Thursday, February 10, 2011

1a 2ae q60 a2: Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions? Yes.

In quibusdam virtus est principaliter circa operationem, in quibusdam circa passionem, quia potest comparari operatio ad virtutem moralem, sicut materia circa quam est. Et secundum hoc, oportet alias esse virtutes morales circa operationes, et alias circa passiones.

In some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions, because operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions.

Cuius ratio est, quia bonum et malum in quibusdam operationibus attenditur secundum seipsas, qualitercumque homo afficiatur ad eas: inquantum scilicet bonum in eis et malum accipitur secundum rationem commensurationis ad alterum. Et in talibus oportet quod sit aliqua virtus directiva operationum secundum seipsas: sicut sunt emptio et venditio, et omnes huiusmodi operationes in quibus attenditur ratio debiti vel indebiti ad alterum.

The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. insofar as good and evil in them depend on the formal aspect of their being in due measure with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is a formal aspect of something due or undue to another.

Et propter hoc, iustitia et partes eius proprie sunt circa operationes sicut circa propriam materiam. In quibusdam vero operationibus bonum et malum attenditur solum secundum commensurationem ad operantem. Et ideo oportet in his bonum et malum considerari, secundum quod homo bene vel male afficitur circa huiusmodi. Et propter hoc, oportet quod virtutes in talibus sint principaliter circa interiores affectiones, quae dicuntur animae passiones, sicut patet de temperantia, fortitudine et aliis huiusmodi.

For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on due measure with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.

Contingit autem quod in operationibus quae sunt ad alterum, praetermittatur bonum virtutis propter inordinatam animi passionem. Et tunc, inquantum corrumpitur commensuratio exterioris operationis, est corruptio iustitiae; inquantum autem corrumpitur commensuratio interiorum passionum, est corruptio alicuius alterius virtutis.

It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked on account of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed inasmuch as the due measure of the external act is destroyed; while some other virtue is destroyed inasmuch as the internal passions exceed their due measure.

Sicut cum propter iram aliquis alium percutit, in ipsa percussione indebita corrumpitur iustitia; in immoderantia vero irae corrumpitur mansuetudo. Et idem patet in aliis.

Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.

Philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa passiones quasdam.

The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).

Sunday, February 06, 2011

1a 2ae q60 a1: Whether there is only one moral virtue? No.

Virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una tantum, quia appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem.

Moral virtues are of various species and are not one only, because objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason.

Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens, vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic.

Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say, because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13).

Sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente.

As stated above (q58 aa1-3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (q54 a2). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent.

Obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem ratio veri, in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia.

The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence.

Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigentem.

On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in formal aspect according to its various relations to reason, the directing formal aspect.

Moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie.

Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends, and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.

1a 2ae q60: How the moral virtues differ from one another

  1. Is there only one moral virtue?
  2. Are those moral virtues which are about operations, distinct from those which are about passions?
  3. Is there but one moral virtue about operations?
  4. Are there different moral virtues about different passions?
  5. Do the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?

Saturday, February 05, 2011

1a 2ae q59 a5: Whether there can be moral virtue without passion? No.

Quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto magis passionem causat, quia fiet redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum, secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est.

The more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion, because it will overflow into the sensitive appetite, insofar as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (q17 a7; q24 a3).

Si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt, sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt.

If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions.

Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo.

The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle. Whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.

"Nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione", ut dicitur in I Ethic.

"No man is just who rejoices not in doing justice", as stated in Ethic. i, 8.

Passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non autem si sunt moderatae.

It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.

Virtus passiones inordinatas superat; moderatas autem producit.

Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.