truly good; so not every delight is of itself good and truly good.