Si dolor accipiatur communiter, sic dolor est genus tristitiae, quia quaecumque cadunt sub exteriori apprehensione, cadunt sub interiori, sed non e converso: sicut illa delectatio quae ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, delectatio quidem nominatur, non autem gaudium; ita ille dolor qui ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, nominatur quidem dolor, non autem tristitia.
If pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sadness, because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely: just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure, but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed, but not sadness.
Sensus exterior non percipit nisi praesens; vis autem cognitiva interior potest percipere praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Et ideo tristitia potest esse de praesenti, praeterito et futuro; dolor autem corporalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem sensus exterioris, non potest esse nisi de praesenti.
External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. Consequently sadness is able to be about present, past and future; whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can only be about something present.