Aliquas delectationes sunt bonas, et aliquas sunt malas, quia est delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et consequens aliquam operationem.
Some pleasures are good, and some are evil, because pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from some operation.
Temperatus non fugit omnes delectationes, sed immoderatas, et rationi non convenientes.
The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and not conforming to reason.
In moralibus est quaedam delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei.
In the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God.
Operationibus autem magis sunt affines delectationes, quae sunt eis coniunctae, quam concupiscentiae, quae tempore eas praecedunt. Unde, cum concupiscentiae bonarum operationum sint bonae, malarum vero malae, multo magis delectationes bonarum operationum sunt bonae, malarum vero malae.
Pleasures which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil, much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions evil.
In concubitu coniugali delectatio, quamvis sit in eo quod convenit rationi, tamen impedit rationis usum, propter corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Sed ex hoc non consequitur malitiam moralem; sicut nec somnus, quo ligatur usus rationis, moraliter est malus, si sit secundum rationem receptus: nam et ipsa ratio hoc habet, ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur.
In conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times.