Secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum, in ipso existens, necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit operatio, quia beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio.
Insofar as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation, because happiness is man's supreme perfection.
Unumquodque autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus actus operantis, unde et "actus secundus" a philosopho nominatur, in II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans, sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis quoque rebus, res unaquaeque dicitur esse "propter suam operationem", ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis operationem esse.
Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1), because that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.
Philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam."
The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."
Solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per essentiam, quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur alio, sed seipso. In Angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato, et haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna.
Of God alone is it true that His Be-ing is His Happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially, since His very Be-ing is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good, and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting.
In hominibus autem, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio secundum operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo, sed haec operatio nec continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter hoc in statu praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest.
But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God, but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man.
Unde philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, beatos autem dicimus ut homines. Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta, quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII.
Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (Matthew 22:30).
Una et continua et sempiterna operatione, in illo beatitudinis statu, mens hominis Deo coniungetur. Sed in praesenti vita, quantum deficimus ab unitate et continuitate talis operationis, tantum deficimus a beatitudinis perfectione.
In that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation, so do we fall short of perfect happiness.
Est tamen aliqua participatio beatitudinis, et tanto maior, quanto operatio potest esse magis continua et una. Et ideo in activa vita, quae circa multa occupatur, est minus de ratione beatitudinis quam in vita contemplativa, quae versatur circa unum: idest circa veritatis contemplationem.
Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness, and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less of the formal aspect of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing: i.e., the contemplation of truth.