Ex parte dispositionis subiecti, quaelibet tristitia per quamlibet delectationem mitigari potest, quia licet non omnis delectatio contrarietur omni tristitiae secundum speciem, contrariatur tamen secundum genus, ut supra dictum est.
On the part of the disposition of the subject, any sadness can be assuaged by any delight, because although not every delight is specifically contrary to every sadness, yet it is generically, as stated above (q35, a4).
Delectationes malorum non causant tristitiam in praesenti, sed in futuro, inquantum scilicet mali poenitent de malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt. Et huic tristitiae subvenitur per contrarias delectationes.
The delights of the wicked are not a cause of sadness while they are enjoyed, but afterwards; that is to say, insofar as the wicked repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sadness is healed by contrary delights.
Delectatio est quaedam quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod repugnat appetitui.
Delight is a kind of repose of the appetite in a befitting good; while sadness arises from something unsuited to the appetite.
Philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod "expellit delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si sit fortis".
The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sadness is driven forth by delight, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense."