In honore beatitudo non consistit quia verum praemium virtutis est ipsa beatitudo, propter quam virtuosi operantur; si autem propter honorem operarentur, iam non esset virtus, sed magis ambitio.
Happiness does not consist in honor because virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work; whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be virtue, but instead ambition.
Sicut philosophus dicit, honor non est praemium virtutis propter quod virtuosi operantur, sed accipiunt honorem ab hominibus loco praemii, "quasi a non habentibus aliquid maius ad dandum".
As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work, but they receive honor from men instead of a reward, "as from those who have nothing greater to offer."
Honor enim exhibetur alicui propter aliquam eius excellentiam; et ita est signum et testimonium quoddam illius excellentiae quae est in honorato. Excellentia autem hominis maxime attenditur secundum beatitudinem, quae est hominis bonum perfectum, et secundum partes eius, idest secundum illa bona quibus aliquid beatitudinis participatur. Et ideo honor potest quidem consequi beatitudinem, sed principaliter in eo beatitudo consistere non potest.
For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion especially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good, and to its parts, i.e. to those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.
Beatitudo est in beato. Honor autem non est in eo qui honoratur, sed magis in honorante, qui reverentiam exhibet honorato, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic.
Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5).