Odium sensitivae partis potest respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis: sicut lupus ovi; unde ovis odit lupum generaliter.
Hatred, in the sensitive faculty of a soul, can regard something universally, because something, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as a particular individual, may be hostile to the animal: for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep; hence a sheep hates the wolf universally.
De universali dupliciter contingit loqui: uno modo, secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur; alia est enim consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo.
There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as it considered under the intention of universality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which such an intention is ascribed; for it is one thing to consider "the human" as universal, and another to consider "the human" as it is in him who is a human.
Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri potest in universale, quia universale fit per abstractionem a materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva.
If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no power of the sensitive faculty of a soul, neither the power of apprehension nor of appetite, can attain the universal, because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, in which every sensitive ability takes root.
Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod obiectum visus est color secundum genus; non quia visus cognoscat colorem universalem, sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est color simpliciter.
Nevertheless some sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight cognizes universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizable by the sight, as is fitting for color, not so much as it is this [particular] color, but inasmuch it is simply color [i.e., color universally considered].
Sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est universale; apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit universalitas.
The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such; but they apprehend something to which [the formal aspect of] universality is given by abstraction.
Id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum.
That which is common to all cannot be the formal aspect of hatred. But nothing hinders something from being common to many, but yet at variance with others, so as thus to be hateful to them [under the formal aspect of hatred].
Sed ira semper causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse ad aliquid in genere.
On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular, because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from particular individuals. And because of this, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that anger is always directed to something singular; whereas hatred can be directed to something in general.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "ira semper fit inter singularia, odium autem etiam ad genera; furem enim odit et calumniatorem unusquisque".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger always arises between singular things, whereas hatred is also directed to general things; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."
Sed odium, secundum quod est in parte intellectiva (cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem intellectus), potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.
But hatred, because it is [possible for it to be not just in the sensitive faculty of a soul but also] in the intellectual faculty of the soul (since it can arise from a universal apprehension of the intellect), is able to be in regard of the universal in both ways [(i.e., in the intention, intellectually, and in the object of intentionality, sensitively)].