Wednesday, May 26, 2010

1a 2ae q32 a3: Whether hope and memory causes pleasure? Yes.

Memoria et spes sunt causa delectationis quia delectatio causatur ex praesentia boni convenientis, secundum quod sentitur, vel qualitercumque percipitur.

Memory and hope do cause delight because delight is caused by the presence of a befitting good, insofar as it is felt, or perceived in any way.

Spes et memoria sunt quidem eorum quae sunt simpliciter absentia; quae tamen secundum quid sunt praesentia: scilicet vel secundum apprehensionem solam; vel secundum apprehensionem et facultatem, ad minus aestimatam.

Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent; and yet those are, after a fashion, present: i.e., either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.

Nihil prohibet idem, secundum diversa, esse causam contrariorum. Sic igitur spes, inquantum habet praesentem aestimationem boni futuri, delectationem causat; inquantum autem caret praesentia eius, causat afflictionem.

Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a present appraising of a future good, causes delight; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.

Amor et concupiscentia delectationem causant. Omne enim amatum fit delectabile amanti, eo quod amor est quaedam unio vel connaturalitas amantis ad amatum. Similiter etiam omne concupitum est delectabile concupiscenti, cum concupiscentia sit praecipue appetitus delectationis.

Love and concupiscence also cause delight. For everything that is loved becomes delectable to the lover, since love is a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is delightful to the one that desires, since desire is chiefly a craving for delight.

Sed tamen spes, inquantum importat quandam certitudinem realis praesentiae boni delectantis, quam non importat nec amor nec concupiscentia, magis ponitur causa delectationis quam illa. Et similiter magis quam memoria, quae est de eo quod iam transiit.

However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the delightful good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference to them as causing delight; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed away.