Nulla tristitia est quae sit contraria delectationi contemplationis quia delectatio contemplationis non causatur ex hoc quod excluditur aliqua molestia, sed ex hoc quod est secundum seipsam delectabilis: non est enim generatio, sed operatio quaedam perfecta, ut dictum est.
There is no sadness contrary to the pleasure of contemplation because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming," but a perfect operation, as stated above (q31 a1).
Contemplatio, secundum se, nunquam habet rationem mali, cum contemplatio nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri, quod est bonum intellectus; sed per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet contemplatio vilioris impedit contemplationem melioris; vel ex parte rei contemplatae, ad quam inordinatae appetitus afficitur.
Contemplation, in itself, never has the formal aspect of evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect; it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e., insofar as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached.
Ea quae sunt contraria in rerum natura, secundum quod sunt in mente, non habent contrarietatem. Non enim rationes contrariorum sunt contrariae, sed magis unum contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud.
Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind. For things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in formal aspect; indeed rather is one contrary the formal aspect for knowing the other.
Dicitur Sap. VIII, "non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius," scilicet sapientiae, "nec taedium convictus eius, sed laetitiam et gaudium".
It is written (Wisdom 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness."
Dicit Gregorius Nyssenus, "ei delectationi quae est secundum contemplationem, non opponitur aliqua tristitia".
According to Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sadness contests the pleasure which is from contemplation".