Potestas maior ponitur causa doloris quia exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum appetitivorum, inquantum causant praesentiam obiecti.
A greater power is reckoned to be the cause of pain because external agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, insofar as they cause the presence of the object.
Id ergo quod est causa coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae.
Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or sadness.
Maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu: dum scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.
A greater power causes pain, as acting not potentially but actually: i.e., by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.
Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non sequitur dolor vel tristitia; sed tunc solum sequitur, quando remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium.
If some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain or sadness will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains.
Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat dolorem; si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.
And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that pain is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power"; for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not pain but pleasure.
Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, "in animo dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori".
Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Pain in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power; while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."