Impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere: primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii (ut patet in V Metaphys), beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi finis; secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum, beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum.
It is impossible for happiness to consist in power: first, because power has the formal aspect of principle (as is stated in Metaph. v, 12), whereas happiness has the formal aspect of last end; secondly, because power has relation to good and to evil, whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good.
Unde magis posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate.
Wherefore some happiness might consist instead in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.
Divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad bonitatem.
God's power is His goodness, hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.
Praemissa autem quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit.
Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune, for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.