Monday, September 27, 2010

1a 2ae q52 a1: Whether habits increase? Yes.

Dupliciter potest intensio et remissio in habitibus et dispositionibus considerari quia habitus et dispositiones dicantur secundum ordinem ad aliquid (ut dicitur in VII Physic.).

In two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions because we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17).

Uno modo, secundum se, prout dicitur maior vel minor sanitas; vel maior vel minor scientia, quae ad plura vel pauciora se extendit.

First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things.

Alio modo, secundum participationem subiecti, prout scilicet aequalis scientia vel sanitas magis recipitur in uno quam in alio, secundum diversam aptitudinem vel ex natura vel ex consuetudine. Non enim habitus et dispositio dat speciem subiecto, neque iterum in sui ratione includit indivisibilitatem.

Secondly, in respect of participation by the subject: insofar as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they, in their formal aspect, imply indivisibility.

1a 2ae q52: The increase of habits

  1. Do habits increase?
  2. Do they increase by addition?
  3. Does each act increase the habit?

Friday, September 17, 2010

1a 2ae q51 a4: Whether any habits are infused in man by God? Yes.

Aliqui habitus homini a Deo infunduntur, quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum est.

Some habits are infused by God into man, because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above (q5 a5).

Et quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur secundum ipsos, ideo necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae naturae. Unde tales habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina, sicut est de omnibus gratuitis virtutibus.

And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.

Alia ratio est, quia Deus potest producere effectus causarum secundarum absque ipsis causis secundis, ut in primo dictum est. Sicut igitur quandoque, ad ostensionem suae virtutis, producit sanitatem absque naturali causa, quae tamen per naturam posset causari, ita etiam quandoque, ad ostendendam suam virtutem, infundit homini illos etiam habitus qui naturali virtute possunt causari. Sicut apostolis dedit scientiam Scripturarum et omnium linguarum, quam homines per studium vel consuetudinem acquirere possunt, licet non ita perfecte.

The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in S.T. I, 105, 6. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.

Hoc quod Deus in omnibus operatur secundum modum eorum, non excludit quin Deus quaedam operetur quae natura operari non potest, sed ex hoc sequitur quod nihil operatur contra id quod naturae convenit.

That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do, but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which befits nature.

Actus qui producuntur ex habitu infuso, non causant aliquem habitum, sed confirmant habitum praeexistentem, sicut medicinalia remedia adhibita homini sano per naturam, non causant aliquam sanitatem, sed sanitatem prius habitam corroborant.

Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a certain habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally healthy, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.

Thursday, September 16, 2010

1a 2ae q51 a3: Whether a habit can be caused by one act? No.

Habitus virtutis, et eadem ratione alius habitus, non causatur per unum actum, quia habitus per actum generatur inquantum potentia passiva movetur ab aliquo principio activo; ad hoc autem quod aliqua qualitas causetur in passivo, oportet quod activum totaliter vincat passivum.

A habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act, because a habit is generated by act inasmuch as a passive power is moved by some active principle; but in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive, the active principle must entirely overcome the passive.

Manifestum est autem quod principium activum quod est ratio, non totaliter potest supervincere appetitivam potentiam in uno actu, eo quod appetitiva potentia se habet diversimode et ad multa; iudicatur autem per rationem, in uno actu, aliquid appetendum secundum determinatas rationes et circumstantias.

Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances.

Unde ex hoc non totaliter vincitur appetitiva potentia, ut feratur in idem ut in pluribus, per modum naturae, quod pertinet ad habitum virtutis. Et ideo habitus virtutis non potest causari per unum actum, sed per multos.

Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.

In apprehensivis autem potentiis considerandum est quod duplex est passivum, unum quidem ipse intellectus possibilis; aliud autem intellectus quem vocat Aristoteles passivum, qui est ratio particularis, idest vis cogitativa cum memorativa et imaginativa.

But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the "possible" [See I, 79, 2 ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls "passive," and is the "particular reason," that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination.

Respectu igitur primi passivi, potest esse aliquod activum quod uno actu totaliter vincit potentiam sui passivi, sicut una propositio per se nota convincit intellectum ad assentiendum firmiter conclusioni; quod quidem non facit propositio probabilis. Unde ex multis actibus rationis oportet causari habitum opinativum, etiam ex parte intellectus possibilis, habitum autem scientiae possibile est causari ex uno rationis actu, quantum ad intellectum possibilem.

With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the "possible" intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the "possible" intellect is concerned.

Sed quantum ad inferiores vires apprehensivas, necessarium est eosdem actus pluries reiterari, ut aliquid firmiter memoriae imprimatur. Unde philosophus, in libro de memoria et reminiscentia, dicit quod meditatio confirmat memoriam. Habitus autem corporales possibile est causari ex uno actu, si activum fuerit magnae virtutis, sicut quandoque medicina fortis statim inducit sanitatem.

But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that "meditation strengthens memory." Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.

Philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod "una hirundo ver non facit, nec una dies, ita utique nec beatum nec felicem una dies, nec paucum tempus".

The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): "As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy."

Sed "beatitudo est operatio secundum habitum perfectae virtutis", ut dicitur in I Ethic.

But "happiness is the activity of a habit of perfect excellence" (Ethic. i, 7,10,13).

Wednesday, September 15, 2010

1a 2ae q51 a2: Whether any habit is caused by acts? Yes.

Invenitur autem aliquod agens in quo est principium activum et passivum sui actus, sicut patet in actibus humanis, quia actus appetitivae virtutis procedunt a vi appetitiva secundum quod movetur a vi apprehensiva repraesentante obiectum, et ulterius vis intellectiva, secundum quod ratiocinatur de conclusionibus, habet sicut principium activum propositionem per se notam.

A certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts, because the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition.

Unde ex talibus actibus possunt in agentibus aliqui habitus causari, non quidem quantum ad primum activum principium, sed quantum ad principium actus quod movet motum. Nam omne quod patitur et movetur ab alio, disponitur per actum agentis.

Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents, not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent.

Idem, secundum idem, non potest esse movens et motum. Nihil autem prohibet idem a seipso moveri secundum diversa, ut in VIII Physic. probatur.

The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.

Unde ex multiplicatis actibus generatur quaedam qualitas in potentia passiva et mota, quae nominatur habitus. Sicut habitus virtutum moralium causantur in appetitivis potentiis, secundum quod moventur a ratione, et habitus scientiarum causantur in intellectu, secundum quod movetur a primis propositionibus.

Wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions.

Monday, September 13, 2010

1a 2ae q51 a1: Whether any habit is from nature? Yes.

Intellectus principiorum dicitur esse habitus naturalis, quia ex ipsa natura animae intellectualis, convenit homini quod statim, cognito quid est totum et quid est pars, cognoscat quod omne totum est maius sua parte, et simile est in ceteris.

The understanding of first principles is called a natural habit, because it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part, and in like manner with regard to other such principles.

Sed quid sit totum, et quid sit pars, cognoscere non potest nisi per species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus acceptas. Et propter hoc philosophus, in fine posteriorum, ostendit quod cognitio principiorum provenit nobis ex sensu.

Yet what is a whole, and what is a part--this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.

Sed habitus qui est dispositio ad operationem, cuius subiectum est potentia animae, ut dictum est, potest quidem esse naturalis et secundum naturam speciei, et secundum naturam individui. Secundum quidem naturam speciei, secundum quod se tenet ex parte ipsius animae, quae, cum sit forma corporis, est principium specificum. Secundum autem naturam individui, ex parte corporis, quod est materiale principium.

The habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (q50 a2), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle.

Sed tamen neutro modo contingit in hominibus esse habitus naturales ita quod sint totaliter a natura. In Angelis siquidem contingit, eo quod habent species intelligibiles naturaliter inditas, quod non competit animae humanae, ut in primo dictum est.

Yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in S.T. I, 55, 2; I, 84, 3.

Sicut in Angelis non potest pertinere ad ipsam potentiam intellectivam quod sit per se cognoscitiva omnium, quia oporteret quod esset actus omnium, quod solius Dei est. Id enim quo aliquid cognoscitur, oportet esse actualem similitudinem eius quod cognoscitur, unde sequeretur, si potentia Angeli per seipsam cognosceret omnia, quod esset similitudo et actus omnium.

With regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things.

Unde oportet quod superaddantur potentiae intellectivae ipsius aliquae species intelligibiles, quae sunt similitudines rerum intellectarum, quia per participationem divinae sapientiae, et non per essentiam propriam, possunt intellectus eorum esse actu ea quae intelligunt.

Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand.

Sic igitur si loquamur de habitu secundum quod est dispositio subiecti in ordine ad formam vel naturam, quolibet praedictorum modorum contingit habitum esse naturalem. Est enim aliqua dispositio naturalis quae debetur humanae speciei, extra quam nullus homo invenitur. Et haec est naturalis secundum naturam speciei.

If we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature.

Sed quia talis dispositio quandam latitudinem habet, contingit diversos gradus huiusmodi dispositionis convenire diversis hominibus secundum naturam individui. Et huiusmodi dispositio potest esse vel totaliter a natura, vel partim a natura et partim ab exteriori principio.

But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle.

In VI Ethic., inter alios habitus ponitur intellectus principiorum, qui est a natura, unde et principia prima dicuntur naturaliter cognita.

In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature, wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.

1a 2ae q51: The cause of habits, as to their formation

  1. Is any habit from nature?
  2. Is any habit caused by acts?
  3. Can any habit be caused by one act?
  4. Are habits infused in man by God?

Sunday, September 12, 2010

1a 2ae q50 a6: Whether there are habits in the angels? Yes.

Quidam posuerunt in Angelis non esse habitus, sed inquantum invenitur in eis de potentia, intantum in eis possunt habitus inveniri, quia, licet in Angelis non sit potentia materiae, est tamen in eis aliqua potentia (esse enim actum purum est proprium Dei).

Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, but as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them, because, though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone).

Quantum ad hoc quod convenit Angelis per suam essentiam, non indigent habitu. Sed quia non ita sunt per seipsos entes, quin participent sapientiam et bonitatem divinam, ideo inquantum indigent participare aliquid ab exteriori, intantum necesse est in eis ponere habitus.

As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits.

In Angelis non sunt partes essentiae, sed sunt partes secundum potentiam, inquantum intellectus eorum per plures species perficitur, et voluntas eorum se habet ad plura.

In angels there are no essential parts, but there are potential parts, insofar as their intellect is perfected by several species, and insofar as their will has a relation to several things.

Sed quia potentia materiae et potentia intellectualis substantiae non est unius rationis, ideo per consequens nec habitus unius rationis est utrobique. Unde Simplicius dicit, in commento praedicamentorum, quod "habitus intellectualis substantiae non sunt similes his qui sunt hic habitibus, sed magis sunt similes simplicibus et immaterialibus speciebus quas continet in seipsa".

Since the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind, habits do not have one and the same aspect on both sides. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: "The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial species which [the angel] contains in itself."

Circa huiusmodi tamen habitum aliter se habet intellectus angelicus, et aliter intellectus humanus. Intellectus enim humanus, cum sit infimus in ordine intellectuum, est in potentia respectu omnium intelligibilium, sicut materia prima respectu omnium formarum sensibilium; et ideo ad omnia intelligenda indiget aliquo habitu.

The angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to a habit of this sort. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit.

Sed intellectus angelicus non se habet sicut pura potentia in genere intelligibilium, sed sicut actus quidam; non autem sicut actus purus (hoc enim solius Dei est), sed cum permixtione alicuius potentiae: et tanto minus habet de potentialitate, quanto est superior.

But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has.

Et ideo, ut in primo dictum est, inquantum est in potentia, indiget perfici habitualiter per aliquas species intelligibiles ad operationem propriam; sed inquantum est actu, per essentiam suam potest aliqua intelligere: ad minus seipsum, et alia secundum modum suae substantiae (ut dicitur in Lib. de causis), et tanto perfectius, quanto est perfectior.

And therefore, as we said above (in S.T. I, 55, 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation; but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things: at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance (as stated in De Causis), and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.

Sed quia nullus Angelus pertingit ad perfectionem Dei, sed in infinitum distat; propter hoc, ad attingendum ad ipsum Deum per intellectum et voluntatem, indigent aliquibus habitibus, tanquam in potentia existentes respectu illius puri actus. Unde Dionysius dicit habitus eorum esse deiformes, quibus scilicet Deo conformantur.

But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are "deiform", that is to say, that by them they are conformed to the likeness of God.

Habitus autem qui sunt dispositiones ad esse naturale, non sunt in Angelis, cum sint immateriales.

But those habits that are dispositions to natural being are not in angels, since they are not material.

Dionysius dicit, VII cap. Cael. Hier., quod "Angeli primae hierarchiae nominantur calefacientes et throni et effusio sapientiae, manifestatio deiformis ipsorum habituum".

Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "the angels are of the first hierarchy are called Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the deiformity of their habits".

Saturday, September 11, 2010

1a 2ae q50 a5: Whether any habit is in the will? Yes.

Oportet in voluntate aliquem habitum ponere, quo bene disponatur ad suum actum, quia voluntas, cum sit potentia rationalis, diversimode potest ad agendum ordinari.

In the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act because, since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act.

Necesse est quod in voluntate, et in aliis viribus appetitivis, sint quaedam qualitates inclinantes, quae dicuntur habitus.

It is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.

Sicut in intellectu est aliqua species quae est similitudo obiecti, ita oportet in voluntate, et in qualibet vi appetitiva, esse aliquid quo inclinetur in suum obiectum; cum nihil aliud sit actus appetitivae virtutis quam inclinatio quaedam, ut supra dictum est.

Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object, so in the will, and in every appetitive power, there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above (q6 a4; q22 a2).

Friday, September 10, 2010

1a 2ae q50 a4: Whether there is any habit in the intellect? Yes.

Ipse intellectus possibilis est in quo est habitus scientiae quo potest considerare etiam cum non considerat, quia intelligere et considerare est proprius actus intellectus.

The possible intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider, because to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect.

Potentia ad esse sensibile convenit materiae corporali, ita potentia ad esse intelligibile convenit intellectui possibili. Unde nihil prohibet in intellectu possibili esse habitum, qui est medius inter puram potentiam et actum perfectum.

As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the possible intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the possible intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.

Vires apprehensivae interius praeparant intellectui possibili proprium obiectum, ideo ex bona dispositione harum virium, ad quam cooperatur bona dispositio corporis, redditur homo habilis ad intelligendum. Et sic habitus intellectivus secundario potest esse in istis viribus. Principaliter autem est in intellectu possibili.

Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the possible intellect, therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the possible intellect.

Ipsum autem intelligere non dicitur commune esse animae et corpori, nisi ratione phantasmatis, ut dicitur in I de anima. Patet autem quod phantasma comparatur ad intellectum possibilem ut obiectum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde relinquitur quod habitus intellectivus sit principaliter ex parte ipsius intellectus, non autem ex parte phantasmatis, quod est commune animae et corpori.

Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except by the aspect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself, and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body.

Et ideo dicendum est quod intellectus possibilis est subiectum habitus, illi enim competit esse subiectum habitus, quod est in potentia ad multa; et hoc maxime competit intellectui possibili. Unde intellectus possibilis est subiectum habituum intellectualium.

And therefore we must say that the possible intellect is the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many, and this belongs, above all, to the possible intellect. Wherefore the possible intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.

Philosophus, in VI Ethic., ponit scientiam et sapientiam et intellectum, qui est habitus principiorum, in ipsa intellectiva parte animae.

The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul.

Thursday, September 09, 2010

1a 2ae q50 a3: Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts? Yes.

Vires sensitivae natae sunt obedire imperio rationis, et ideo in eis esse possunt aliqui habitus, quia secundum quod obediunt rationi, quodammodo rationales dicuntur, ut in I Ethic. dicitur.

The sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore habits can be in them, because insofar as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.

Vires nutritivae partis non sunt natae obedire imperio rationis, et ideo non sunt in eis aliqui habitus.

The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them.

Appetitus sensitivus natus est moveri ab appetitu rationali, ut dicitur in III de anima, sed vires rationales apprehensivae natae sunt accipere a viribus sensitivis. Et ideo magis convenit quod habitus sint in viribus sensitivis appetitivis quam in viribus sensitivis apprehensivis, cum in viribus sensitivis appetitivis non sint habitus nisi secundum quod operantur ex imperio rationis.

The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason.

Quamvis etiam in ipsis interioribus viribus sensitivis apprehensivis possint poni aliqui habitus, secundum quos homo fit bene memorativus vel cogitativus vel imaginativus, unde etiam philosophus dicit, in cap. de memoria, quod "consuetudo multum operatur ad bene memorandum", quia etiam istae vires moventur ad operandum ex imperio rationis.

And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that "custom conduces much to a good memory": the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.

Vires autem apprehensivae exteriores, ut visus et auditus et huiusmodi, non sunt susceptivae aliquorum habituum, sed secundum dispositionem suae naturae ordinantur ad suos actus determinatos; sicut et membra corporis, in quibus non sunt habitus, sed magis in viribus imperantibus motum ipsorum.

On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.

Wednesday, September 08, 2010

1a 2ae q50 a2: Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence? No.

Si accipiatur habitus secundum quod habet ordinem ad naturam, sic non potest esse in anima, si tamen de natura humana loquamur, quia ipsa anima est forma completiva humanae naturae; unde secundum hoc, magis potest esse aliquis habitus vel dispositio in corpore per ordinem ad animam, quam in anima per ordinem ad corpus.

If we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul--that is, if we speak of human nature: because the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body.

Sed si loquamur de aliqua superiori natura, cuius homo potest esse particeps, secundum illud II Petr. I, ut simus consortes naturae divinae, sic nihil prohibet in anima secundum suam essentiam esse aliquem habitum, scilicet gratiam, ut infra dicetur.

But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Peter 1, "that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature": thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on (q110 a4).

Si vero accipiatur habitus in ordine ad operationem, sic maxime habitus inveniuntur in anima, inquantum anima non determinatur ad unam operationem, sed se habet ad multas, quod requiritur ad habitum, ut supra dictum est. Et quia anima est principium operationum per suas potentias, ideo secundum hoc, habitus sunt in anima secundum suas potentias.

If we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: insofar as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above (q49 a4). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers.

Essentia animae pertinet ad naturam humanam, non sicut subiectum disponendum ad aliquid aliud, sed sicut forma et natura ad quam aliquis disponitur.

The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed.

Philosophus, in I Ethic., ponit diversos habitus in diversis partibus animae.

The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.

Tuesday, September 07, 2010

1a 2ae q50 a1: Whether there is a habit in the body? Yes.

Supra dictum est, habitus est quaedam dispositio alicuius subiecti existentis in potentia vel ad formam, vel ad operationem. Secundum ergo quod habitus importat dispositionem ad operationem, nullus habitus est principaliter in corpore sicut in subiecto. Omnis enim operatio corporis est aut a naturali qualitate corporis, aut est ab anima movente corpus.

As we have said above (q49 a2 seqq.), habit is a certain disposition of a subject existing in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore insofar as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body, or from the soul moving the body.

Quantum igitur ad illas operationes quae sunt a natura, non disponitur corpus per aliquem habitum, quia virtutes naturales sunt determinatae ad unum; dictum est autem quod habitualis dispositio requiritur ubi subiectum est in potentia ad multa.

Consequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit, because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said (q49 a4) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required.

Operationes vero quae sunt ab anima per corpus, principaliter quidem sunt ipsius animae, secundario vero ipsius corporis. Habitus autem proportionantur operationibus, unde ex similibus actibus, similes habitus causantur, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Et ideo dispositiones ad tales operationes principaliter sunt in anima. In corpore vero possunt esse secundario: inquantum scilicet corpus disponitur et habilitatur ad prompte deserviendum operationibus animae.

As to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion to their operations: whence "by like acts, like habits are formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body: to wit, insofar as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the soul.

Si vero loquamur de dispositione subiecti ad formam, sic habitualis dispositio potest esse in corpore, quod comparatur ad animam sicut subiectum ad formam. Et hoc modo sanitas et pulchritudo, et huiusmodi, habituales dispositiones dicuntur. Non tamen perfecte habent rationem habituum, quia causae eorum ex sua natura de facili transmutabiles sunt.

If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the formal aspect of habit perfectly, because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.

Philosophus, in praedicamentis, sanitatem corporis, vel infirmitatem insanabilem, habitum nominari dicit.

The Philosopher says in the Book of Categories (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called habits.