Saturday, September 19, 2009

1a 2ae q2 a6: Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure? No.

Beatitudo, quae est summum bonum, non consistit in voluptate, quia omnes appetunt delectationem, sicut et appetunt bonum, et tamen delectationem (quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus in bono) appetunt ratione boni, et non e converso.

Happiness, which is the supreme good, does not consist in pleasure, because all desire delight in the same way as they desire good, and yet they desire delight (which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good) under the formal aspect of the good and not conversely.

Unde non sequitur quod delectatio sit maximum et per se bonum, sed quod unaquaeque delectatio consequatur aliquod bonum, et quod aliqua delectatio consequatur id quod est per se et maximum bonum.

Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.

Quia in unaquaque re aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium accidens ipsius (sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile), est igitur considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria.

Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident (just as in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal), we must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness, since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory.

Bonum autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis beatitudo; si autem sit imperfectum, est quaedam beatitudinis participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio, quae consequitur bonum perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis, sed quoddam consequens ad ipsam sicut per se accidens.

Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness; and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.

Vehemens appetitus delectationis sensibilis contingit ex hoc quod operationes sensuum, quia sunt principia nostrae cognitionis, sunt magis perceptibiles. Unde etiam a pluribus delectationes sensibiles appetuntur.

The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.

"Quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum," ut dicitur VII Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit.

Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them; and yet happiness does not consist in them.

Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., "tristes exitus esse voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget. Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes quoque beatae esse dicantur."

Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending; and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."