Saturday, January 31, 2009

Q75 A6: Whether the human soul is corruptible?

No. We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible because it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.

Necesse est dicere animam humanam, quam dicimus intellectivum principium, esse incorruptibilem quia impossibile est quod forma subsistens desinat esse.

This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it.

Quod quidem omnino est impossibile non solum de ipsa, sed de quolibet subsistente quod est forma tantum. Manifestum est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui, est inseparabile ab ipso.

But existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself.

Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit esse in actu, quod acquirit formam, secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod separatur forma ab ea. Impossibile est autem quod forma separetur a seipsa.

For a thing may be corrupted in two ways--"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption.

Dupliciter enim aliquid corrumpitur, uno modo, per se; alio modo, per accidens. Impossibile est autem aliquid subsistens generari aut corrumpi per accidens, idest aliquo generato vel corrupto. Sic enim competit alicui generari et corrumpi, sicut et esse, quod per generationem acquiritur et per corruptionem amittitur.

Therefore, whatever has existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se'; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or corruption of composite things.

Unde quod per se habet esse, non potest generari vel corrumpi nisi per se, quae vero non subsistunt, ut accidentia et formae materiales, dicuntur fieri et corrumpi per generationem et corruptionem compositorum.

Now it was shown above (Q75 A2, Q75 A3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted "per se."

Ostensum est autem supra quod animae brutorum non sunt per se subsistentes, sed sola anima humana. Unde animae brutorum corrumpuntur, corruptis corporibus, anima autem humana non posset corrumpi, nisi per se corrumperetur.

For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God.

Nam anima brutorum producitur ex virtute aliqua corporea, anima vero humana a Deo.

Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible.

In anima autem intellectiva non potest esse aliqua contrarietas. Recipit enim secundum modum sui esse, ea vero quae in ipsa recipiuntur, sunt absque contrarietate; quia etiam rationes contrariorum in intellectu non sunt contrariae, sed est una scientia contrariorum. Impossibile est ergo quod anima intellectiva sit corruptibilis.

Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of "here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist.

Potest etiam huius rei accipi signum ex hoc, quod unumquodque naturaliter suo modo esse desiderat. Desiderium autem in rebus cognoscentibus sequitur cognitionem. Sensus autem non cognoscit esse nisi sub hic et nunc, sed intellectus apprehendit esse absolute, et secundum omne tempus. Unde omne habens intellectum naturaliter desiderat esse semper.

But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

Naturale autem desiderium non potest esse inane. Omnis igitur intellectualis substantia est incorruptibilis.

Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an incorruptible substantial life."

Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod animae humanae habent ex bonitate divina quod sint intellectuales et quod habeant substantialem vitam inconsumptibilem.

Friday, January 30, 2009

Q75 A5: Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?

No. The intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form, because the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely.

Anima igitur intellectiva est forma absoluta, non autem aliquid compositum ex materia et forma. Anima autem intellectiva cognoscit rem aliquam in sua natura absolute.

For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower.

Manifestum est enim quod omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. Sic autem cognoscitur unumquodque, sicut forma eius est in cognoscente.

For instance, [the intellectual soul] knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul.

Puta lapidem inquantum est lapis absolute. Est igitur forma lapidis absolute, secundum propriam rationem formalem, in anima intellectiva.

For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized.

Si enim anima intellectiva esset composita ex materia et forma, formae rerum reciperentur in ea ut individuales, et sic non cognosceret nisi singulare, sicut accidit in potentiis sensitivis, quae recipiunt formas rerum in organo corporali, materia enim est principium individuationis formarum.

It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.

Relinquitur ergo quod anima intellectiva, et omnis intellectualis substantia cognoscens formas absolute, caret compositione formae et materiae.

To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.

Subiici et transmutari convenit materiae secundum quod est in potentia. Sicut ergo est alia potentia intellectus, et alia potentia materiae primae, ita est alia ratio subiiciendi et transmutandi. Secundum hoc enim intellectus subiicitur scientiae, et transmutatur de ignorantia ad scientiam, secundum quod est in potentia ad species intelligibiles.

The soul in general has no matter because it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body.

In communi anima non habet materiam. Est enim de ratione animae, quod sit forma alicuius corporis.

Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself.

Aut igitur est forma secundum se totam; aut secundum aliquam partem sui.

If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto.

Si secundum se totam, impossibile est quod pars eius sit materia, si dicatur materia aliquod ens in potentia tantum, quia forma, inquantum forma, est actus; id autem quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse pars actus, cum potentia repugnet actui, utpote contra actum divisa.

If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate."

Si autem sit forma secundum aliquam partem sui, illam partem, dicemus esse animam, et illam materiam cuius primo est actus, dicemus esse primum animatum.

Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.

Est autem alia potentia receptiva in anima intellectiva, a potentia receptiva materiae primae, ut patet ex diversitate receptorum, nam materia prima recipit formas individuales, intellectus autem recipit formas absolutas. Unde talis potentia in anima intellectiva existens, non ostendit quod anima sit composita ex materia et forma.

The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act.

Primus actus est universale principium omnium actuum, quia est infinitum, virtualiter in se omnia praehabens, ut dicit Dionysius. Unde participatur a rebus, non sicut pars, sed secundum diffusionem processionis ipsius. Potentia autem, cum sit receptiva actus, oportet quod actui proportionetur. Actus vero recepti, qui procedunt a primo actu infinito et sunt quaedam participationes eius, sunt diversi. Unde non potest esse potentia una quae recipiat omnes actus, sicut est unus actus influens omnes actus participatos, alioquin potentia receptiva adaequaret potentiam activam primi actus.

Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

Omne participatum comparatur ad participans ut actus eius. Quaecumque autem forma creata per se subsistens ponatur, oportet quod participet esse, quia etiam ipsa vita, vel quidquid sic diceretur, participat ipsum esse, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. Nom.

Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite.

Esse autem participatum finitur ad capacitatem participantis. Unde solus Deus, qui est ipsum suum esse, est actus purus et infinitus.

But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.

In substantiis vero intellectualibus est compositio ex actu et potentia; non quidem ex materia et forma, sed ex forma et esse participato. Unde a quibusdam dicuntur componi ex quo est et quod est, ipsum enim esse est quo aliquid est.

The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act.

Forma est causa essendi materiae, et agens, unde agens, inquantum reducit materiam in actum formae transmutando, est ei causa essendi. Si quid autem est forma subsistens, non habet esse per aliquod formale principium, nec habet causam transmutantem de potentia in actum.

Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.

Augustinus probat, in VII super Gen. ad Litt., quod anima non est facta nec ex materia corporali, nec ex materia spirituali.

Thursday, January 29, 2009

Q75 A4: Whether the soul is man?

No. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body.

Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed est aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore.

Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body.

Plato vero, ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset anima utens corpore.

This could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above (Q75 A3) that sensation is not the operation of the soul only.

Et hoc quidem sustineri posset, si poneretur quod animae sensitivae operatio esset eius propria sine corpore, quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini, convenirent soli animae; illud autem est unaquaeque res, quod operatur operationes illius rei. Unde illud est homo, quod operatur operationes hominis. Ostensum est autem quod sentire non est operatio animae tantum.

Some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter.

Quod ideo dico, quia quidam posuerunt solam formam esse de ratione speciei, materiam vero esse partem individui, et non speciei. Quod quidem non potest esse verum. Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat formam tantum, sed formam et materiam.

Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter.

Unde materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus, non quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis; sed materia communis.

For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species, must belong to the substance of the species.

Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus; ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus. Oportet enim de substantia speciei esse quidquid est communiter de substantia omnium individuorum sub specie contentorum.

Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and body."

Augustinus, XIX de Civ. Dei, commendat Varronem, "qui hominem nec animam solam, nec solum corpus, sed animam simul et corpus esse arbitrabatur."

Wednesday, January 28, 2009

Q75 A3: Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?

No. Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul, whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent because the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its being.

Solum hominem credimus habere animam substantivam; animalium vero animae non sunt substantivae quod cum animae brutorum animalium per se non operentur, non sint subsistentes, similiter enim unumquodque habet esse et operationem.

Sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body.

Sentire vero, et consequentes operationes animae sensitivae, manifeste accidunt cum aliqua corporis immutatione.

Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite.

Et sic manifestum est quod anima sensitiva non habet aliquam operationem propriam per seipsam, sed omnis operatio sensitivae animae est coniuncti.

The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower.

Sensitivum quodammodo se habet ad sensibilia sicut intellectivum ad intelligibilia, inquantum scilicet utrumque est in potentia ad sua obiecta. Sed quodammodo dissimiliter se habent, inquantum sensitivum patitur a sensibili cum corporis immutatione, unde excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum. Quod in intellectu non contingit, nam intellectus intelligens maxima intelligibilium, magis potest postmodum intelligere minora.

If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.

Si vero in intelligendo fatigetur corpus, hoc est per accidens, in quantum intellectus indiget operatione virium sensitivarum, per quas ei phantasmata praeparantur.

The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has been said (Q75 A1). Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ.

Antiqui philosophi nullam distinctionem ponebant inter sensum et intellectum, et utrumque corporeo principio attribuebant, ut dictum est. Plato autem distinxit inter intellectum et sensum; utrumque tamen attribuit principio incorporeo, ponens quod, sicut intelligere, ita et sentire convenit animae secundum seipsam. Et ex hoc sequebatur quod etiam animae brutorum animalium sint subsistentes. Sed Aristoteles posuit quod solum intelligere, inter opera animae, sine organo corporeo exercetur.

Tuesday, January 27, 2009

Q75 A2: Whether the human soul is something subsistent?

Yes. The nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something subsistent because if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies.

Natura mentis humanae non solum est incorporea, sed etiam substantia, scilicet aliquid subsistens quod si igitur principium intellectuale haberet in se naturam alicuius corporis, non posset omnia corpora cognoscere.

Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies.

Omne autem corpus habet aliquam naturam determinatam. Impossibile est igitur quod principium intellectuale sit corpus. Et similiter impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, quia etiam natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum.

Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual.

Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu, unde eo modo aliquid operatur, quo est.

The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.

Corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione obiecti, phantasma enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut color ad visum. Sic autem indigere corpore non removet intellectum esse subsistentem, alioquin animal non esset aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat exterioribus sensibilibus ad sentiendum.

We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.

Relinquitur igitur animam humanam, quae dicitur intellectus vel mens, esse aliquid incorporeum et subsistens.

Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature--i.e. imaginary pictures of corporeal things."

Augustinus dicit, X de Trin. "Quisquis videt mentis naturam et esse substantiam, et non esse corpoream, videt eos qui opinantur eam esse corpoream, ob hoc errare, quod adiungunt ei ea sine quibus nullam possunt cogitare naturam, scilicet corporum phantasias."

Monday, January 26, 2009

Q75 A1: Whether the soul is a body?

No. The soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body because a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act.

Anima igitur, quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus, sed corporis actus, quod convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens, vel etiam principium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu tale, habet hoc ab aliquo principio quod dicitur actus eius.

It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul.

Manifestum est enim quod non quodcumque vitalis operationis principium est anima, sic enim oculus esset anima, cum sit quoddam principium visionis; et idem esset dicendum de aliis animae instrumentis. Sed primum principium vitae dicimus esse animam.

Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life.

Quamvis autem aliquod corpus possit esse quoddam principium vitae, sicut cor est principium vitae in animali; tamen non potest esse primum principium vitae aliquod corpus. Manifestum est enim quod esse principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus, alioquin omne corpus esset vivens, aut principium vitae.

The soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live: for we call living things "animate," [i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement.

Anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt animata enim viventia dicimus, res vero inanimatas vita carentes. Vita autem maxime manifestatur duplici opere, scilicet cognitionis et motus.

The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal.

Horum autem principium antiqui philosophi, imaginationem transcendere non valentes, aliquod corpus ponebant; sola corpora res esse dicentes, et quod non est corpus, nihil esse. Et secundum hoc, animam aliquod corpus esse dicebant.

But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul.

Sed sicut ostenditur in VIII Physic., est quoddam movens penitus immobile, quod nec per se nec per accidens movetur, et tale movens potest movere motum semper uniformem. Est autem aliud movens, quod non movetur per se, sed movetur per accidens, et propter hoc non movet motum semper uniformem. Et tale movens est anima.

There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially--namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.

Est autem aliud movens, quod per se movetur, scilicet corpus. Et quia antiqui naturales nihil esse credebant nisi corpora, posuerunt quod omne movens movetur, et quod anima per se movetur, et est corpus.

But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.

Sed quia antiqui naturales nesciebant distinguere inter actum et potentiam, ponebant animam esse corpus, ad hoc quod cognosceret corpus; et ad hoc quod cognosceret omnia corpora, quod esset composita ex principiis omnium corporum.

Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk."

Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod "anima simplex dicitur respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium loci."

Q75: The nature of the soul in itself

Question 75. Man who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal substance: and in the first place, concerning what belongs to the essence of the soul

  1. Is the soul a body?
  2. Is the human soul a subsistence?
  3. Are the souls of brute animals subsistent?
  4. Is the soul man, or is man composed of soul and body?
  5. Is the soul composed of matter and form?
  6. Is the soul incorruptible?
  7. Is the soul of the same species as an angel?

Sunday, January 25, 2009

Q74 A3: Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?

Yes. Scripture does use suitable words to express the works of the six days because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place.

Scriptura utatur convenientibus verbis ad exprimendum opera sex dierum quod secundum Augustinum, persona filii commemoratur tam in prima rerum creatione, quam in rerum distinctione et ornatu; aliter tamen et aliter.

For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is by the word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and adornment the Word is mentioned.

Distinctio enim et ornatus pertinet ad rerum formationem. Sicut autem formatio artificiatorum est per formam artis quae est in mente artificis, quae potest dici intelligibile verbum ipsius; ita formatio totius creaturae est per verbum Dei. Et ideo in opere distinctionis et ornatus fit mentio de verbo.

But in creation the Son is mentioned as the beginning, by the words, "In the beginning God created," since by creation is understood the production of formless matter.

In creatione autem commemoratur filius ut principium, cum dicitur, in principio creavit Deus, quia per creationem intelligitur productio informis materiae.

But according to those who hold that the elements were created from the first under their proper forms, another explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, "God said," signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it.

Secundum vero alios, qui ponunt primo creata elementa sub propriis formis, oportet aliter dici. Basilius enim dicit quod per hoc quod dicitur, dixit Deus, importatur divinum imperium. Prius autem oportuit produci creaturam quae obediret, quam fieri mentionem de divino imperio.

According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth, the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted.

Secundum Augustinum, per caelum intelligitur spiritualis natura informis; per terram autem materia informis omnium corporum. Et sic nulla creatura est praetermissa.

In either work, of creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters.

Et sic in utroque opere creationis et formationis, Trinitas personarum insinuatur. In creatione quidem, persona patris per Deum creantem; persona filii, per principium in quo creavit; spiritus sancti, qui superfertur aquis.

But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good.

In formatione vero, persona patris in Deo dicente; persona vero filii, in verbo quo dicitur; persona spiritus sancti, in complacentia qua vidit Deus esse bonum quod factum erat.

But according to the holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the water" -- that is to say, over what Augustine holds to mean formless matter, "lest it should be supposed that God loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7).

Sed secundum sanctos, per spiritum domini intelligitur spiritus sanctus. Qui dicitur superferri aquae, idest materiae informi secundum Augustinum, "ne facienda opera sua propter indigentiae necessitatem putaretur Deus amare, indigentiae enim amor rebus quas diligit subiicitur. Commode, autem factum est, ut prius insinuaretur aliquid inchoatum, cui superferri diceretur, non enim superfertur loco, sed praeexcellente potentia," ut Augustinus dicit I super Gen. ad Litt.

According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being in the Word, denoted by the command "Let . . . be made"; secondly, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, "It was . . . done"; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words, "He made."

Secundum Augustinum, per illa tria designatur triplex esse rerum, primo quidem esse rerum in verbo, per hoc quod dixit, fiat; secundo, esse rerum in mente angelica per hoc quod dixit, factum est; tertio, esse rerum in propria natura, per hoc quod dixit, fecit.

According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,30), by the "evening" and the "morning" are understood the evening and the morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained (Q58 A6, Q58 A7).

Secundum Augustinum, per vespere et mane intelligitur vespertina et matutina cognitio in Angelis, de quibus dictum est supra.

The words "one day" are used when day is first instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours. Hence, by mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed.

Dicitur unus dies in prima diei institutione, ad designandum quod viginti quatuor horarum spatia pertinent ad unum diem. Unde per hoc quod dicitur unus, praefigitur mensura diei naturalis.

Saturday, January 24, 2009

Q74 A2: Whether all these days are one day?

No. There was not only one day because God created all things together so far as regards their substance in some measure formless, but He did not create all things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in distinction and adornment. (Hence the word "creation" is significant in (Sirach 18:1): "He that liveth for ever, created all things together.")

Non fuit unus dies tantum quod Deus creavit omnia simul, quantum ad rerum substantiam quodammodo informem. Sed quantum ad formationem quae facta est per distinctionem et ornatum, non simul. (Unde signanter utitur verbo "creationis": Eccli. XVIII, dicitur, "qui vivit in aeternum, creavit omnia simul.")

All things were not distinguished and adorned together, not from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in which to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfection.

Non est ex impotentia Dei, quasi indigentis tempore ad operandum, quod omnia non sunt simul distincta et ornata, sed ut ordo servaretur in rerum institutione. Et ideo oportuit ut diversis statibus mundi diversi dies deservirent. Semper autem per sequens opus novus perfectionis status mundo est additus.

According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the natural order of the works attributed to the days.

Secundum Augustinum, ille ordo dierum referendus est ad naturalem ordinem operum quae diebus attribuuntur.

On this question Augustine differs from other expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were seven distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different.

In hac quaestione Augustinus ab aliis expositoribus dissentit. Augustinus enim vult, et super Gen. ad Litt., et XI de Civ. Dei, et ad Orosium, quod omnes qui dicuntur septem dies, sunt unus dies septempliciter rebus praesentatus. Alii vero expositores sentiunt quod fuerunt septem dies diversi, et non unus tantum. Hae autem duae opiniones, si referantur ad expositionem litterae Genesis, magnam diversitatem habent.

For Augustine understands by the word "day," the knowledge in the mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second day their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can know many things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated.

Nam secundum Augustinum, per "diem" intelligitur cognitio mentis angelicae; ut sic primus dies sit cognito primi divini operis, secundus dies cognitio secundi operis, et sic de aliis. Et dicitur unumquodque opus esse factum in aliqua die, quia nihil Deus produxit in rerum natura, quod non impresserit menti angelicae. Quae quidem multa simul potest cognoscere, praecipue in verbo, in quo omnis Angelorum cognitio perficitur et terminatur.

So the distinction of days denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced.

Et sic distinguitur dies secundum naturalem ordinem rerum cognitarum, non secundum successionem cognitionis, aut secundum successionem productionis rerum.

Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately called "day," since light, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in the things produced.

Cognitio autem angelica proprie et vere "dies" nominari potest, cum lux, quae est causa diei, proprie in spiritualibus, secundum Augustinum, inveniatur. Secundum vero alios, per istos dies et successio dierum temporalium ostenditur, et successio productionis rerum.

If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown (Q67, A1; Q69, A1), between Augustine and other writers is taken into account.

Sed si istae duae opiniones referantur ad modum productionis rerum, non invenitur magna differentia. Et hoc propter duo in quibus, exponendo, diversificatur Augustinus ab aliis, ut ex supra dictis patet.

First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as first created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter.

Primo quidem, quia Augustinus per terram et aquam prius creatam, intelligit materiam corporalem totaliter informem; per factionem autem firmamenti, et congregationem aquarum, et apparitionem aridae, intelligit impressionem formarum in materiam corporalem.

But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing under the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown (Q67, A1; Q67, A4; Q69, A1).

Alii vero sancti per terram et aquam primo creatas, intelligunt ipsa elementa mundi, sub propriis formis existentia, per sequentia autem opera, aliquam distinctionem in corporibus prius existentibus, ut supra dictum est.

Secondly, some writers hold that plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially.

Secundo autem differunt quantum ad productionem plantarum et animalium, quae alii ponunt in opere sex dierum esse producta in actu; Augustinus vero potentialiter tantum.

On the day on which God created the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed, actually, but "before it sprung up in the earth," that is, potentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to the first instituting of the world.

In die in quo creavit Deus caelum et terram, creavit etiam omne virgultum agri, non in actu, sed "antequam oriretur super terram," idest potentialiter. Quod Augustinus adscribit tertiae diei, alii vero primae rerum institutioni.

Now the opinion of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did not exist actually.

In hoc ergo quod Augustinus ponit opera sex dierum esse simul facta, sequitur idem modus productionis rerum. Nam secundum utrosque, in prima rerum productione materia erat sub formis substantialibus elementorum, et secundum utrosque, in prima rerum institutione non fuerunt animalia et plantae in actu.

There remains, however, a difference as to four points; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the production of creatures, in which
(1) light did not exist,
(2) the firmament had not been formed,
(3) and the earth was still covered by the waters,
(4) nor had the heavenly bodies been formed,
which is the fourth difference; which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. "Therefore, in order not to do prejudice to either of these opinions, we must reply to the arguments for both sides."

Sed remanet differentia quantum ad quatuor. Quia secundum alios sanctos, post primam productionem creaturae, fuit aliquod tempus
in quo
non erat lux;
item in quo non erat firmamentum formatum;
item in quo non erat terra discooperta aquis;
et in quo non erant formata caeli luminaria,
quod est quartum. Quae non oportet ponere secundum expositionem Augustini. Ut igitur neutri sententiae praeiudicetur, utriusque rationibus respondendum est.

On the seventh day God ceased from making new things, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.

In die septimo cessavit Deus a novis operibus condendis, non autem a propagandis quibusdam ex aliis, ad quam propagationem pertinet quod post primum diem alii succedunt.

Friday, January 23, 2009

Q74 A1: Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?

Yes. These days are devoted to the first instituting of the world and the reason of the distinction of these days is made clear by what has been said above (Q70, A1), namely, that the parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it.

Dies isti deputantur primae institutioni mundi et ratio distinctionis horum dierum ex praemissis potest esse manifesta. Oportuit enim primo distingui partes mundi; et postmodum singulas partes ornari, per hoc quod quasi suis habitatoribus replentur.

Now the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest part. (Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the beginning, the middle, and the end.)

Secundum ergo alios sanctos, in creatura corporali tres partes designantur, prima, quae significatur nomine caeli; media, quae significatur nomine aquae; et, infima quae significatur nomine terrae. (Unde et secundum Pythagoricos, perfectio in tribus ponitur, principio, medio et fine, ut dicitur in I de caelo.)

The first part, then, is distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth.

Prima ergo pars distinguitur prima die, et ornatur quarta; media distinguitur secunda die, et ornatur quinta; infima distinguitur tertia die, et ornatur sexta.

But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him, spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two days, and the lower on the second. (Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment.)

Augustinus vero convenit quidem cum eis in ultimis tribus diebus, differt autem in tribus primis. Quia secundum eum, in primo die formatur creatura spiritualis, in duobus aliis creatura corporalis; ita quod in secundo corpora superiora, in tertio corpora inferiora. (Et sic perfectio divinorum operum respondet perfectioni senarii numeri, qui consurgit ex suis partibus aliquotis simul iunctis; quae quidem partes sunt unum, duo, tria. Una enim dies deputatur formationi creaturae spiritualis, duae formationi creaturae corporalis, et tres ornatui.)

According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs to the production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says (Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there was any day.

Secundum Augustinum, opus creationis pertinet ad productionem materiae informis, et naturae spiritualis informis. Quae quidem duo sunt extra tempus, ut ipse dicit in XII Confess., et ideo creatio utriusque ponitur ante omnem diem.

But it may also be said, following other holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas the work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore, every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place "in a day," but creation "in the beginning" which denotes something indivisible.

Sed secundum alios sanctos, potest dici quod opus distinctionis et ornatus attenditur secundum aliquam mutationem creaturae, quae tempore mensuratur. Opus autem creationis consistit in sola divina actione in instanti rerum substantiam producentis. Et ideo quodlibet opus distinctionis et ornatus dicitur factum in die, creatio autem dicitur facta in principio, quod sonat aliquid indivisibile.

The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they then received a form that they had not before, as said above (Q70, A1, RO2).

Prima die facta est natura lucis in aliquo subiecto. Sed quarto die facta dicuntur luminaria, non quia eorum substantia sit de novo producta; sed quia sunt aliquo modo formata, quo prius non erant, ut supra dictum est.

According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15), after all that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something distinct is attributed to the seventh--namely, that on it God rested in Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right that the seventh day should be mentioned after the six.

Septimae diei, secundum Augustinum, deputatur aliquid post omnia quae sex diebus attribuuntur, scilicet quod Deus a suis operibus in seipso requiescit. Et ideo oportuit post sex dies fieri mentionem de septimo.

It may also be said, with the other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to cessation from work.

Secundum vero alios, potest dici quod in septimo die mundus habuit quendam novum statum, ut scilicet ei nihil adderetur de novo. Et ideo post sex dies ponitur septima, deputata cessationi ab opere.

Q74: All the seven days in common

  1. The sufficiency of these days
  2. Are they all one day, or more than one?
  3. Certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days

Thursday, January 22, 2009

Q73 A3: Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?

Yes. The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God.

Non propter hoc dies septimus sanctificatur, quia Deo possit aliquid accrescere vel decrescere, sed quia creaturis aliquid accrescit per multiplicationem et quietem in Deo.

God's rest on the seventh day is understood in two ways.

Requies Dei in die septima dupliciter accipitur.

First, in that He ceased from producing new works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has made.

Primo quidem, quantum ad hoc, quod cessavit a novis operibus condendis, ita tamen quod creaturam conditam conservat et administrat.

According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh day, since, as we explained (Q72, A1, RO4), the blessing referred to the increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures which He blessed: "Increase and multiply." Now, this increase is effected through God's Providence over His creatures, securing the generation of like from like.

Quantum ergo ad primum, competit septimae diei benedictio. Quia, sicut supra dictum est, benedictio ad multiplicationem pertinet, unde dictum est creaturis quas benedixit, crescite et multiplicamini. Multiplicatio autem rerum fit per administrationem creaturae, secundum quam ex similibus similia generantur.

Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself.

Alio modo, secundum quod post opera requievit in seipso.

And according to the second meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God. For this reason things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.

Quantum vero ad secundum, competit septimae diei sanctificatio. Maxime enim sanctificatio cuiuslibet attenditur in hoc quod in Deo requiescit, unde et res Deo dedicatae sanctae dicuntur.

In the first six days creatures were produced in their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its fruition.

In primis sex diebus productae sunt res in suis primis causis. Sed postea ex illis primis causis res multiplicantur et conservantur, quod etiam ad bonitatem divinam pertinet. Cuius etiam perfectio in hoc maxime ostenditur quod in ipsa sola et ipse requiescit, et nos requiescere possumus, ea fruentes.

The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the seventh day, to its propagation.

Bonum quod in singulis diebus commemoratur, pertinet ad primam naturae institutionem, benedictio autem diei septimae pertinet ad naturae propagationem.

Wednesday, January 21, 2009

Q73 A2: Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?

Yes. God did rest on the seventh day from all His work. First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for, as said above (Q73, A1, RO3), He made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly, because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was happy in the fruition of Himself.

Septima die requievit ab omni opere. Primo quidem, quia die septima cessavit novas creaturas condere, nihil enim postea fecit, quod non aliquo modo praecesserit in primis operibus, ut dictum est. Alio modo, secundum quod rebus conditis ipse non indigebat, sed seipso fruendo beatus est.

Hence, when all things were made He is not said to have rested "in" His works, as though needing them for His own happiness, but to have rested "from" them, as in fact resting in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire.

Unde post conditionem omnium operum, non dicitur quod in suis operibus requievit, quasi eis ad suam beatitudinem indigens, sed ab eis requievit, utique in seipso, quia ipse sufficit sibi et implet desiderium suum.

And even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God's resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).

Et quamvis ab aeterno in seipso requieverit, tamen quod post opera condita in seipso requievit, hoc pertinet ad septimum diem. Et hoc est ab operibus requiescere, ut Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt.

Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an external object.

Requies non opponitur labori sive motui, sed productioni novarum rerum, et desiderio in aliud tendenti, ut dictum est.

Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal explanation.

Sicut Deus in solo se requiescit, et se fruendo beatus est; ita et nos per solam Dei fruitionem beati efficimur. Et sic etiam facit nos a suis et nostris operibus in seipso requiescere. Est ergo conveniens expositio, ut dicatur Deus requievisse, quia nos requiescere facit. Sed non est haec sola ponenda, sed alia expositio est principalior et prior.

God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new ones.

Deus usque modo operatur, conservando et administrando creaturam conditam, non autem novam creaturam condendo.

Tuesday, January 20, 2009

Q73 A1: Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day?

Yes. The completion of the Divine works does belong to the seventh day because on the seventh day was the consummation of nature; in Christ's Incarnation, the consummation of grace; and at the end of the world will be the consummation of glory.

Completio divinorum operum competit diei septimo quod in septima die fuit consummatio naturae; in incarnatione Christi, consummatio gratiae; in fine mundi, consummatio gloriae.

The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first perfection and the second perfection. The 'first' perfection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole having its parts complete.

Duplex est rei perfectio, prima, et secunda. Prima quidem perfectio est, secundum quod res in sua substantia est perfecta. Quae quidem perfectio est forma totius, quae ex integritate partium consurgit.

But the 'second' perfection is the end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the principle of operation.

Perfectio autem secunda est finis. Finis autem vel est operatio, sicut finis citharistae est citharizare, vel est aliquid ad quod per operationem pervenitur, sicut finis aedificatoris est domus, quam aedificando facit. Prima autem perfectio est causa secundae, quia forma est principium operationis.

Now the final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to the seventh day.

Ultima autem perfectio, quae est finis totius universi, est perfecta beatitudo sanctorum; quae erit in ultima consummatione saeculi. Prima autem perfectio, quae est in integritate universi, fuit in prima rerum institutione. Et haec deputatur septimo diei.

Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are required, nature and grace.

Ad beatitudinem autem consequendam duo requiruntur, natura et gratia.

But this consummation existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (John 1:17).

Sed ista consummatio praecessit causaliter, quantum ad naturam quidem, in prima rerum institutione, quantum ad gratiam vero, in incarnatione Christi, quia "gratia et veritas per Iesum Christum facta est," ut dicitur Ioan. I.

God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the "second" perfection.

Septima die Deus aliquid operatus est, non novam creaturam condendo, sed creaturam administrando, et ad propriam operationem eam movendo, quod iam aliqualiter pertinet ad inchoationem quandam secundae perfectionis.

Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days.

Nihil postmodum a Deo factum est totaliter novum, quin aliqualiter in operibus sex dierum praecesserit.

The glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the empyrean. Hence it is written (Ecclesiastes 1:10), "Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us."

Gloria etiam spiritualis secundum similitudinem praecessit in Angelis, corporalis vero in caelo, praecipue Empyreo. Unde dicitur Eccle. I, "nihil sub sole novum; iam enim praecessit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos."

Q73: The things that belong to the seventh day

  1. The completion of the works
  2. The resting of God
  3. The blessing and sanctifying of this day
Igitur perfecti sunt caeli et terra et omnis exercitus eorum.

Complevitque Deus die septimo opus suum, quod fecerat, et requievit die septimo ab universo opere, quod patrarat.

Et benedixit Deus diei septimo et sanctificavit illum, quia in ipso requieverat ab omni opere suo, quod creavit Deus, ut faceret.

(Gen 2:1-3)

Monday, January 19, 2009

Q72 A1: The work of the sixth day

Is the work of the sixth day fittingly described?

Dixit quoque Deus: “Producat terra animam viventem in genere suo, iumenta et reptilia et bestias terrae secundum species suas”. Factumque est ita.

Et fecit Deus bestias terrae iuxta species suas et iumenta secundum species suas et omne reptile terrae in genere suo. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum.

Et ait Deus: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram; et praesint piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et bestiis universaeque terrae omnique reptili, quod movetur in terra”.

Et creavit Deus hominem ad imaginem suam;
ad imaginem Dei creavit illum;
masculum et feminam creavit eos.

Benedixitque illis Deus et ait illis Deus: “Crescite et multiplicamini et replete terram et subicite eam et dominamini piscibus maris et volatilibus caeli et universis animantibus, quae moventur super terram”.

Dixitque Deus: “Ecce dedi vobis omnem herbam afferentem semen super terram et universa ligna, quae habent in semetipsis fructum ligni portantem sementem, ut sint vobis in escam

et cunctis animantibus terrae omnique volucri caeli et universis, quae moventur in terra et in quibus est anima vivens, omnem herbam virentem ad vescendum”. Et factum est ita.

Viditque Deus cuncta, quae fecit, et ecce erant valde bona. Et factum est vespere et mane, dies sextus.

(Gen 1:24-31)

Yes. Therefore the words, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature," should not rather have been, "Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures," because Scripture does not call fishes "living creatures," but "creeping creatures having life"; whereas it does call land animals "living creatures" on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them.

Convenienter dicitur, "producat terra animam viventem"; sed non debuit dici, "producat terra quadrupedia animae viventis".

Et ideo pisces vocat, non animam viventem, sed reptile animae viventis, sed terrena animalia vocat animam viventem, propter perfectionem vitae in eis, ac si pisces sint corpora habentia aliquid animae, terrestria vero animalia, propter perfectionem vitae, sint quasi animae dominantes corporibus.

But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God.

Perfectissimus autem gradus vitae est in homine. Et ideo vitam hominis non dicit produci a terra vel aqua, sicut ceterorum animalium, sed a Deo.

Again, animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas man is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God."

Vel quia animalia et plantae producuntur secundum genus et speciem suam, quasi longe a similitudine divina remota, homo autem dicitur formatus ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei.

In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i): "If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use, laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe."

Augustinus dicit in I super Gen. contra Manichaeos, "si in alicuius opificis officinam imperitus intraverit, videt ibi multa instrumenta quorum causas ignorat, et si multum est insipiens, superflua putat. Iam vero si in fornacem incautus ceciderit, aut ferramento aliquo acuto se vulneraverit, noxia existimat ibi esse multa, quorum usum quia novit artifex, insipientiam eius irridet. Sic in hoc mundo quidam audent multa reprehendere, quorum causas non vident, multa enim, etsi domui nostrae non sunt necessaria, eis tamen completur universitatis integritas."

Sunday, January 18, 2009

Q71 A1: The work of the fifth day

Is the work of the fifth day fittingly described?

Dixit etiam Deus: “Pullulent aquae reptile animae viventis, et volatile volet super terram sub firmamento caeli”.

Creavitque Deus cete grandia et omnem animam viventem atque motabilem, quam pullulant aquae secundum species suas, et omne volatile secundum genus suum. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum;

benedixitque eis Deus dicens: “Crescite et multiplicamini et replete aquas maris, avesque multiplicentur super terram”.

Et factum est vespere et mane, dies quintus.

(Gen 1:20-23)

Yes. The words, "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth," fittingly describe this work because at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine teaches.

Convenienter dicitur, "producant aquae reptile animae viventis, et volatile super terram," quod in prima autem rerum institutione, fuit principium activum verbum Dei, quod ex materia elementari produxit animalia vel in actu, secundum alios sanctos; vel virtute, secundum Augustinum.

Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars.

Non quod aqua aut terra habeat in se virtutem producendi omnia animalia, ut Avicenna posuit, sed quia hoc ipsum quod ex materia elementari, virtute seminis vel stellarum, possunt animalia produci, est ex virtute primitus elementis data.

Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially.

Alii enim dicunt pisces et aves quinta die esse productos in actu, Augustinus autem dicit, V super Gen. ad Litt., quod quinta die aquarum natura produxit pisces et aves potentialiter.

Saturday, January 17, 2009

Q70 A3: Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?

No. The heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally because the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words.

Sic igitur patet quod corpora caelestia non sunt animata eo modo quo plantae et animalia, sed aequivoce. Unde inter ponentes ea esse animata, et ponentes ea inanimata, parva vel nulla differentia invenitur in re, sed in voce tantum.

The movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he moves.

Relinquitur ergo quod propter solam motionem. Ad hoc autem quod moveat, non oportet quod uniatur ei ut forma; sed per contactum virtutis, sicut motor unitur mobili.

Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other not.

Unde Aristoteles, libro VIII Physic., postquam ostendit quod primum movens seipsum componitur ex duabus partibus, quarum una est movens et alia mota; assignans quomodo hae duae partes uniantur, dicit quod per contactum vel duorum ad invicem, si utrumque sit corpus, vel unius ad alterum et non e converso, si unum sit corpus et aliud non corpus.

The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power.

Platonici etiam animas corporibus uniri non ponebant nisi per contactum virtutis, sicut motor mobili. Et sic per hoc quod Plato ponit corpora caelestia animata, nihil aliud datur intelligi, quam quod substantiae spirituales uniuntur corporibus caelestibus ut motores mobilibus.

A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances.

Quod autem corpora caelestia moveantur ab aliqua substantia apprehendente, et non solum a natura, sicut gravia et levia, patet ex hoc, quod natura non movet nisi ad unum, quo habito quiescit, quod in motu corporum caelestium non apparet.

Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4).

Unde relinquitur quod moventur ab aliqua substantia apprehendente Augustinus etiam dicit, III de Trin., corpora omnia administrari a Deo per spiritum vitae.

Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).

Augustinus vero sub dubio dereliquit, in neutram partem declinans, ut patet in II supra Gen. ad Litt.; et in Enchirid., ubi etiam dicit quod, si sunt animata caelestia corpora, pertinent ad societatem Angelorum eorum animae.

The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power.

Motus corporis caelestis est naturalis, non propter principium activum, sed propter principium passivum, quia scilicet habet in sua natura aptitudinem ut tali motu ab intellectu moveatur.

Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent.

Corpus caeleste, cum sit movens motum, habet rationem instrumenti, quod agit in virtute principalis agentis. Et ideo ex virtute sui motoris, qui est substantia vivens, potest causare vitam.

Friday, January 16, 2009

Q70 A2: Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?

Yes. The heavenly lights were made to be signs because light was given to the earth for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies.

Luminaria in signa facta sunt quod in illuminatione terrae intelligitur utilitas hominis, qui secundum animam praefertur corporibus luminarium.

The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which depend upon the free-will.

Luminaria sunt in signa corporalium transmutationum, non autem eorum quae dependent ex libero arbitrio.

The general division of time into day and night took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than another, and one year than another, are due to certain particular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their beginning on the fourth day.

In prima die facta est communis distinctio temporis per diem et noctem, secundum motum diurnum, qui est communis totius caeli; qui potest intelligi incoepisse primo die. Sed speciales distinctiones dierum et temporum, secundum quod dies est calidior die, et tempus tempore, et annus anno, fiunt secundum speciales motus stellarum; qui possunt intelligi quarto die incoepisse.

For although the perfect is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.

Licet enim naturali processu ab imperfecto ad perfectum deveniatur, simpliciter tamen perfectum prius est imperfecto. Augustinus tamen hoc non asserit, quia dicit non esse inconveniens quod Deus imperfecta fecerit, quae postmodum ipse perfecit.

As we have said above (Q65, A2), a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures (nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of the universe), or for the whole universe, or for the glory of God.

Sicut dictum est supra, creatura aliqua corporalis potest dici esse facta vel propter actum proprium, vel propter aliam creaturam (nihil tamen prohibet dici quod dignior creatura facta est propter inferiorem, non secundum quod in se consideratur sed secundum quod ordinatur ad integritatem universi), vel propter totum universum, vel propter gloriam Dei.

Of these reasons only that which points out the usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Deuteronomy 4:19): "Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all nations."

Sed Moyses, ut populum ab idololatria revocaret, illam solam causam tetigit, secundum quod sunt facta ad utilitatem hominum. Unde dicitur Deut. IV, "ne forte, elevatis oculis ad caelum, videas solem et lunam et omnia astra caeli, et errore deceptus adores ea et colas, quae creavit dominus Deus in ministerium cunctis gentibus."

Thursday, January 15, 2009

Q70 A1: Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?

Yes. The lights were produced on the fourth day because just as distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local movement, as separating one from another, so the work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens, and upon the earth.

Luminaria sunt facta quarta die. Distinctio autem aliquorum maxime manifestatur per motum localem, quo ab invicem separantur. Et ideo ad opus ornatus pertinet productio illarum rerum quae habent motum in caelo et in terra.

In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a determination of power.

Secundum Augustinum, nulla difficultas ex hoc oritur. Non enim ponit successionem temporis in istis operibus, et ideo non oportet dicere quod materia luminarium fuerit sub alia forma. Secundum etiam eos qui ponunt caelestia corpora ex natura quatuor elementorum, nulla difficultas accidit, quia potest dici quod sunt formata ex praeiacenti materia, sicut animalia et plantae. Sed secundum eos qui ponunt corpora caelestia esse alterius naturae ab elementis et incorruptibilia per naturam, oportet dicere quod substantia luminarium a principio fuit creata; sed prius erat informis, et nunc formatur; non quidem forma substantiali, sed per collationem determinatae virtutis.

Three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received their form from the three days' work of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first day; on the second day the waters were separated; and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land.

De tribus fit mentio in creatione, scilicet de caelo et aqua et terra. Et haec tria etiam formantur per opus distinctionis tribus diebus, primo die, caelum; secundo die distinguuntur aquae; tertio die fit distinctio in terra, maris et aridae.

So also is it in the work of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one; while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it.

Et similiter in opere ornatus, primo die, qui est quartus, producuntur luminaria, quae moventur in caelo, ad ornatum ipsius. Secundo die, qui est quintus, aves et pisces, ad ornatum medii elementi, quia habent motum in aere et aqua, quae pro uno accipiuntur. Tertio die, qui est sextus, producuntur animalia quae habent motum in terra, ad ornatum ipsius.

It must also here be noted that Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: "Let the firmament produce lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb."

Sed sciendum est quod in productione luminarium non discordat Augustinus ab aliis sanctis. Dicit enim luminaria esse facta in actu, non in virtute tantum, non enim habet firmamentum virtutem productivam luminarium, sicut habet terra virtutem productivam plantarum. Unde Scriptura non dicit, producat firmamentum luminaria; sicut dicit, germinet terra herbam virentem.

Q70: The work of adornment, as regards the fourth day

  1. The production of the lights
  2. The end of their production
  3. Are they living beings?
Dixit autem Deus: “Fiant luminaria in firmamento caeli, ut dividant diem ac noctem et sint in signa et tempora et dies et annos,

ut luceant in firmamento caeli et illuminent terram. Et factum est ita.

Fecitque Deus duo magna luminaria: luminare maius, ut praeesset diei, et luminare minus, ut praeesset nocti, et stellas.

Et posuit eas Deus in firmamento caeli, ut lucerent super terram

et praeessent diei ac nocti et dividerent lucem ac tenebras. Et vidit Deus quod esset bonum.

Et factum est vespere et mane, dies quartus.

(Gen 1:14-19)

Wednesday, January 14, 2009

Q69 A2: Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day?

Yes. The production of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface because in these first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and on the third day, as was said (Q69, A1), the formless state of the earth comes to an end.

Ante ergo quam orirentur super terram, factae sunt causaliter in terra ... quia in illis primis diebus condidit Deus creaturam originaliter vel causaliter, et sicut supra dictum est, in tertia die informitas terrae removetur.

Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce them.

Augustinus autem, V Sup. Gen. ad Litt., dicit quod "causaliter tunc dictum est produxisse terram herbam et lignum, idest producendi accepisse virtutem".

Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is treated as a part of the earth's formation.

Vita in plantis est occulta, quia carent motu locali et sensu, quibus animatum ab inanimato maxime distinguitur. Et ideo, quia immobiliter terrae inhaerent, earum productio ponitur quasi quaedam terrae formatio.

Moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we have said (Q67, A4; Q68, A3). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he makes no mention of them.

Moyses ea tantum proposuit quae in manifesto apparent, sicut iam dictum est. Corpora autem mineralia habent generationem occultam in visceribus terrae. Et iterum, non habent manifestam distinctionem a terra, sed quaedam terrae species videntur. Et ideo de eis mentionem non fecit.

Tuesday, January 13, 2009

Q69 A1: Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as recorded, on the third day?

Yes. The words, "Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land appear," mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.

Unde per hoc quod dicitur, congregentur aquae, et appareat arida, intelligitur quod materiae corporali impressa est forma substantialis aquae, per quam competit sibi talis motus; et forma substantialis terrae, per quam competit sibi sic videri.

In all these works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature. He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated by the words "earth" and "water." Not that this formlessness preceded formation, in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest or spiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it is said that light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the lower.

Augustinus enim in omnibus his operibus non ponit durationis ordinem, sed solum originis et naturae. Dicit enim primo creatam naturam spiritualem informem, et naturam corporalem absque omni forma (quam dicit primo significari nomine terrae et aquae), non quia haec informitas formationem praecesserit tempore, sed origine tantum. Neque una formatio, secundum eum, praecessit aliam duratione; sed solum naturae ordine. Secundum quem ordinem necesse fuit ut primo poneretur formatio supremae naturae, scilicet spiritualis, per hoc quod legitur prima die lux facta. Sicut autem spiritualis natura praeeminet corporali, ita superiora corpora praeeminent inferioribus.

Hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the second place, by the words, "Let there be made a firmament," by which is to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only.

Unde secundo loco tangitur formatio superiorum corporum, cum dicitur, fiat firmamentum; per quod intelligitur impressio formae caelestis in materiam informem, non prius existentem tempore, sed origine tantum.

But in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only.

Tertio vero loco ponitur impressio formarum elementarium in materiam informem, non tempore, sed origine praecedentem.

According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned, but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself.

Secundum Augustinum, per terram de qua primo fiebat mentio, intelligitur materia prima, nunc autem intelligitur ipsum elementum terrae.