Monday, May 17, 2010

1a 2ae q31 a2: Whether delight is in time? No.

Delectatio secundum se quidem non est in tempore, quia est delectatio in bono iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus.

Delight, of itself indeed, is not in time, because it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement.

Sed si illud bonum adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.

But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time incidentally. But if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either essentially, or incidentally.

Sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, qui est "actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi": et talis motus est successivus, et in tempore.

As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time.

Alius autem motus est "actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu"; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in tempore.

Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This sort of movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.

Aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non esse in tempore.

Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the formal aspect of imperfect movement in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.

Philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod "secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."