Thursday, May 06, 2010

1a 2ae q29 a1: Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred? Yes.

Sicut bonum est obiectum amoris, ita malum est obiectum odii, quia sicut omne conveniens, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni, ita omne repugnans, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali.

Just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred, because just as whatever is fitting as such bears the formal aspect of good, so whatever is repugnant as such bears the formal aspect of evil.

Ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia conveniunt in ente. Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per comparationem ad alterum.

Being, as be-ing, has not the formal aspect of repugnance, but only of fittingness, because all things are fitting in their be-ing. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has a formal aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil, although not in itself, but by comparison with something else.

Sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est vere bonum, ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni, esse bonum.

Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good, so a thing may be apprehended as evil, when it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil, nor love of good, is good.

Contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri.

To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful, in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally fitted to one thing, and naturally opposed to another.

In appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod sibi convenit (quae est amor naturalis), ita ad id quod est ei repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem (quae est odium naturale).

With regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which befits it (wherein consists natural love), so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it (and this is natural hatred).

Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens; odium vero est dissonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum.

So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as fitting; while hatred is a certain dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as opposed and harmful.