Omnia enim quae facimus vel patimur propter amicum, delectabilia sunt, quia amor praecipua causa delectationis est.
Whatever we do or suffer for a friend is delightful, because love is the principal cause of delight.
Benefacere alteri, potest tripliciter esse delectationis causa. Uno modo, per comparationem ad effectum, quod est bonum in altero constitutum. Et secundum hoc, inquantum bonum alterius reputamus quasi nostrum bonum, propter unionem amoris, delectamur in bono quod per nos fit aliis, praecipue amicis, sicut in bono proprio.
Doing good to another may give delight in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take delight in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good.
Alio modo, per comparationem ad finem; sicut cum aliquis, per hoc quod alteri benefacit, sperat consequi aliquod bonum sibi ipsi, vel a Deo vel ab homine. Spes autem delectationis est causa.
Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when someone, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either from God or from man: for hope is a cause of delight.
Tertio modo, per comparationem ad principium. Et sic hoc quod est benefacere alteri, potest esse delectabile per comparationem ad triplex principium.
Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle.
Quorum unum est facultas benefaciendi: et secundum hoc, benefacere alteri fit delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini quaedam imaginatio abundantis boni in seipso existentis, ex quo possit aliis communicare. Et ideo homines delectantur in filiis et in propriis operibus, sicut quibus communicant proprium bonum.
One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing good to another becomes delightful, insofar as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take delight in their children, and in their own works, as being things on which they bestow a share of their own good.
Aliud principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem benefacere fit alicui connaturale. Unde liberales delectabiliter dant aliis.
Another principle is [a man's] habitual inclination [to do good,] according to which doing good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes delight in giving to others.
Tertium principium est motivum: puta cum aliquis movetur ab aliquo quem diligit, ad benefaciendum alicui.
The third principle is motive: for instance when someone is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone.
Philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod "largiri et auxiliari amicis aut extraneis, est delectabilissimum".
The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most delightful to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers".