Expectatum malum timorem constituit, praesens vero tristitiam quia tristitia est motus appetitus apprehensionem sequentis; in apprehensione autem ipsa privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur "ens rationis".
The dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow, because sadness is a movement of the appetite following upon an apprehension; and even a privation, as apprehended, has the formal aspect of a certain being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason".
Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum.
And in this way evil, since it is a privation, is a kind of "contrary". Accordingly, inasmuch as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.
Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita tristitia respicit malum coniunctum.
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sadness is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while delight is a kind of pursuit or approach; just as delight regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sadness regards the evil that is present.
Sed causa delectationis et tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum amissum.
On the other hand, love, which is the cause of delight and sadness, first regards good rather than evil. And therefore, inasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sadness or pain, than the good which is lost.