Monday, May 24, 2010

1a 2ae q32 a1: Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?

Omnis delectatio in operationem reducitur sicut in causam quia operationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt proportionatae et connaturales operanti.

Every delight is traced to some operation as its cause because operations are delectable, insofar as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent.

Ipsa obiecta operationum non sunt delectabilia, nisi inquantum coniunguntur nobis: vel per cognitionem solam (sicut cum delectamur in consideratione vel inspectione aliquorum); vel quocumque alio modo simul cum cognitione (sicut cum aliquis delectatur in hoc quod cognoscit se habere quodcumque bonum: puta divitias vel honorem vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae quidem non essent delectabilia, nisi inquantum apprehenduntur ut habita).

The objects themselves of operations are not delectable, save inasmuch as they are united to us: either by knowledge alone (as when we take delight in thinking of or looking at certain things); or in some other way together with knowledge (as when a man takes delight in knowing that he has something good: e.g., riches, honor, or the like, which would not be delectable unless they were apprehended as possessed).

Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Polit., "magnam delectationem habet putare aliquid sibi proprium, quae procedit ex naturali amore alicuius ad seipsum". Habere autem huiusmodi nihil est aliud quam uti eis, vel posse uti. Et hoc est per aliquam operationem.

For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take great delight in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such like things is nothing else but to use them, or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation.

Philosophus dicit, VII et X Ethic., quod "delectatio est operatio connaturalis non impedita".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that "delight is a connatural operation that is uninterrupted".