Delectatio est passio animae quia delectatio est motus in appetitu animali consequens apprehensionem sensus.
Delight is a passion of the soul because delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense.
Quamvis nomen passionis magis proprie conveniat passionibus corruptivis et in malum tendentibus (sicut sunt aegritudines corporales, et tristitia et timor in anima), tamen etiam in bonum ordinantur aliquae passiones, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc delectatio dicitur passio.
Although the name of passion is [customarily considered as being] more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency (such as bodily ailments, and also sadness and fear in the soul), yet some passions are ordered to something good, as stated above (q23, a1,a4). And in this sense delight [a.k.a., pleasure,] is called a passion.
Augustinus, in IX et XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit delectationem, sive gaudium vel laetitiam, inter alias passiones animae.
Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight (i.e., joy, or happiness) among the other passions of the soul.
Motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur, sicut supra dictum est. Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem necesse est competere delectationi.
The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above (q22, a3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight.
Sicut contingit in rebus naturalibus aliqua consequi suas perfectiones naturales, ita hoc contingit in animalibus. Et quamvis moveri ad perfectionem non sit totum simul, tamen consequi naturalem perfectionem est totum simul. Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales, quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt. Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu sensitivo; et iste motus est delectatio.
Just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight.
In animali duplex motus considerari potest: unus secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum; alius secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem.
A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation.
Licet ergo in eo qui iam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset motus executionis, quo tenditur ad finem; non tamen cessat motus appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius desiderabat non habitum, ita postea delectatur in habito.
And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses.
Licet enim delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod appetitui satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab appetibili: ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est.
For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite; nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object: the formal aspect by which delight is a kind of movement.
Philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., "delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem".
According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing."
Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod delectatio est "motus animae", ponitur in genere.
By saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus.
Per hoc autem quod dicitur constitutio in existentem naturam (idest in id quod existit in natura rei), ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet praesentia connaturalis boni.
By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping with an existing nature," i.e., (with that which exists in the nature of thing), we assign the cause of delight, viz., the presence of a connatural good.
Per hoc autem quod dicitur simul tota, ostendit quod constitutio non debet accipi prout est in constitui, sed prout est in constitutum esse, quasi in termino motus: non enim delectatio est generatio, ut Plato posuit, sed magis consistit in factum esse, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.
By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the be-ing of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete [act of] be-ing," as stated in [Aristotle's] Ethic. vii, 12.
Per hoc autem quod dicitur sensibilis, excluduntur perfectiones rerum insensibilium, in quibus non est delectatio.
Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things, wherein there is no delight.
Sic ergo patet quod, cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens apprehensionem sensus, delectatio est passio animae.
It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul.
Operatio connaturalis non impedita, est perfectio secunda, ut habetur in II de anima. Et ideo, quando constituitur res in propria operatione connaturali et non impedita, sequitur delectatio, quae consistit in perfectum esse, ut dictum est. Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam.
Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion of [the act] of be-ing, as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.