1a 2ae q32 a8: Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure? Yes.

Admiratio non est delectabilis inquantum habet ignorantiam, sed inquantum habet desiderium addiscendi causam, et inquantum admirans aliquid novum addiscit, scilicet talem esse quem non aestimabat.

Wonder gives delight, not because it implies ignorance, but insofar as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and insofar as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he had thought it to be.

Est autem admiratio desiderium quoddam sciendi, quod in homine contingit ex hoc quod videt effectum et ignorat causam, vel ex hoc quod causa talis effectus excedit cognitionem aut facultatem ipsius. Et ideo admiratio est causa delectationis, inquantum habet adiunctam spem consequendi cognitionem eius quod scire desiderat.

Wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge, a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of delight, insofar as it includes an adjunct hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have.

Philosophus dicit, in I Rhetoric., quod admiratio est delectationis causa.

The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is a cause of delight.

1a 2ae q32 a7: Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure? Yes.

Similitudo est causa delectationis quia similitudo est causa amoris, ut dictum est supra, et amor est causa delectationis.

Likeness is a cause of delight because likeness is a cause of love, as above stated (q27, a3), and love is the cause of delight.

Illi qui patiuntur tristitias, maxime sequuntur delectationes, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.

Those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek delights, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14).

Et ideo appetitur delectatio ab his qui in tristitia sunt, ut conferens ad proprium bonum, inquantum est medicativa contrarii. Et ista est causa quare delectationes corporales, quibus sunt contrariae quaedam tristitiae, magis appetuntur, quam delectationes intellectuales, quae non habent contrarietatem tristitiae, ut infra dicetur.

Wherefore the sorrowful man seeks delight as making for his own good, insofar as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily delights, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought than intellectual delights, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall state later on (q35, a5).

Exinde etiam est quod omnia animalia naturaliter appetunt delectationem, quia semper animal laborat per sensum et motum. Et propter hoc etiam iuvenes maxime delectationes appetunt: propter multas transmutationes in eis existentes, dum sunt in statu augmenti. Et etiam melancholici vehementer appetunt delectationes, ad expellendum tristitiam, quia corpus eorum quasi pravo humore corroditur, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.

And this explains why all animals naturally desire delight, because animals ever work through sense and movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined to seek delights: on account of the many changes to which they are subject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong desire for delights, in order to drive away sorrow, because his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.

Bona corporalia in quadam mensura consistunt, et ideo superexcessus similium corrumpit proprium bonum. Et propter hoc efficitur fastidiosum et contristans, inquantum contrariatur bono proprio hominis.

Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure, wherefore surfeit of such similar things destroys the proper good, and consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the proper good of man.

1a 2ae q32 a6: Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure? Yes.

Omnia enim quae facimus vel patimur propter amicum, delectabilia sunt, quia amor praecipua causa delectationis est.

Whatever we do or suffer for a friend is delightful, because love is the principal cause of delight.

Benefacere alteri, potest tripliciter esse delectationis causa. Uno modo, per comparationem ad effectum, quod est bonum in altero constitutum. Et secundum hoc, inquantum bonum alterius reputamus quasi nostrum bonum, propter unionem amoris, delectamur in bono quod per nos fit aliis, praecipue amicis, sicut in bono proprio.

Doing good to another may give delight in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take delight in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good.

Alio modo, per comparationem ad finem; sicut cum aliquis, per hoc quod alteri benefacit, sperat consequi aliquod bonum sibi ipsi, vel a Deo vel ab homine. Spes autem delectationis est causa.

Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when someone, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either from God or from man: for hope is a cause of delight.

Tertio modo, per comparationem ad principium. Et sic hoc quod est benefacere alteri, potest esse delectabile per comparationem ad triplex principium.

Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle.

Quorum unum est facultas benefaciendi: et secundum hoc, benefacere alteri fit delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini quaedam imaginatio abundantis boni in seipso existentis, ex quo possit aliis communicare. Et ideo homines delectantur in filiis et in propriis operibus, sicut quibus communicant proprium bonum.

One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing good to another becomes delightful, insofar as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take delight in their children, and in their own works, as being things on which they bestow a share of their own good.

Aliud principium est habitus inclinans, secundum quem benefacere fit alicui connaturale. Unde liberales delectabiliter dant aliis.

Another principle is [a man's] habitual inclination [to do good,] according to which doing good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes delight in giving to others.

Tertium principium est motivum: puta cum aliquis movetur ab aliquo quem diligit, ad benefaciendum alicui.

The third principle is motive: for instance when someone is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone.

Philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod "largiri et auxiliari amicis aut extraneis, est delectabilissimum".

The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most delightful to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers".

1a 2ae q32 a5: Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us? Yes.

Operationes aliorum etsi non procedant ex habitibus qui in me sunt, causant tamen in me aliquid delectabile; vel faciunt mihi aestimationem sive apprehensionem proprii habitus; vel procedunt ex habitu illius qui est unum mecum per amorem: quia operatio alterius potest esse mihi coniuncta vel per effectum, sicut in primo modo; vel per apprehensionem, sicut in secundo modo; vel per affectionem, sicut in tertio modo.

Although the actions of another do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that gives delight; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love: because another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way; or by knowledge, as in the second way; or by affection, as in the third way.

Homines delectantur in hoc quod laudantur vel honorantur ab aliis, quia scilicet per hoc accipiunt aestimationem in seipsis aliquod bonum esse. Et quia ista aestimatio fortius generatur ex testimonio bonorum et sapientum, ideo in horum laudibus et honoribus homines magis delectantur. Et quia adulator est apparens laudator, propter hoc etiam adulationes quibusdam sunt delectabiles.

Men take delight in being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing in themselves. And since this appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater delight in being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is delightful to some.

Et quia amor est alicuius boni, et admiratio est alicuius magni, idcirco amari ab aliis, et in admiratione haberi, est delectabile, inquantum per hoc fit homini aestimatio propriae bonitatis vel magnitudinis, in quibus aliquis delectatur.

And as love is for something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is delightful to be loved and admired by others, inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through his giving delight to others.

Dicitur in II Ethic., quod "signum generati habitus oportet accipere fientem in opere delectationem".

Aristotle says in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon the delight which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us."

1a 2ae q32 a4: Whether sadness causes pleasure? Yes.

Tristitia potest esse delectationis causa, quia tristitia siquidem in actu existens est causa delectationis, inquantum facit memoriam rei dilectae, de cuius absentia aliquis tristatur, et tamen de sola eius apprehensione delectatur.

Sadness can cause delight because sadness, as actually existing, causes delight, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives delight.

Memoria autem tristitiae fit causa delectationis, propter subsequentem evasionem. Nam carere malo accipitur in ratione boni; unde secundum quod homo apprehendit se evasisse ab aliquibus tristibus et dolorosis, accrescit ei gaudii materia.

The recollection of sadness becomes a cause of delight, on account of the deliverance which ensued, because absence of evil is looked upon under the formal aspect of good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason has he to rejoice.

Augustinus dicit in VIII Confess. dicit quod "quanto maius fuit periculum in proelio, tanto maius erit gaudium in triumpho".

Augustine (Confess. viii, 3) says that "the more peril there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the triumph."

1a 2ae q32 a3: Whether hope and memory causes pleasure? Yes.

Memoria et spes sunt causa delectationis quia delectatio causatur ex praesentia boni convenientis, secundum quod sentitur, vel qualitercumque percipitur.

Memory and hope do cause delight because delight is caused by the presence of a befitting good, insofar as it is felt, or perceived in any way.

Spes et memoria sunt quidem eorum quae sunt simpliciter absentia; quae tamen secundum quid sunt praesentia: scilicet vel secundum apprehensionem solam; vel secundum apprehensionem et facultatem, ad minus aestimatam.

Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent; and yet those are, after a fashion, present: i.e., either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.

Nihil prohibet idem, secundum diversa, esse causam contrariorum. Sic igitur spes, inquantum habet praesentem aestimationem boni futuri, delectationem causat; inquantum autem caret praesentia eius, causat afflictionem.

Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a present appraising of a future good, causes delight; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.

Amor et concupiscentia delectationem causant. Omne enim amatum fit delectabile amanti, eo quod amor est quaedam unio vel connaturalitas amantis ad amatum. Similiter etiam omne concupitum est delectabile concupiscenti, cum concupiscentia sit praecipue appetitus delectationis.

Love and concupiscence also cause delight. For everything that is loved becomes delectable to the lover, since love is a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is delightful to the one that desires, since desire is chiefly a craving for delight.

Sed tamen spes, inquantum importat quandam certitudinem realis praesentiae boni delectantis, quam non importat nec amor nec concupiscentia, magis ponitur causa delectationis quam illa. Et similiter magis quam memoria, quae est de eo quod iam transiit.

However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the delightful good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference to them as causing delight; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed away.

1a 2ae q32 a2: Whether movement is a cause of pleasure? Yes.

Motus etiam efficitur delectabilis, inquantum per ipsum fit aliquid conveniens quod prius conveniens non erat, vel desinit esse, quia ex parte nostra qui delectamur, transmutatio efficitur nobis delectabilis propter hoc, quod natura nostra transmutabilis est, et propter hoc, quod est nobis conveniens nunc, non erit nobis conveniens postea; sicut calefieri ad ignem est conveniens homini in hieme, non autem in aestate.

Movement becomes the cause of delight, insofar as through it something which previously was unbefitting, becomes befitting or ceases to be, because as far as we who take delight are concerned, change is delightful to us because our nature is changeable, for which reason that which is befitting to us at one time is not befitting at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is befitting to man in winter but not in summer.

Ex parte vero boni delectantis quod nobis coniungitur, fit etiam transmutatio delectabilis. Quia actio continuata alicuius agentis auget effectum: sicut quanto aliquis diutius appropinquat igni, magis calefit et desiccatur. Naturalis autem habitudo in quadam mensura consistit. Et ideo quando continuata praesentia delectabilis superexcedit mensuram naturalis habitudinis, efficitur remotio eius delectabilis.

Again, on the part of the delightful good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now our natural state of affairs consists in a certain measure. And therefore when the continued presence of a delightful object exceeds the measure of one's natural state of affairs, the removal of that object becomes delightful.

Ex parte vero ipsius cognitionis, quia homo desiderat cognoscere aliquod totum et perfectum. Cum ergo aliqua non poterunt apprehendi tota simul, delectat in his transmutatio, ut unum transeat et alterum succedat, et sic totum sentiatur.

On the part of the knowledge itself, [change becomes delightful] because man desires to know something whole and perfect. When therefore something cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is delightful, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived.

Motus laborem et lassitudinem inducit, secundum quod transcendit habitudinem naturalem. Sic autem motus non est delectabilis, sed secundum quod removentur contraria habitudinis naturalis.

Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural state of affairs. It is not thus that it causes delight, but by removing the obstacles to our natural state of affairs.

Id quod est consuetum, efficitur delectabile, inquantum efficitur naturale, nam consuetudo est quasi altera natura. Motus autem est delectabilis, non quidem quo receditur a consuetudine, sed magis secundum quod per ipsum impeditur corruptio naturalis habitudinis, quae posset provenire ex assiduitate alicuius operationis. Et sic ex eadem causa connaturalitatis efficitur consuetudo delectabilis, et motus.

What is customary becomes delightful, insofar as it becomes natural, because custom is like a second nature. But the movement which gives delight is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which in itself prevents the corruption of the natural state of affairs, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturality, both custom and movement become delightful.

1a 2ae q32 a1: Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?

Omnis delectatio in operationem reducitur sicut in causam quia operationes sunt delectabiles, inquantum sunt proportionatae et connaturales operanti.

Every delight is traced to some operation as its cause because operations are delectable, insofar as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent.

Ipsa obiecta operationum non sunt delectabilia, nisi inquantum coniunguntur nobis: vel per cognitionem solam (sicut cum delectamur in consideratione vel inspectione aliquorum); vel quocumque alio modo simul cum cognitione (sicut cum aliquis delectatur in hoc quod cognoscit se habere quodcumque bonum: puta divitias vel honorem vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae quidem non essent delectabilia, nisi inquantum apprehenduntur ut habita).

The objects themselves of operations are not delectable, save inasmuch as they are united to us: either by knowledge alone (as when we take delight in thinking of or looking at certain things); or in some other way together with knowledge (as when a man takes delight in knowing that he has something good: e.g., riches, honor, or the like, which would not be delectable unless they were apprehended as possessed).

Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Polit., "magnam delectationem habet putare aliquid sibi proprium, quae procedit ex naturali amore alicuius ad seipsum". Habere autem huiusmodi nihil est aliud quam uti eis, vel posse uti. Et hoc est per aliquam operationem.

For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take great delight in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such like things is nothing else but to use them, or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation.

Philosophus dicit, VII et X Ethic., quod "delectatio est operatio connaturalis non impedita".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that "delight is a connatural operation that is uninterrupted".

1a 2ae q32: The causes of pleasure

1. Is operation the proper cause of pleasure?
2. Is movement a cause of pleasure?
3. Do hope and memory cause pleasure?
4. Does sadness cause pleasure?
5. Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure to us?
6. Is doing good to another a cause of pleasure?
7. Is likeness a cause of pleasure?
8. Is wonder a cause of pleasure?

1a 2ae q31 a8: Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another? Yes.

Contingit in affectibus animae duas delectationes esse contrarias quia nil prohibet duo bona esse ad invicem contraria, sicut calidum et frigidum, quorum unum est bonum igni, alterum aquae.

It happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to another because nothing prevents one good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is the good of fire, the latter, of water.

Sed hoc in bono virtutis esse non potest, quia bonum virtutis non accipitur nisi per convenientiam ad aliquid unum: scilicet rationem.

That this is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good is not received except through conformity to some one thing: namely, formal aspect.

Delectatio se habet in affectibus animae, sicut quies naturalis in corporibus, est enim in aliquo convenienti et quasi connaturali.

Delight, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies, because its object is something befitting and connatural, so to speak.

Dicuntur autem duae quietes esse contrariae, quae sunt in contrariis terminis; sicut "quies quae est sursum, ei quae est deorsum", ut dicitur V Physic.

Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6).

Ea in quibus delectamur, cum sint obiecta delectationis, non solum faciunt differentiam materialem, sed etiam formalem, si sit diversa ratio delectabilitatis. Diversa enim ratio obiecti diversificat speciem actus vel passionis, ut ex supradictis patet.

The things in which we take delight, since they are the objects of delight, cause not only a material, but also a formal difference, if the formal aspect of delectability be different. Because difference in the formal aspect of the object causes a specific difference in acts and passions, as stated above (q23, a1,a4; q30, a2).

Quaedam delectationes se invicem impediunt ut dicitur in X Ethic.

Some pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5.

1a 2ae q31 a7: Whether any pleasure is not natural? Yes.

Secundum utrasque autem delectationes, contingit aliquas esse innaturales, simpliciter loquendo, sed connaturales secundum quid, quia contingit in aliquo individuo corrumpi aliquod principiorum naturalium speciei: et sic id quod est contra naturam speciei, fieri per accidens naturale huic individuo; sicut huic aquae calefactae est naturale quod calefaciat.

Under each kind of delights, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some respect, because it happens in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted: so that something which is contrary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual; thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat.

Ita igitur contingit quod id quod est contra naturam hominis, vel quantum ad rationem, vel quantum ad corporis conservationem, fiat huic homini connaturale, propter aliquam corruptionem naturae in eo existentem.

Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to formal aspect, or in regard to the preservation of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of some corruption of nature existing in him.

Quae quidem corruptio potest esse vel ex parte corporis: sive ex aegritudine (sicut febricitantibus dulcia videntur amara et e converso); sive propter malam complexionem (sicut aliqui delectantur in comestione terrae vel carbonum, vel aliquorum huiusmodi); vel etiam ex parte animae (sicut propter consuetudinem, aliqui delectantur in comedendo homines, vel in coitu bestiarum aut masculorum, aut aliorum huiusmodi, quae non sunt secundum naturam humanam).

And this corruption may be either on the part of the body: from some ailment (thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, and vice versa); or from an evil temperament (thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like); or on the part of the soul (thus from custom, some take pleasure in cannibalism, or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, or other such things, which are not in accord with human nature).

Philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod quaedam delectationes sunt aegritudinales et contra naturam.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some delights are "diseased and contrary to nature".

1a 2ae q31 a6: Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses? Yes.

Delectatio tactus est maxima ratione utilitatis, delectatio autem visus ratione cognitionis; si quis utramque comparare velit, inveniet simpliciter delectationem tactus esse maiorem delectatione visus, secundum quod sistit infra limites sensibilis delectationis, quia manifestum est quod id quod est naturale in unoquoque, est potentissimum (huiusmodi autem delectationes tactus sunt ad quas ordinantur concupiscentiae naturales, sicut cibi, et venerea, et huiusmodi); sed si consideremus delectationes visus, secundum quod visus deservit intellectui, sic delectationes visus erunt potiores, ea ratione qua et intelligibiles delectationes sunt potiores sensibilibus.

The delight afforded by touch is the greatest according to the formal aspect of usefulness, and the delight afforded by sight the greatest according to the formal aspect of cognition; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the delight of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the delight of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure, because it is evident that in everything, that which is natural is most powerful (and it is to these delights of the touch that the natural desires, such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained); if, however, we consider the delights of sight, inasmuch as sight is the handmaid of the intellect, then the delights of sight will be more powerful, by that formal aspect by which intellectual delights are more powerful than sensible.

Utilitas enim sensibilium attenditur secundum ordinem ad conservationem naturae animalis. Ad hanc autem utilitatem propinquius se habent sensibilia tactus, est enim tactus cognoscitivus eorum ex quibus consistit animal, scilicet calidi et frigidi, et huiusmodi. Unde secundum hoc, delectationes quae sunt secundum tactum, sunt maiores, quasi fini propinquiores.

The usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their ordination to the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this usefulness, for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like. Wherefore in this respect, the delights of touch are greater, as being more closely related to the end.

Et propter hoc etiam, alia animalia, quae non habent delectationem secundum sensum nisi ratione utilitatis, non delectantur secundum alios sensus, nisi in ordine ad sensibilia tactus: "neque enim odoribus leporum canes gaudent, sed cibatione; neque leo voce bovis, sed comestione", ut dicitur in III Ethic.

For this reason, too, other animals, which do not experience sensible delight save according to the formal aspect of usefulness, derive no delight from the other senses, except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, 10).

Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod maximae delectationes sunt secundum tactum.

The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.

Alio modo delectatio est causa amoris carnalis, et alio modo visio. Nam delectatio, et maxime quae est secundum tactum, est causa amicitiae delectabilis per modum finis; visio autem est causa sicut unde est principium motus, inquantum per visum amabilis imprimitur species rei, quae allicit ad amandum et ad concupiscendum eius delectationem.

Delight causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in another. For delight, especially that which is afforded by the touch, is the final cause of the [type of] friendship which is for the sake of delight; whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of the thing, which entices him to love it and to seek its delight.

Visus maxime diligitur propter cognitionem, eo quod multas rerum differentias nobis ostendit.

The sight is loved most, "on account of cognition, because it helps us to distinguish many things (Metaph. i, 1).

Sed delectatio naturalis maxime pertinet ad tactum.

But natural pleasure belongs principally to the touch.

1a 2ae q31 a5: Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures? No.

Non est dubium quod multo sunt maiores delectationes intelligibiles quam sensibiles, quia multo magis delectatur homo de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid intelligendo, quam de hoc quod cognoscit aliquid sentiendo; quia intellectualis cognitio et perfectior est, et etiam magis cognoscitur (quia intellectus magis reflectitur supra actum suum quam sensus).

Without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures, because man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense; because intellectual knowledge is more perfect, and it is even better known (since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does).

Est etiam cognitio intellectiva magis dilecta; nullus enim est qui non magis vellet carere visu corporali quam visu intellectuali, eo modo quo bestiae vel stulti carent, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei.

Moreover intellectual cognition is more beloved; for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily vision rather than his intellectual vision, in the way that beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (cf. De Trin. xiv, 14 [PL 42: 1051]).

Ideo plures sequuntur delectationes corporales, quia bona sensibilia sunt magis et pluribus nota. Et etiam quia homines indigent delectationibus ut medicinis contra multiplices dolores et tristitias; et cum plures hominum non possint attingere ad delectationes spirituales, quae sunt propriae virtuosorum, consequens et quod declinent ad corporales.

The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensory goods are known better and more generally. And, again, because men need delights as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness; and since the majority cannot attain spiritual delights, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.

1a 2ae q31 a4: Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite? Yes.

Delectatio potest esse in appetitu intellectivo quia delectatio quaedam sequitur apprehensionem rationis. Ad apprehensionem autem rationis, non solum commovetur appetitus sensitivus, per applicationem ad aliquid particulare; sed etiam appetitus intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas. Et secundum hoc, in appetitu intellectivo, sive in voluntate, est delectatio quae dicitur gaudium, non autem delectatio corporalis.

Delight can be in the intellectual appetite because a certain delight arises from the apprehension of formal aspect. Now on apprehension of formal aspect, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.

Hoc tamen interest inter delectationem utriusque appetitus, quod delectatio appetitus sensibilis est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali, delectatio autem appetitus intellectivi nihil aliud est quam simplex motus voluntatis. Et secundum hoc Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod cupiditas et laetitia non est aliud quam voluntas in eorum consensione quae volumus.

However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish."

Delectatio habet rationem passionis, proprie loquendo, inquantum est cum aliqua transmutatione corporali. Et sic non est in appetitu intellectivo, sed secundum simplicem motum; sic enim etiam est in Deo et in Angelis. Unde dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod Deus una simplici operatione gaudet. Et Dionysius dicit, in fine Cael. Hier., quod "Angeli non sunt susceptibiles nostrae passibilis delectationis, sed congaudent Deo secundum incorruptionis laetitiam".

Delight has the formal aspect of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement; for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of incorruption."

In nobis non solum est delectatio in qua communicamus cum brutis, sed etiam in qua communicamus cum Angelis. Unde ibidem Dionysius dicit quod "sancti homines multoties fiunt in participatione delectationum angelicarum". Et ita in nobis est delectatio non solum in appetitu sensitivo, in quo communicamus cum brutis; sed etiam in appetitu intellectivo, in quo communicamus cum Angelis.

In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.

1a 2ae q31 a3: Whether delight differs from joy? Yes.

Non est idem gaudium et delectatio quia nomen gaudii non habet locum nisi in delectatione quae consequitur rationem; unde gaudium non attribuimus brutis animalibus, sed solum nomen delectationis.

Joy is not the same as delight because we do not speak of "joy" except when delight follows formal aspect; and so we do not ascribe joy to brute animals, but only "delight".

Sicut Damascenus et Gregorius Nyssenus dicunt, "quaedam sunt corporales, quaedam animales".

As Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul".

Similis differentia invenitur etiam in concupiscentiis, ita quod delectatio respondeat concupiscentiae (et gaudium respondeat desiderio), quod magis videtur pertinere ad concupiscentiam animalem. Et sic secundum differentiam motus, est etiam differentia quietis.

A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also, so that delight corresponds to concupiscence (while joy corresponds to desire), which seems to pertain more to animal concupiscence. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of movement.

Alia nomina ad delectationem pertinentia, sunt imposita ab effectibus delectationis; nam laetitia imponitur a dilatatione cordis, ac si diceretur latitia; exultatio vero dicitur ab exterioribus signis delectationis interioris, quae apparent exterius, inquantum scilicet interius gaudium prosilit ad exteriora; iucunditas vero dicitur a quibusdam specialibus laetitiae signis vel effectibus. Et tamen omnia ista nomina videntur pertinere ad gaudium, non enim utimur eis nisi in naturis rationalibus.

Other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which appear outwardly insofar as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of beings with formally aspectual natures.

1a 2ae q31 a2: Whether delight is in time? No.

Delectatio secundum se quidem non est in tempore, quia est delectatio in bono iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus.

Delight, of itself indeed, is not in time, because it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement.

Sed si illud bonum adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.

But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time incidentally. But if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either essentially, or incidentally.

Sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, qui est "actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi": et talis motus est successivus, et in tempore.

As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time.

Alius autem motus est "actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu"; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in tempore.

Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This sort of movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.

Aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non esse in tempore.

Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the formal aspect of imperfect movement in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.

Philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod "secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem".

The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."

1a 2ae q31 a1: Whether delight is a passion? Yes.

Delectatio est passio animae quia delectatio est motus in appetitu animali consequens apprehensionem sensus.

Delight is a passion of the soul because delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense.

Quamvis nomen passionis magis proprie conveniat passionibus corruptivis et in malum tendentibus (sicut sunt aegritudines corporales, et tristitia et timor in anima), tamen etiam in bonum ordinantur aliquae passiones, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc delectatio dicitur passio.

Although the name of passion is [customarily considered as being] more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency (such as bodily ailments, and also sadness and fear in the soul), yet some passions are ordered to something good, as stated above (q23, a1,a4). And in this sense delight [a.k.a., pleasure,] is called a passion.

Augustinus, in IX et XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit delectationem, sive gaudium vel laetitiam, inter alias passiones animae.

Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight (i.e., joy, or happiness) among the other passions of the soul.

Motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur, sicut supra dictum est. Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem necesse est competere delectationi.

The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above (q22, a3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight.

Sicut contingit in rebus naturalibus aliqua consequi suas perfectiones naturales, ita hoc contingit in animalibus. Et quamvis moveri ad perfectionem non sit totum simul, tamen consequi naturalem perfectionem est totum simul. Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales, quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt. Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu sensitivo; et iste motus est delectatio.

Just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight.

In animali duplex motus considerari potest: unus secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum; alius secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem.

A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation.

Licet ergo in eo qui iam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset motus executionis, quo tenditur ad finem; non tamen cessat motus appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius desiderabat non habitum, ita postea delectatur in habito.

And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses.

Licet enim delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod appetitui satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab appetibili: ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est.

For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite; nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object: the formal aspect by which delight is a kind of movement.

Philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., "delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem".

According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing."

Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod delectatio est "motus animae", ponitur in genere.

By saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus.

Per hoc autem quod dicitur constitutio in existentem naturam (idest in id quod existit in natura rei), ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet praesentia connaturalis boni.

By saying that it is "an establishing in keeping with an existing nature," i.e., (with that which exists in the nature of thing), we assign the cause of delight, viz., the presence of a connatural good.

Per hoc autem quod dicitur simul tota, ostendit quod constitutio non debet accipi prout est in constitui, sed prout est in constitutum esse, quasi in termino motus: non enim delectatio est generatio, ut Plato posuit, sed magis consistit in factum esse, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.

By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the be-ing of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete [act of] be-ing," as stated in [Aristotle's] Ethic. vii, 12.

Per hoc autem quod dicitur sensibilis, excluduntur perfectiones rerum insensibilium, in quibus non est delectatio.

Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things, wherein there is no delight.

Sic ergo patet quod, cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens apprehensionem sensus, delectatio est passio animae.

It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul.

Operatio connaturalis non impedita, est perfectio secunda, ut habetur in II de anima. Et ideo, quando constituitur res in propria operatione connaturali et non impedita, sequitur delectatio, quae consistit in perfectum esse, ut dictum est. Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam.

Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion of [the act] of be-ing, as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.

1a 2ae q31: Pleasure considered in itself

1. Is pleasure a passion?
2. Is pleasure subject to time?
3. Does it differ from joy?
4. Is it in the intellectual appetite?
5. The pleasures of the higher appetite compared with the pleasure of the lower
6. Sensible pleasures compared with one another
7. Is any pleasure non-natural?
8. Can one pleasure be contrary to another?

1a 2ae q30 a4: Whether desire is infinite? Yes.

Sed concupiscentia non naturalis omnino est infinita, quia sequitur rationem, ut dictum est, rationi autem competit in infinitum procedere; unde qui concupiscit divitias, potest eas concupiscere, non ad aliquem certum terminum, sed simpliciter: se divitem esse, quantumcumque potest.

Non-natural desire is altogether infinite, because, it follows from aspectual apprehension, as stated above (q30 a3), and it belongs to formal aspect to proceed to infinity; hence he that desires riches, is able to desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but [to desire] simply: that he is to be rich, as much as possible.

Ratio quodammodo est virtutis infinitae, inquantum potest in infinitum aliquid considerare (ut apparet in additione numerorum et linearum). Unde infinitum aliquo modo sumptum, est proportionatum rationi. Nam et universale, quod ratio apprehendit, est quodammodo infinitum, inquantum in potentia continet infinita singularia.

Formal aspect, in a certain sense, is possessed of infinite power, insofar as it can consider a thing infinitely (for example, [in mathematics] in the addition of numbers and lines). Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to formal aspect. In fact the universal, which formal aspect apprehends, is, in a way, infinite, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of singulars.

Omne quod concupiscitur, accipitur ut quoddam finitum: vel quia est finitum secundum rem, prout semel concupiscitur in actu; vel quia est finitum secundum quod cadit sub apprehensione. Non enim potest sub ratione infiniti apprehendi, quia infinitum est, "cuius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est aliquid extra sumere", ut dicitur in III Physic.

Every object of desire is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in the thing, as being once actually desired; or because it is finite inasmuch as it falls under apprehension. For it cannot be apprehended under the formal aspect of the infinite, since the infinite is that "from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken" (Phys. iii, 6).

Duplex est concupiscentia: una naturalis; et alia non naturalis. Naturalis quidem igitur concupiscentia non potest esse infinita in actu. Est enim eius quod natura requirit; natura vero semper intendit in aliquid finitum et certum. Unde nunquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum, vel infinitum potum.

Desire is twofold: one is natural; the other is not natural. Natural desire cannot be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink.

Sed sicut in natura contingit esse infinitum in potentia per successionem, ita huiusmodi concupiscentiam contingit infinitam esse per successionem; ut scilicet, post adeptum cibum, iterum alia vice desideret cibum; vel quodcumque aliud quod natura requirit: quia huiusmodi corporalia bona, cum adveniunt, non perpetuo manent, sed deficiunt. Unde dixit dominus Samaritanae, Ioan. IV, "qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum".

But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of desire be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (John 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again."

Philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod, "in infinitum concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant".

The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since desire is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things."

Potest et alia ratio assignari, secundum philosophum in I Polit., quare quaedam concupiscentia sit finita, et quaedam infinita: Semper enim concupiscentia finis est infinita, finis enim per se concupiscitur (ut sanitas); unde maior sanitas magis concupiscitur, et sic in infinitum; sicut, si album per se disgregat, magis album magis disgregat.

Another formal aspect may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain desire is finite, and another infinite: Because desire of the end is always infinite, since the end is desired for its own sake (e.g., health); and thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more.

Concupiscentia vero eius quod est ad finem, non est infinita, sed secundum illam mensuram appetitur qua convenit fini. Unde qui finem ponunt in divitiis, habent concupiscentiam divitiarum in infinitum; qui autem divitias appetunt propter necessitatem vitae, concupiscunt divitias finitas, sufficientes ad necessitatem vitae, ut philosophus dicit ibidem. Et eadem est ratio de concupiscentia, quarumcumque aliarum rerum.

On the other hand, desire of the means is not infinite, because the desire of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an infinite desire of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same formal aspect of desire applies to any other things.

Ad hoc quod aliquis delectetur, non requiritur quod omnia consequatur quae concupiscit, sed in quolibet concupito quod consequitur, delectatur.

In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to attain all that he desires, for he delights in the attainment of each desired object.

1a 2ae q30 a3: Whether some desires are natural, and some not natural? Yes.

Diversitas concupiscentiarum naturalium a non naturalibus, non est materialis tantum; sed etiam quodammodo formalis, inquantum procedit ex diversitate obiecti activi, quia obiectum appetitus est bonum apprehensum, unde ad diversitatem activi pertinet diversitas apprehensionis: prout scilicet apprehenditur aliquid ut conveniens absoluta apprehensione, ex qua causantur concupiscentiae naturales, quas philosophus in Rhetoric. vocat irrationales; et prout apprehenditur aliquid cum deliberatione, ex quo causantur concupiscentiae non naturales, quae propter hoc in Rhetoric. dicuntur cum ratione.

The difference between those desires that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; it is also, in a way, formal, insofar as it arises from a difference in the active object, because the object of the appetite is the apprehended good, and hence diversity of the active [object] follows from diversity of apprehension: either inasmuch as something is [apprehended as] befitting, by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural desires, which the Philosopher calls "non-aspectual" (Rhet. i, 11); or inasmuch as something is apprehended together with deliberation, whence arise those desires that are not natural, and which accordingly the Philosopher calls "aspectual" (Rhet. i, 11).

In homine non solum est ratio universalis, quae pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis, quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut in primo libro dictum est. Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscentia quae est cum ratione, potest ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere. Et praeterea appetitus sensitivus potest etiam a ratione universali moveri, mediante imaginatione particulari.

In humans, there is not only universal formal aspect, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular aspect pertaining to the sensitive faculty (as stated in I, q78, a4; I, q81, a3). Accordingly, even aspectual desire may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by a universal formal aspect also, through the medium of the particular imagination.

1a 2ae q30 a2: Whether concupiscence is a specific passion? Yes.

Concupiscentia est passio differens specie et ab amore et a delectatione quia ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, inquantum appetitum sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem; inquantum vero absens attrahit ad seipsum, causat concupiscentiam; inquantum vero praesens quietat in seipso, causat delectationem.

Desire is a passion differing in species from both love and delight because the [object] itself delectable to sense causes love, inasmuch as, in a certain way, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes desire, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws [the concupiscible faculty] to itself; and it causes delight, inasmuch as, when present, it makes [the concupiscible faculty] to find rest in itself.

Est autem alia ratio virtutis motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, et secundum quod est absens, nam secundum quod est praesens, facit in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad seipsum moveri.

Now the formal aspect of the motive power of the end (i.e., of the good), differs according as it is really present, or absent, because, according as it is present, it causes [the concupiscible faculty] to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes [the concupiscible faculty] to be moved towards it.

Bonum delectabile non est absolute obiectum concupiscentiae, sed sub ratione absentis, sicut et sensibile sub ratione praeteriti, est obiectum memoriae. Huiusmodi enim particulares conditiones diversificant speciem passionum, vel etiam potentiarum sensitivae partis, quae respicit particularia.

The delectable good is the object of [the passion of] desire, not absolutely, but considered under the formal aspect of absence, just as the sensible, considered under the formal aspect of the past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers of the sensitive part, which regards particular things.

1a 2ae q30 a1: Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only? Yes.

Concupiscentia, proprie loquendo, est in appetitu sensitivo, et in vi concupiscibili, quae ab ea denominatur, quia unicuique potentiae animae competit appetere proprium bonum appetitu naturali, qui non sequitur apprehensionem; sed appetere bonum appetitu animali, qui sequitur apprehensionem, pertinet solum ad vim appetitivam: appetere autem aliquid sub ratione boni delectabilis secundum sensum, quod proprie est concupiscere, pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem.

Properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in its concupiscible power, which takes its name from it, because while it belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension, the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone: and to crave something under the formal aspect of a good that is delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.

Sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis. Est autem duplex delectatio, ut infra dicetur: una quae est in bono intelligibili, quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est in bono secundum sensum.

As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on (q31, a3,a4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good apprehended by formal aspect; the other is in good perceptible to the senses.

Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animae tantum. Secunda autem est animae et corporis, quia sensus est virtus in organo corporeo; unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius coniuncti. Talis autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen concupiscentiae sonat.

The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone, whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body, because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ; wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "con-cupiscentia." [="a together-desire"]

1a 2ae q30: Concupiscence

1. Is concupiscence in the sensitive appetite only?
2. Is concupiscence a specific passion?
3. Are some concupiscences natural, and some not natural?
4. Is concupiscence infinite?

1a 2ae q29 a6: Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred? Yes.

Odium sensitivae partis potest respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis: sicut lupus ovi; unde ovis odit lupum generaliter.

Hatred, in the sensitive faculty of a soul, can regard something universally, because something, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as a particular individual, may be hostile to the animal: for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep; hence a sheep hates the wolf universally.

De universali dupliciter contingit loqui: uno modo, secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur; alia est enim consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo.

There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as it considered under the intention of universality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which such an intention is ascribed; for it is one thing to consider "the human" as universal, and another to consider "the human" as it is in him who is a human.

Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri potest in universale, quia universale fit per abstractionem a materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva.

If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no power of the sensitive faculty of a soul, neither the power of apprehension nor of appetite, can attain the universal, because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, in which every sensitive ability takes root.

Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod obiectum visus est color secundum genus; non quia visus cognoscat colorem universalem, sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est color simpliciter.

Nevertheless some sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight cognizes universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizable by the sight, as is fitting for color, not so much as it is this [particular] color, but inasmuch it is simply color [i.e., color universally considered].

Sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est universale; apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit universalitas.

The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such; but they apprehend something to which [the formal aspect of] universality is given by abstraction.

Id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum.

That which is common to all cannot be the formal aspect of hatred. But nothing hinders something from being common to many, but yet at variance with others, so as thus to be hateful to them [under the formal aspect of hatred].

Sed ira semper causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse ad aliquid in genere.

On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular, because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from particular individuals. And because of this, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that anger is always directed to something singular; whereas hatred can be directed to something in general.

Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "ira semper fit inter singularia, odium autem etiam ad genera; furem enim odit et calumniatorem unusquisque".

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger always arises between singular things, whereas hatred is also directed to general things; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."

Sed odium, secundum quod est in parte intellectiva (cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem intellectus), potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.

But hatred, because it is [possible for it to be not just in the sensitive faculty of a soul but also] in the intellectual faculty of the soul (since it can arise from a universal apprehension of the intellect), is able to be in regard of the universal in both ways [(i.e., in the intention, intellectually, and in the object of intentionality, sensitively)].

1a 2ae q29 a5: Whether a man can hate the truth? Yes.

Sed in particulari nihil prohibet quoddam ens et quoddam verum odio haberi, inquantum habet rationem contrarii et repugnantis, quia contrarietas et repugnantia non adversatur rationi entis et veri, sicut adversatur rationi boni.

Nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an object of hatred, insofar as it is considered under the formal aspect of being hurtful and repugnant, because hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with the formal aspect of being and truth, as they are with the formal aspect of good.

Bonum et verum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt ratione. Bonum enim habet rationem appetibilis, non autem ens vel verum, quia bonum est "quod omnia appetunt". Et ideo bonum, sub ratione boni, non potest odio haberi, nec in universali nec in particulari.

Good, true and being are the same in a thing, but differ in their formal aspect. For good has the formal aspect of something desirable, while being and true are not so considered, since the good is "what all things seek". Wherefore a good, considered under the formal aspect of good, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular.

Dicit Augustinus, in X Confess., quod homines "amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem".

Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that humans "love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it reproves".

Cognoscere veritatem secundum se est amabile; propter quod dicit Augustinus quod amant eam lucentem. Sed per accidens cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, inquantum impedit ab aliquo desiderato.

The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself; hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful, insofar as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire.

Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "homines amant non fictos".

The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward".

Ex hoc procedit quod non ficti amantur, quod homo amat secundum se cognoscere veritatem, quam homines non ficti manifestant.

The reason why those who are straightforward are loved, is that a man loves the knowledge of the truth in itself, which is what is displayed by men who are straightforward.

1a 2ae q29 a4: Whether a man can hate himself? No.

Impossibile est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat seipsum quia naturaliter unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni; nam "malum est praeter voluntatem", ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.

Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself, because everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the formal aspect of good; for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi inquantum apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt seipsos, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni, inquantum est terminativum alicuius miseriae vel doloris.

No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the formal aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself under the formal aspect of good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain.

Avaritia odiosos facit aliis, non autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore, secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam debeat.

Avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should.

1a 2ae q29 a3: Whether hatred is stronger than love? No.

Amor est fortior odio quia impossibile est effectum sua causa esse fortiorem; omne autem odium procedit ex aliquo amore sicut ex causa.

Love is stronger than hatred because it is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause; but every hatred arises from some love as its cause.

Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo, sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem, quam in ea quae sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, fortior est motus animae in bonum quam in malum.

And furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil.

Bonum est fortius quam malum, quia malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de Div. Nom.

Good is stronger than evil, because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

1a 2ae q29 a2: Whether love is a cause of hatred? Yes.

Omne odium ex amore causatur quia nihil odio habeatur, nisi per hoc quod contrariatur convenienti quod amatur.

Every hatred is caused by love because nothing is hated save through being contrary to a fitting thing which is loved.

Amor autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem, sed non realiter.

Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous according to formal aspect but not really.

1a 2ae q29 a1: Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred? Yes.

Sicut bonum est obiectum amoris, ita malum est obiectum odii, quia sicut omne conveniens, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni, ita omne repugnans, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali.

Just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred, because just as whatever is fitting as such bears the formal aspect of good, so whatever is repugnant as such bears the formal aspect of evil.

Ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia conveniunt in ente. Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per comparationem ad alterum.

Being, as be-ing, has not the formal aspect of repugnance, but only of fittingness, because all things are fitting in their be-ing. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has a formal aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil, although not in itself, but by comparison with something else.

Sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est vere bonum, ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni, esse bonum.

Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good, so a thing may be apprehended as evil, when it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil, nor love of good, is good.

Contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri.

To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful, in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally fitted to one thing, and naturally opposed to another.

In appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod sibi convenit (quae est amor naturalis), ita ad id quod est ei repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem (quae est odium naturale).

With regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which befits it (wherein consists natural love), so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it (and this is natural hatred).

Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens; odium vero est dissonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum.

So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as fitting; while hatred is a certain dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as opposed and harmful.

1a 2ae q29: Hatred

1. Is evil the cause and the object of hatred?
2. Is love the cause of hatred?
3. Is hatred stronger than love?
4. Can a man hate himself?
5. Can a man hate the truth?
6. Can a thing be the object of universal hatred?

1a 2ae q28 a6: Whether love is cause of all that the lover does? Yes.

Omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore, quia omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique.

Every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind, because every agent acts for an end, as stated above (q1 a2); but the end is the good desired and loved by each one.

Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem.

Here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love.

Omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa. Unde non superfluunt aliae passiones, quae sunt causae proximae.

Every act proceeding from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause; and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "propter amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt".

Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."

1a 2ae q28 a5: Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover? No.

Amor non est passio laesiva, sed magis conservativa et perfectiva, quia amor significat coaptationem quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum; nihil autem quod coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso laeditur: sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur.

Love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects, because love denotes a certain fitting adapting of the appetitive power to some good; but nothing is hurt by being fittingly adapted to that which befits it: rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered.

Et hoc quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis: sicut accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per aliquam immutationem organi corporalis.

And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love may be hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ.

1a 2ae q28 a4: Whether zeal is an effect of love? Yes.

Zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intensione amoris provenit, quia quanto aliqua virtus intensius tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel repugnans.

Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love, because the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance.

Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici; unde quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bono amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo repellere studet.

Love of friendship seeks the friend's good; wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good.

Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare pro Deo, quando ea quae sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, repellere secundum posse conatur.

In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of God.