Friday, September 25, 2009

1a 2ae q3 a4: Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect? Yes.

Beatitudo hominis in cognitione Dei consistit, quae est actus intellectus, quia quantum ad id quod est essentialiter ipsa beatitudo, impossibile est quod consistat in actu voluntatis.

Man's happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect, because as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will.

Voluntas enim fertur in finem, et absentem (cum ipsum desiderat) et praesentem (cum in ipso requiescens delectatur). Manifestum est autem quod ipsum desiderium finis non est consecutio finis, sed est motus ad finem. Delectatio autem advenit voluntati ex hoc quod finis est praesens, non autem e converso ex hoc aliquid fit praesens, quia voluntas delectatur in ipso. Oportet igitur aliquid aliud esse quam actum voluntatis, per quod fit ipse finis praesens volenti.

For the will is directed to the end, both absent (when it desires it) and present (when it is delighted by resting therein). Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.

Nam a principio volumus consequi finem intelligibilem; consequimur autem ipsum per hoc quod fit praesens nobis per actum intellectus; et tunc voluntas delectata conquiescit in fine iam adepto.

For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.

Sic igitur essentia beatitudinis in actu intellectus consistit, sed ad voluntatem pertinet delectatio beatitudinem consequens; secundum quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod beatitudo est "gaudium de veritate"; quia scilicet ipsum gaudium est consummatio beatitudinis.

So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect, but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is "joy in truth," because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.

Finem primo apprehendit intellectus quam voluntas, tamen motus ad finem incipit in voluntate. Et ideo voluntati debetur id quod ultimo consequitur consecutionem finis, scilicet delectatio vel fruitio.

The intellect apprehends the end before the will does, yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz., delight or enjoyment.

Dilectio praeeminet cognitioni in movendo, sed cognitio praevia est dilectioni in attingendo, non enim diligitur nisi cognitum, ut dicit Augustinus in X de Trin.

Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining, for "naught is loved save what is known," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1).