Monday, September 07, 2009

1a 2ae q1 a2: Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end? No.

Omnia quae carent ratione, moveantur in fines particulares ab aliqua voluntate rationali, quae se extendit in bonum universale, scilicet a voluntate divina, quia manifestum est quod particulares causae moventur a causa universali.

All things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will, because it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause.

Omnia agentia necesse est agere propter finem. Causarum enim ad invicem ordinatarum, si prima subtrahatur, necesse est alias subtrahi. Prima autem inter omnes causas est causa finalis.

Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause.

Cuius ratio est, quia materia non consequitur formam nisi secundum quod movetur ab agente, nihil enim reducit se de potentia in actum. Agens autem non movet nisi ex intentione finis. Si enim agens non esset determinatum ad aliquem effectum, non magis ageret hoc quam illud, ad hoc ergo quod determinatum effectum producat, necesse est quod determinetur ad aliquid certum, quod habet rationem finis.

The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the formal aspect of an end.

Haec autem determinatio, sicut in rationali natura fit per "rationalem appetitum", qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis fit per inclinationem naturalem, quae dicitur "appetitus naturalis".

And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."

Obiectum voluntatis est finis et bonum in universali. Unde non potest esse voluntas in his quae carent ratione et intellectu, cum non possint apprehendere universale; sed est in eis appetitus naturalis vel sensitivus, determinatus ad aliquod bonum particulare.

The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some particular good.

Philosophus probat in II Physic., quod "non solum intellectus, sed etiam natura agit propter finem".

The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that "not only mind but also nature acts for an end."