Sunday, September 20, 2009

1a 2ae q2 a7: Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness? No.

In nullo bono animae beatitudo consistit quia beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam animae bonum inhaerens, sed id in quo beatitudo consistit (quod scilicet beatum facit) est aliquid extra animam.

Happiness consists in no good of the soul because happiness itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul, but that which constitutes happiness (viz. which makes man happy) is something outside his soul.

Sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ., "id in quo constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est". Sed homo non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed quidquid est in homine, est diligendum propter Deum.

As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake"; but man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man, is to be loved for God's sake.

Sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio aut possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem, impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel aliquid eius.

As stated above (q1 a8), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it.

Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in potentia existens, fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis. Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius.

Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality, for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfillment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot have the formal aspect of last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.

Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia, sive habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus—qui est voluntas—est boni universalis. Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens ipsi animae, est bonum participatum, et per consequens particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus finis hominis.

In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now the human appetite—which is the will—is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.

Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid hominis ex parte animae, quia homo per animam beatitudinem consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit; sed huius rei adeptio vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra animam.

But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end, since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.

Beatitudo maxime amatur tanquam bonum concupitum, amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum.

Happiness is loved above all, as the good desired, whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself.