1a 2ae q38 a5: Whether pain and sadness are assuaged by sleep and baths? Yes.

Huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum, causatur ex his delectatio, quia hoc est quod delectationem facit, ut supra dictum est.

Such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure, because this is precisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above (q31 a1).

Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.

Therefore, since every pleasure assuages sadness, sadness is assuaged by such like bodily remedies.

1a 2ae q38 a4: Whether pain and sadness are assuaged by the contemplation of truth? Yes.

In contemplatione veritatis maxima delectatio consistit, quia omnis delectatio dolorem mitigat, ut supra dictum est, et ideo contemplatio veritatis mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius aliquis est amator sapientiae.

The greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth because every pleasure assuages pain, as stated above (q38 a1), and hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sadness, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom.

In viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu.

In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses.

Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., "videbatur mihi, si se ille mentibus nostris veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut non me sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilo toleraturum."

Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me."

1a 2ae q38 a3: Whether pain or sadness are assuaged by the sympathy of friends? Yes.

Naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis, est consolativus, quia per hoc quod amici contristantur ei, percipit se ab eis amari: quod est delectabile, ut supra dictum est.

When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation, because when a man's friends console him, he sees that he is loved by them: and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (q32 a5).

Unde, cum omnis delectatio mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus condolens tristitiam mitiget.

Consequently, since every pleasure assuages pain, as stated above (q38 a1), it follows that pain is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.

Philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod in tristitiis amicus condolens consolatur.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.

1a 2ae q38 a2: Whether pain or sadness is assuaged by tears? Yes.

Lacrimae et gemitus naturaliter mitigant tristitiam, quia omne nocivum interius clausum magis affligit, quia magis multiplicatur intentio animae circa ipsum; sed quando ad exteriora diffunditur, tunc animae intentio ad exteriora quodammodo disgregatur, et sic interior dolor minuitur. (Et propter hoc, quando homines qui sunt in tristitiis, exterius suam tristitiam manifestant vel fletu aut gemitu, vel etiam verbo, mitigatur tristitia.)

Tears and groans naturally assuage sadness, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it; whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on outward things, so that the inward pain is lessened. (This is why when men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sadness, by tears or groans or even by words, their sadness is assuaged.)

Secundo, quia semper operatio conveniens homini secundum dispositionem in qua est, sibi est delectabilis. Fletus autem et gemitus sunt quaedam operationes convenientes tristato vel dolenti. Et ideo efficiuntur ei delectabiles. Cum igitur omnis delectatio aliqualiter mitiget tristitiam vel dolorem, ut dictum est, sequitur quod per planctum et gemitum tristitia mitigetur.

Secondly, because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a man who is in sadness or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above (q38 a1), every pleasure assuages sadness or pain somewhat, it follows that sadness is assuaged by weeping and groans.

Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod quando dolebat de morte amici, "in solis gemitibus et lacrimis erat ei aliquantula requies".

Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some little refreshment".

1a 2ae q38 a1: Whether pain or sadness is assuaged by every pleasure? Yes.

Ex parte dispositionis subiecti, quaelibet tristitia per quamlibet delectationem mitigari potest, quia licet non omnis delectatio contrarietur omni tristitiae secundum speciem, contrariatur tamen secundum genus, ut supra dictum est.

On the part of the disposition of the subject, any sadness can be assuaged by any delight, because although not every delight is specifically contrary to every sadness, yet it is generically, as stated above (q35, a4).

Delectationes malorum non causant tristitiam in praesenti, sed in futuro, inquantum scilicet mali poenitent de malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt. Et huic tristitiae subvenitur per contrarias delectationes.

The delights of the wicked are not a cause of sadness while they are enjoyed, but afterwards; that is to say, insofar as the wicked repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sadness is healed by contrary delights.

Delectatio est quaedam quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod repugnat appetitui.

Delight is a kind of repose of the appetite in a befitting good; while sadness arises from something unsuited to the appetite.

Philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod "expellit delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si sit fortis".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sadness is driven forth by delight, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense."

1a 2ae q38: The remedies of sadness or pain

1. Is pain or sorrow assuaged by every pleasure?
2. Is it assuaged by weeping?
3. Is it assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
4. Is it assuaged by contemplating the truth?
5. Is it assuaged by sleep and baths?

1a 2ae q37 a4: Whether sadness is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul? Yes.

Tristitia, inter omnes animae passiones, magis corpori nocet, quia tristitia repugnat humanae vitae quantum ad speciem sui motus, et non solum quantum ad mensuram seu quantitatem, sicut aliae animae passiones.

Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body, because sorrow is repugnant to human life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul.

Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis: sicut in omnibus materia proportionatur formae.

Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form.

Illae ergo animae passiones quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare secundum quantitatem: ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi. Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed propter excessum possunt nocere.

Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it.

Passiones autem quae important motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent: sicut timor et desperatio, et prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti, cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.

On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sadness which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil.

1a 2ae q37 a3: Whether sadness or pain weakens all activity? Yes.

Tristitia quamlibet operationem impedit, nunquam enim illud quod cum tristitia facimus, ita bene facimus sicut illud quod facimus cum delectatione, vel sine tristitia, quia voluntas est causa operationis humanae, unde quando operatio est de qua aliquis contristatur, necesse est quod actio debilitetur.

Sadness hinders any action, for we never do that which we do with sadness as well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sadness, because the will is the cause of human action, and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened in consequence.

Philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit operationem, sed e contrario tristitia impedit.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sadness hinders it" (Ethic. x, 5).

1a 2ae q37 a2: Whether the effect of sadness or pain is to burden the soul? Yes.

Tristitia contingit ex aliquo malo praesenti, quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo quod vult.

Sadness is caused by a present evil, and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy.

Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult, remanet tamen motus ad repellendum nocivum contristans.

And if the evil which is the cause of sadness be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed insofar as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for, yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil.

Si vero superexcrescat vis mali intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac divertere valeat.

If, on the other hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that.

Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.

Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied.

1a 2ae q37 a1: Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn? Yes.

Si sit dolor intensus, impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid addiscere possit (et tantum potest intendi, quod nec etiam, instante dolore, potest homo aliquid considerare etiam quod prius scivit) quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicantur: necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione alterius, unius enim animae non potest esse nisi una intentio.

If the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from learning anything (indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that which he knew already) because all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul: it must needs happen, when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power, because the soul, being one, can only have one intention.

Et propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod magnam attentionem requirat.

The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible therewith.

In hoc tamen attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.

However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning or for considering, because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.

Tam delectatio quam dolor, inquantum ad se trahunt animae intentionem, impediunt considerationem rationis, unde in VII Ethic. dicitur quod "impossibile est in ipsa delectatione venereorum, aliquid intelligere". Sed tamen dolor magis trahit ad se intentionem animae quam delectatio.

Both pleasure and pain, insofar as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does.

Si ergo dolor seu tristitia fuerit moderata, per accidens potest conferre ad addiscendum, inquantum aufert superabundantiam delectationum. Sed per se impedit, et si intendatur, totaliter aufert.

If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, insofar as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.

Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., "quanquam acerrimo dolore dentium his diebus torquerer, non quidem sinebar animo volvere nisi ea quae iam forte didiceram. A discendo autem penitus impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat."

Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required undivided attention."

1a 2ae q37: The effects of pain or sorrow

1. Does pain deprive one of the power to learn?
2. Is the effect of sorrow or pain to burden the soul?
3. Does sorrow or pain weaken all activity?
4. Is sorrow more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?

1a 2ae q36 a4: Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow? Yes.

Potestas maior ponitur causa doloris quia exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum appetitivorum, inquantum causant praesentiam obiecti.

A greater power is reckoned to be the cause of pain because external agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, insofar as they cause the presence of the object.

Id ergo quod est causa coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae.

Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or sadness.

Maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu: dum scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.

A greater power causes pain, as acting not potentially but actually: i.e., by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.

Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non sequitur dolor vel tristitia; sed tunc solum sequitur, quando remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium.

If some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain or sadness will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains.

Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat dolorem; si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.

And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that pain is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power"; for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not pain but pleasure.

Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, "in animo dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori".

Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Pain in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power; while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."

1a 2ae q36 a3: Whether the craving for unity is a cause of pain? Yes.

Eo modo quo concupiscentia vel cupiditas boni est causa doloris, etiam appetitus unitatis, vel amor, causa doloris ponendus est quia bonum uniuscuiusque rei in quadam unitate consistit, prout scilicet unaquaeque res habet in se unita illa ex quibus consistit eius perfectio.

Inasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of pain, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted as causing pain, because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements of which its perfection consists.

Unde et Platonici posuerunt unum esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc, sicut amor vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus unitatis.

Wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything naturally craves unity, just as it desires goodness. And therefore, just as love or craving for good is a cause of pain, so also is the love or craving for unity.

Non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam, non cuiuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiae, ut quidam opinabantur. Quorum opinionem ibi philosophus excludit per hoc, quod quaedam repletiones non sunt delectabiles: sicut repleti cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio, sive unio, magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum constitueret.

Not every kind of union perfects the formal aspect of the good, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither does the craving of any kind of unity cause pain or sadness, as some have maintained, whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant: for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating; because repletion, or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being.

Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cuiuslibet unitatis, sed eius in qua consistit perfectio naturae.

Consequently pain is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists.

Separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur, inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem. Unde appetitus huiusmodi separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus unitatis.

Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is craved, insofar as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the craving for this sort of separation is not the first cause of pain, whereas the craving for unity is.

Augustinus dicit, in III de libero arbitrio, "quod ex dolore quem bestiae sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animae appetentes unitatis. Quid enim est aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens?"

Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a certain feeling of not wanting to suffer division or corruption?"

1a 2ae q36 a2: Whether desire is a cause of sadness? Yes.

Concupiscentia est causa doloris quia omne quod impedit motum ne perveniat ad terminum, est contrarium motui.

Desire is a cause of pain because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement.

Illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus, est contristans. Et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa tristitiae, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali ablatione, tristamur.

Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sadness. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sadness, insofar as we are sad for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal.

Universalis autem causa doloris esse non potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum praesentium, in quibus iam delectamur, quam futurorum, quae concupiscimus.

But it cannot be a universal cause of pain, because we are pained more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.

Concupiscentia est delectabilis, quandiu manet spes adipiscendi quod concupiscitur. Sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.

Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire causes pain.

Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., "subintrantibus ignorantia agendarum rerum, et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites subinferuntur error et dolor".

Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their way in, then error and pain stole an entrance in their company."

1a 2ae q36 a1: Whether sadness is caused by the loss of good rather than by the presence of evil? No.

Expectatum malum timorem constituit, praesens vero tristitiam quia tristitia est motus appetitus apprehensionem sequentis; in apprehensione autem ipsa privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur "ens rationis".

The dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow, because sadness is a movement of the appetite following upon an apprehension; and even a privation, as apprehended, has the formal aspect of a certain being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason".

Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum.

And in this way evil, since it is a privation, is a kind of "contrary". Accordingly, inasmuch as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.

Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita tristitia respicit malum coniunctum.

Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sadness is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while delight is a kind of pursuit or approach; just as delight regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sadness regards the evil that is present.

Sed causa delectationis et tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum amissum.

On the other hand, love, which is the cause of delight and sadness, first regards good rather than evil. And therefore, inasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sadness or pain, than the good which is lost.

1a 2ae q36: The causes of sorrow or pain

1. Is sorrow caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?
2. Is desire a cause of sorrow?
3. Is the craving for unity a cause of sorrow?
4. Is an irresistible power a cause of sorrow?

1a 2ae q35 a8: Whether there are only four species of sadness? Yes.

Et hoc modo loquendi assignantur hic species tristitiae, per applicationem rationis tristitiae ad aliquid extraneum. Quod quidem extraneum accipi potest vel ex parte causae, obiecti; vel ex parte effectus. Proprium enim obiectum tristitiae est proprium malum.

The species of sadness are reckoned by an application of the formal aspect of sadness to something foreign to it, because this foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect: for the proper object of sadness is "one's own evil."

Unde extraneum obiectum tristitiae accipi potest vel secundum alterum tantum, quia scilicet est malum, sed non proprium, et sic est misericordia, quae est tristitia de alieno malo, inquantum tamen aestimatur ut proprium.

Hence sadness may be concerned for an object foreign to it, either through one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we have "pity" which is sadness for another's evil, considered, however, as one's own.

Vel quantum ad utrumque, quia neque est de proprio, neque de malo, sed de bono alieno, inquantum tamen bonum alienum aestimatur ut proprium malum, et sic est invidia.

Or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but another's good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we have "envy."

Proprius autem effectus tristitiae consistit in quadam fuga appetitus. Unde extraneum circa effectum tristitiae, potest accipi quantum ad alterum tantum, quia scilicet tollitur fuga: et sic est anxietas quae sic aggravat animum, ut non appareat aliquod refugium; unde alio nomine dicitur angustia.

The proper effect of sadness consists in a certain "flight of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sadness, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible; hence it is also called "perplexity."

Si vero intantum procedat talis aggravatio, ut etiam exteriora membra immobilitet ab opere, quod pertinet ad acediam; sic erit extraneum quantum ad utrumque, quia nec est fuga, nec est in appetitu. Ideo autem specialiter acedia dicitur vocem amputare, quia vox inter omnes exteriores motus magis exprimit interiorem conceptum et affectum, non solum in hominibus, sed etiam in aliis animalibus, ut dicitur in I Polit.

If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated in Polit. i, 1.

Delectatio causatur ex bono, quod uno modo dicitur. Et ideo delectationis non assignantur tot species sicut tristitiae, quae causatur ex malo, quod "multifariam contingit", ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning. And so pleasure is not divided into several species as sadness is; for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways", as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

1a 2ae q35 a7: Whether outward pain is greater than interior sadness? No.

Tristitia cordis omnem plagam exteriorem excedit quia tristitia interior non procedit ex similitudine rei apprehensa, sicut ex causa: non enim homo tristatur interius de ipsa similitudine apprehensa, sed de re cuius est similitudo.

Sadness of the heart surpasses every outward wound because inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents.

Quae quidem res tanto perfectius apprehenditur per aliquam similitudinem, quanto similitudo est magis immaterialis et abstracta.

And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract.

Et ideo dolor interior, per se loquendo, est maior, tanquam de maiori malo existens, propter hoc quod interiori apprehensione magis cognoscitur malum.

Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, inasmuch as evil is better known by an inward apprehension.

1a 2ae q35 a6: Whether sadness is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought? No.

Appetitus delectationis est fortior quam fuga tristitiae quia naturaliter maior est appetitus delectationis quam fuga tristitiae.

The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sadness because desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sadness.

Cuius ratio est, quia causa delectationis est bonum conveniens, causa autem doloris sive tristitiae est aliquod malum repugnans. Contingit autem aliquod bonum esse conveniens absque omni dissonantia, non autem potest esse aliquod malum totaliter, absque omni convenientia, repugnans. Unde delectatio potest esse integra et perfecta, tristitia autem est semper secundum partem.

The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is a conforming good; while the cause of pain or sadness is an unconforming evil. Now it happens that a certain good is conforming without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unconforming as not to be conforming in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect, whereas sadness is always partial.

Alia vero ratio est, quia bonum, quod est obiectum delectationis, propter seipsum appetitur, malum autem, quod est obiectum tristitiae, est fugiendum inquantum est privatio boni. Quod autem est per se, potius est illo quod est per aliud.

Another reason is because the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought for its own sake; whereas the evil, which is the object of sadness, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that which is, by reason of itself, is stronger than that which is by reason of something else.

Bonum est fortius quam malum, ut patet per Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv).

1a 2ae q35 a5: Whether there is any sadness contrary to the pleasure of contemplation? No.

Nulla tristitia est quae sit contraria delectationi contemplationis quia delectatio contemplationis non causatur ex hoc quod excluditur aliqua molestia, sed ex hoc quod est secundum seipsam delectabilis: non est enim generatio, sed operatio quaedam perfecta, ut dictum est.

There is no sadness contrary to the pleasure of contemplation because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming," but a perfect operation, as stated above (q31 a1).

Contemplatio, secundum se, nunquam habet rationem mali, cum contemplatio nihil aliud sit quam consideratio veri, quod est bonum intellectus; sed per accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet contemplatio vilioris impedit contemplationem melioris; vel ex parte rei contemplatae, ad quam inordinatae appetitus afficitur.

Contemplation, in itself, never has the formal aspect of evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect; it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e., insofar as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached.

Ea quae sunt contraria in rerum natura, secundum quod sunt in mente, non habent contrarietatem. Non enim rationes contrariorum sunt contrariae, sed magis unum contrarium est ratio cognoscendi aliud.

Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind. For things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in formal aspect; indeed rather is one contrary the formal aspect for knowing the other.

Dicitur Sap. VIII, "non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius," scilicet sapientiae, "nec taedium convictus eius, sed laetitiam et gaudium".

It is written (Wisdom 8:16): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness."

Dicit Gregorius Nyssenus, "ei delectationi quae est secundum contemplationem, non opponitur aliqua tristitia".

According to Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sadness contests the pleasure which is from contemplation".

1a 2ae q35 a4: Whether all sadness is contrary to all pleasure? No.

Non omnis tristitia omni delectationi contrariatur quia tristitia et delectatio, cum sint passiones, specificantur ex obiectis.

Not every sadness is contrary to every pleasure because sadness and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects.

Et quidem secundum genus suum, contrarietatem habent, nam unum pertinet ad prosecutionem, aliud vero ad fugam, "quae se habent in appetitu sicut affirmatio et negatio in ratione", ut dicitur in VI Ethic.

According to their respective genera, they are contrary to one another, since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2).

Et ideo tristia et delectatio quae sunt de eodem, habent oppositionem ad invicem secundum speciem. Tristitia vero et delectatio de diversis, si quidem illa diversa non sint opposita, sed disparata, non habent oppositionem ad invicem secundum rationem speciei, sed sunt etiam disparatae; sicut tristari de morte amici, et delectari in contemplatione.

Consequently sadness and pleasure in respect of the same object, are opposite to one another according to species, whereas sadness and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary but disparate, are not opposite to one another according to the formal aspect of species, but are also disparate; for instance, sadness at the death of a friend, and pleasure in contemplation [of his life].

Si vero illa diversa sint contraria, tunc delectatio et tristitia non solum non habent contrarietatem secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam habent convenientiam et affinitatem: sicut gaudere de bono et tristari de malo.

If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and sadness are not only contrary according to the formal aspect of species, but they also have a certain [mutual] conformity and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to be sad about evil.

Etsi non omnis tristitia contrarietur omni delectationi secundum speciem, tamen quantum ad effectum contrariantur: nam ex uno confortatur natura animalis, ex alio vero quodammodo molestatur.

Although not every sadness is contrary to every pleasure according to species, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort.

1a 2ae q35 a3: Whether sadness or pain is contrary to pleasure? Yes.

Laetitia et tristitia sunt contraria quia cum obiecta delectationis et tristitiae, seu doloris, sint contraria, scilicet bonum praesens et malum praesens, sequitur quod dolor et delectatio sint contraria.

Joy and sadness are contrary to one another because since the objects of pleasure and sadness (i.e., pain), viz. present good and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another.

Sicut philosophus dicit X Metaphys., contrarietas est differentia secundum formam. Forma autem, seu species, passionis et motus sumitur ex obiecto vel termino.

As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. But the form (i.e., species) of a passion or movement is taken from the object or term.

Dolor ipse potest esse delectabilis per accidens, inquantum scilicet habet adiunctam admirationem, ut in spectaculis; vel inquantum facit recordationem rei amatae, et facit percipere amorem eius, de cuius absentia doletur. Unde, cum amor sit delectabilis, et dolor et omnia quae ex amore consequuntur, inquantum in eis sentitur amor, sunt delectabilia. Et propter hoc etiam dolores in spectaculis possunt esse delectabiles: inquantum in eis sentitur aliquis amor conceptus ad illos qui in spectaculis commemorantur.

Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally, insofar as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or insofar as it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, inasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage: insofar as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented.

Voluntas et ratio supra suos actus reflectuntur, inquantum ipsi actus voluntatis et rationis accipiuntur sub ratione boni vel mali. Et hoc modo tristitia potest esse materia delectationis, vel e converso, non per se, sed per accidens: inquantum scilicet utrumque accipitur in ratione boni vel mali.

The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered under the formal aspect of good or evil. In this way, sadness can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially, but accidentally: that is, insofar as either of them is considered in the formal aspect of good or evil.

Augustinus dicit, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod "laetitia est voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus, tristitia autem est voluntas in dissensione ab his quae nolumus".

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the will consenting to the things we will, and sadness is the will dissenting from the things we do not will".

1a 2ae q35 a2: Whether sadness is the same as pain? Yes.

Si dolor accipiatur communiter, sic dolor est genus tristitiae, quia quaecumque cadunt sub exteriori apprehensione, cadunt sub interiori, sed non e converso: sicut illa delectatio quae ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, delectatio quidem nominatur, non autem gaudium; ita ille dolor qui ex exteriori apprehensione causatur, nominatur quidem dolor, non autem tristitia.

If pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sadness, because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely: just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure, but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed, but not sadness.

Sensus exterior non percipit nisi praesens; vis autem cognitiva interior potest percipere praesens, praeteritum et futurum. Et ideo tristitia potest esse de praesenti, praeterito et futuro; dolor autem corporalis, qui sequitur apprehensionem sensus exterioris, non potest esse nisi de praesenti.

External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. Consequently sadness is able to be about present, past and future; whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can only be about something present.

1a 2ae q35 a1: Whether pain is a passion of the soul? Yes.

Dolor, secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo, propriissime dicitur passio animae, quia omnis motus appetitus sensitivi dicitur passio, ut supra dictum est, et praecipue illi qui in defectum sonant.

Pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul, because every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as stated above (q22, a1,a3), and especially those which tend to some defect.

Dolor dicitur esse corporis, quia causa doloris est in corpore: puta cum patimur aliquod nocivum corpori. Sed motus doloris semper est in anima, nam "corpus non potest dolere nisi dolente anima", ut Augustinus dicit.

We speak of pain as of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).

Sicut ad delectationem duo requiruntur (scilicet coniunctio boni, et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis), ita etiam ad dolorem duo requiruntur: scilicet coniunctio alicuius mali (quod ea ratione est malum, quia privat aliquod bonum), et perceptio huiusmodi coniunctionis.

Just as two things are requisite for pleasure (namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction), so also two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is evil by the formal aspect that it deprives one of some good), and perception of this conjunction.

Quidquid autem coniungitur, si non habeat, respectu eius cui coniungitur, rationem boni vel mali, non potest causare delectationem vel dolorem. Ex quo patet quod aliquid sub ratione boni vel mali, est obiectum delectationis et doloris. Bonum autem et malum, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt obiecta appetitus. Unde patet quod delectatio et dolor ad appetitum pertinent.

Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the formal aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that something under the formal aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite.

Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit dolorem inter passiones animae, inducens illud Virgilii, "hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque dolentque".

Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the passions of the soul, quoting Virgil: "hence wild desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears" (Aeneid, vi, 733) [Translation: Conington.]

1a 2ae q35: Pain or sorrow, in itself

1. Is pain a passion of the soul?
2. Is sorrow the same as pain?
3. Is sorrow or pain contrary in pleasure?
4. Is all sorrow contrary to all pleasure?
5. Is there a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
6. Is sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
7. Is exterior pain greater than interior?
8. The species of sorrow

1a 2ae q34 a4: Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil? Yes.

Secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus vel malus, quia est bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum, malus autem qui in operibus malis.

Man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will, because that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue, and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.

Omnis delectatio in hoc est uniformis, quod est quies in aliquo bono, et secundum hoc potest esse regula vel mensura. Nam ille bonus est cuius voluntas quiescit in vero bono; malus autem, cuius voluntas quiescit in malo.

All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good, and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good; and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.

Delectationes autem appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas malorum.

On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice, since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in conformity with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.

Cum delectatio perficiat operationem per modum finis, ut supra dictum est, non potest esse operatio perfecte bona, nisi etiam adsit delectatio in bono, nam bonitas rei dependet ex fine. Et sic quodammodo bonitas delectationis est causa bonitas in operatione.

Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above (q33 a4), an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good, because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.

1a 2ae q34 a3: Whether any pleasure is the greatest good? Yes.

Aliqua delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona humana quia ultimus finis hominis dici potest vel ipse Deus, qui est summum bonum simpliciter, vel fruitio ipsius, quae importat delectationem quandam in ultimo fine.

A certain delight of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods because man's last end may be said to be either God Who is the Supreme Good simply, or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain delight in the last end.

Plato non posuit omnes delectationes esse malas, sicut Stoici, neque omnes esse bonas, sicut Epicurei; sed quasdam esse bonas, et quasdam esse malas; ita tamen quod nulla sit summum bonum, vel optimum.

Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all delights are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that all delights are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good.

1a 2ae q34 a2: Whether every pleasure is good? No.

Non omne delectabile est bonum bonitate morali (quae attenditur secundum rationem) quia delectabile dicitur secundum appetitum, qui quandoque in illud tendit quod non est conveniens rationi.

Not every delight is good with moral goodness (which depends on the order of formal aspect) because the delectable depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which does not conform with formal aspect.

Honestum et utile dicuntur secundum rationem, et ideo nihil est honestum vel utile, quod non sit bonum.

The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with formal aspect, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being good.

Sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas. Qui ex hoc decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguebant inter id quod est bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quoad hunc.

While some of the Stoics maintained that all delights are evil, the Epicureans held that delight is good in itself, and that consequently all delights are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual.

Ideo delectatio non quaeritur propter aliud, quia est quies in fine. Finem autem contingit esse bonum et malum; quamvis nunquam sit finis nisi secundum quod est bonum quoad hunc. Ita etiam est de delectatione.

The reason why delight is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except insofar as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with regard to delight.

Hoc modo omnia appetunt delectationem, sicut et bonum, cum delectatio sit quies appetitus in bono. Sed sicut contingit non omne bonum quod appetitur, esse per se et vere bonum; ita non omnis delectatio est per se et vere bona.

All things seek delight in the same way as they seek good, since delight is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself good and truly good; so not every delight is of itself good and truly good.

1a 2ae q34 a1: Whether every pleasure is evil? No.

Aliquas delectationes sunt bonas, et aliquas sunt malas, quia est delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et consequens aliquam operationem.

Some pleasures are good, and some are evil, because pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from some operation.

Temperatus non fugit omnes delectationes, sed immoderatas, et rationi non convenientes.

The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and not conforming to reason.

In moralibus est quaedam delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei.

In the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God.

Operationibus autem magis sunt affines delectationes, quae sunt eis coniunctae, quam concupiscentiae, quae tempore eas praecedunt. Unde, cum concupiscentiae bonarum operationum sint bonae, malarum vero malae, multo magis delectationes bonarum operationum sunt bonae, malarum vero malae.

Pleasures which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil, much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions evil.

In concubitu coniugali delectatio, quamvis sit in eo quod convenit rationi, tamen impedit rationis usum, propter corporalem transmutationem adiunctam. Sed ex hoc non consequitur malitiam moralem; sicut nec somnus, quo ligatur usus rationis, moraliter est malus, si sit secundum rationem receptus: nam et ipsa ratio hoc habet, ut quandoque rationis usus intercipiatur.

In conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times.

1a 2ae q34: The goodness and badness of pleasures

1. Is every pleasure evil?
2. If not, is every pleasure good?
3. Is any pleasure the greatest good?
4. Is pleasure the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?

1a 2ae q33 a4: Whether pleasure perfects operation? Yes.

Delectatio operationem perficit quia operatio causat delectationem sicut causa efficiens; delectatio autem perficit operationem per modum finis.

Pleasure perfects operation because operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause.

Delectatio perficit operationem inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito.

Pleasure perfects operation inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed.

Perficit delectatio operationem, inquantum scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius eam operatur.

Pleasure perfects operation inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care.

Delectationes adaugent proprias operationes, et impediunt extraneas.

Pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that are not appropriate.

Delectatio autem quae consequitur actum rationis, fortificat rationis usum.

Pleasure that arises from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.

1a 2ae q33 a3: Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason? Yes.

Usus rationis requirit debitum usum imaginationis et aliarum virium sensitivarum, quae utuntur organo corporali; et ideo ex transmutatione corporali usus rationis impeditur, impedito actu virtutis imaginativae et aliarum sensitivarum.

The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through a bodily organ; consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers.

Philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod "delectatio corrumpit existimationem prudentiae".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence".

Est ergo quaedam delectatio quae habetur de ipso actu rationis, sicut cum aliquis delectatur in contemplando vel ratiocinando. Et talis delectatio non impedit usum rationis, sed ipsum adiuvat, quia illud attentius operamur in quo delectamur, attentio autem adiuvat operationem.

There is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning. And such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it, because we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.

1a 2ae q33 a2: Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself? Yes.

Omnes fere delectationes corporales faciunt sui ipsarum sitim, quousque consummentur, eo quod tales delectationes consequuntur aliquem motum: sicut patet in delectationibus ciborum.

Nearly all bodily delights cause thirst for [more of] themselves, until they are fully realized, because of the fact that delights of this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in the delights of food.

Si vero per sitim vel desiderium intelligatur sola intensio affectus, tollens fastidium, sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum. Delectationes enim corporales, quia augmentatae, vel etiam continuatae, faciunt superexcrescentiam naturalis habitudinis, efficiuntur fastidiosae; ut patet in delectatione ciborum. Et propter hoc, quando aliquis iam pervenit ad perfectum in delectationibus corporalibus, fastidit eas, et quandoque appetit aliquas alias.

On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, [the sort of emotion] that excludes distaste, thus, more than all others, spiritual delights cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because bodily delights, when they are increased or even when they are protracted, become distasteful by causing an excess in the natural state of affairs; as is evident in the case of the delights of food. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in bodily delights, he loses taste for them, and sometimes desires another kind.

Sed delectationes spirituales non superexcrescunt naturalem habitudinem, sed perficiunt naturam. Unde cum pervenitur ad consummationem in ipsis, tunc sunt magis delectabiles: nisi forte per accidens, inquantum operationi contemplativae adiunguntur aliquae operationes virtutum corporalium, quae per assiduitatem operandi lassantur.

Spiritual delights, on the contrary, do not exceed a natural state of affairs, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except, perchance, accidentally, insofar as the [spiritual] activity of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from protracted activity.

1a 2ae q33 a1: Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure? Yes.

Desiderium habet quidem aliquam ampliationem ex imaginatione rei desideratae, sed multo magis ex praesentia rei iam delectantis: quia magis praebet se animus rei iam delectanti, quam rei non habitae desideratae, cum delectatio sit finis desiderii.

Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the presence of the delightful object: because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking delight in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since delight is the end of desire.

Latitudo est quaedam dimensio magnitudinis corporalis, unde in affectionibus animae non nisi secundum metaphoram dicitur. Dilatatio autem dicitur quasi motus ad latitudinem. Et competit delectationi secundum duo quae ad delectationem requiruntur.

Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs to delight in respect of the two things requisite for delight.

Quorum unum est ex parte apprehensivae virtutis, quae apprehendit coniunctionem alicuius boni convenientis. Ex hac autem apprehensione apprehendit se homo perfectionem quandam adeptum, quae est spiritualis magnitudo, et secundum hoc, animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari, seu dilatari.

One of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some befitting good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be magnified (i.e., expanded) by delight.

Aliud autem est ex parte appetitivae virtutis, quae assentit rei delectabili, et in ea quiescit, quodammodo se praebens ei ad eam interius capiendam. Et sic dilatatur affectus hominis per delectationem, quasi se tradens ad continendum interius rem delectantem.

The other requisite for delight is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the delightful object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by delight, as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its delight.

Ad delectationem vero pertinet dilatatio, inquantum aliquid in seipso ampliatur, ut quasi capacius reddatur.

Expansion pertains to delight, insofar as a thing becomes wider in itself so as to become more capacious.

1a 2ae q33: The effects of pleasure

1. Is expansion an effect of pleasure?
2. Does pleasure cause thirst or desire for itself?
3. Does pleasure hinder the use of reason?
4. Does pleasure perfect operation?