"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Tuesday, October 12, 2010
Monday, October 11, 2010
1a 2ae q53 a3: Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act? Yes.
Hoc modo cessatio ab actu causat corruptionem vel diminutionem habituum, inquantum scilicet removetur actus qui prohibebat causas corrumpentes vel diminuentes habitum, quia habitus per se corrumpuntur vel diminuuntur ex contrario agente; unde quorumcumque habituum contraria subcrescunt per temporis tractum, quae oportet subtrahi per actum ab habitu procedentem: huiusmodi habitus diminuuntur, vel etiam tolluntur totaliter, per diuturnam cessationem ab actu, ut patet et in scientia et in virtute.
The destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, insofar, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit because habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency; consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.
Cum igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur intellectualis habitus.
When man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary. And thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.
Pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.
The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
Philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio dissolvit.
The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship."
The destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, insofar, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit because habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency; consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue.
Cum igitur homo cessat ab usu intellectualis habitus, insurgunt imaginationes extraneae, et quandoque ad contrarium ducentes; ita quod, nisi per frequentem usum intellectualis habitus, quodammodo succidantur vel comprimantur, redditur homo minus aptus ad recte iudicandum, et quandoque totaliter disponitur ad contrarium. Et sic per cessationem ab actu diminuitur, vel etiam corrumpitur intellectualis habitus.
When man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary. And thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.
Pars intellectiva animae secundum se est supra tempus, sed pars sensitiva subiacet tempori. Et ideo per temporis cursum, transmutatur quantum ad passiones appetitivae partis et etiam quantum ad vires apprehensivas. Unde philosophus dicit, in IV Physic., quod tempus est causa oblivionis.
The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.
Philosophus, in libro de Longit. et Brevit. vitae, dicit quod corruptio scientiae non solum est deceptio, sed etiam oblivio. Et in VIII Ethic. dicitur quod multas amicitias inappellatio dissolvit.
The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship."
Sunday, October 10, 2010
1a 2ae q53 a2: Whether a habit can diminish? Yes.
Habitus diminuuntur, sicut et augentur, quia sicut ex eadem causa augentur ex qua generantur, ita ex eadem causa diminuuntur ex qua corrumpuntur.
Habits diminish, just as they increase, because since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them.
Quaedam diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a participante.
A certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.
Habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora extendi.
A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease, but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.
Habits diminish, just as they increase, because since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them.
Quaedam diminutio essentiae habitus non habet principium ab habitu, sed a participante.
A certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.
Habitus secundum se consideratus, est forma simplex, et secundum hoc non accidit ei diminutio, sed secundum diversum modum participandi, qui provenit ex indeterminatione potentiae ipsius participantis, quae scilicet diversimode potest unam formam participare, vel quae potest ad plura vel ad pauciora extendi.
A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease, but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.
Wednesday, October 06, 2010
1a 2ae q53 a1: Whether a habit can be corrupted? Yes.
Per iudicium rationis in contrarium moventis quocumque modo, scilicet sive ex ignorantia, sive ex passione, vel etiam ex electione, corrumpitur habitus virtutis vel vitii.
A habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion, or deliberate choice.
Sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile removetur.
As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus, inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem.
Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science, insofar as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation.
Sed per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus.
But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit.
Et similiter etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus: nam virtutum usus est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.
In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning" this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.
A habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion, or deliberate choice.
Sicut dicitur in VII Ethic., habitus similitudinem habet naturae, deficit tamen ab ipsa. Et ideo, cum natura rei nullo modo removeatur ab ipsa, habitus difficile removetur.
As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.
Scientia non removetur per motum corporalem quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus, sed solum quantum ad impedimentum actus, inquantum intellectus indiget in suo actu viribus sensitivis, quibus impedimentum affertur per corporalem transmutationem.
Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science, insofar as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation.
Sed per intelligibilem motum rationis potest corrumpi habitus scientiae, etiam quantum ad ipsam radicem habitus.
But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit.
Et similiter etiam potest corrumpi habitus virtutis. Tamen quod dicitur, virtutes esse permanentiores disciplinis, intelligendum est non ex parte subiecti vel causae, sed ex parte actus: nam virtutum usus est continuus per totam vitam, non autem usus disciplinarum.
In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said that "virtue is more lasting than learning" this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.
Tuesday, October 05, 2010
1a 2ae q52 a3: Whether every act increases its habit? No.
Non omnis actus habitum auget quia vero usus habituum in voluntate hominis consistit, ut ex supradictis patet: sicut contingit quod aliquis habens habitum non utitur illo, vel etiam agit actum contrarium; ita etiam potest contingere quod utitur habitu secundum actum non respondentem proportionaliter intensioni habitus.
It is not every act that increases a habit because use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (q50 a5): just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat, quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius (ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad similitudinem augmenti animalis).
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof (if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal).
Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius.
If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
"Similes actus similes habitus causant", ut dicitur in II Ethic.
"Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2).
Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum, utpote cum negligenter fiunt.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly.
It is not every act that increases a habit because use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (q50 a5): just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.
Si igitur intensio actus proportionaliter aequetur intensioni habitus, vel etiam superexcedat, quilibet actus vel auget habitum, vel disponit ad augmentum ipsius (ut loquamur de augmento habituum ad similitudinem augmenti animalis).
Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof (if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal).
Si vero intensio actus proportionaliter deficiat ab intensione habitus, talis actus non disponit ad augmentum habitus, sed magis ad diminutionem ipsius.
If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.
"Similes actus similes habitus causant", ut dicitur in II Ethic.
"Like acts cause like habits" (Ethic. ii, 1,2).
Sed, sicut dicitur in II Ethic., aliqui actus ab habitu procedentes diminuunt ipsum, utpote cum negligenter fiunt.
But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly.
Monday, October 04, 2010
1a 2ae q52 a2: Whether habits increase by addition? No.
Augmentum habituum non fiat per additionem quia augmentum habituum et aliarum formarum, non fit per additionem formae ad formam, sed fit per hoc quod subiectum magis vel minus perfecte participat unam et eandem formam.
The increase of habits is not by way of addition because the increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form, but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form.
The increase of habits is not by way of addition because the increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form, but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form.
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