Audacia est timori contraria quia illud quod maxime distat a timore, est audacia: timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum, propter eius victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum.
Daring is contrary to fear because that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger.
Uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria; sed secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero desperatio.
To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (q23 a2; q40 a4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope; the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.
De ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.
It is of the formal aspect of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Friday, July 30, 2010
Thursday, July 29, 2010
1a 2ae q44 a4: Whether fear hinders action? No.
Timor non impedit bonam operationem quia ex parte instrumentorum corporalium, timor, quantum est de se, semper natus est impedire exteriorem operationem, sed ex parte animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem perturbans, confert ad bene operandum, inquantum causat quandam sollicitudinem, et facit hominem attentius consiliari et operari.
Fear does not hinder a good action because on the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, but on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, insofar as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention.
Apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, "cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini", quod non diceret, si timor bonam operationem impediret.
The Apostle says (Philippians 2:12): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work.
Fear does not hinder a good action because on the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, but on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, insofar as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention.
Apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, "cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini", quod non diceret, si timor bonam operationem impediret.
The Apostle says (Philippians 2:12): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work.
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
1a 2ae q44 a3: Whether fear makes one tremble? Yes.
Tremor est effectus timoris quia in timore fit quaedam contractio ab exterioribus ad interiora, et propter hoc in eis accidit tremor, qui causatur ex debilitate virtutis continentis membra.
Trembling is an effect of fear because in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling the members.
Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod "terrorem sequitur tremor, et pallor, et dentium crepitus".
Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth".
Trembling is an effect of fear because in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling the members.
Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod "terrorem sequitur tremor, et pallor, et dentium crepitus".
Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth".
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
1a 2ae q44 a2: Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel? Yes.
Homines maxime in timoribus quaerunt consiliari quia in difficilibus, maxime in quibus nobis non confidimus, consiliamur.
Men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid because it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel.
Sed ex defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.
But owing to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.
Quanto aliqua passio est fortior, tanto magis homo secundum ipsam affectus, impeditur. Et ideo quando timor fuerit fortis, vult quidem homo consiliari, sed adeo perturbatur in suis cogitationibus, quod consilium adinvenire non potest.
The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel.
Si autem sit parvus timor, qui sollicitudinem consiliandi inducat, nec multum rationem conturbet; potest etiam conferre ad facultatem bene consiliandi, ratione sollicitudinis consequentis.
If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod timor consiliativos facit.
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel".
Men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid because it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel.
Sed ex defectu rectitudinis iudicii, quaelibet passio, quantum est de se, impedit facultatem bene consiliandi.
But owing to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.
Quanto aliqua passio est fortior, tanto magis homo secundum ipsam affectus, impeditur. Et ideo quando timor fuerit fortis, vult quidem homo consiliari, sed adeo perturbatur in suis cogitationibus, quod consilium adinvenire non potest.
The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel.
Si autem sit parvus timor, qui sollicitudinem consiliandi inducat, nec multum rationem conturbet; potest etiam conferre ad facultatem bene consiliandi, ratione sollicitudinis consequentis.
If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod timor consiliativos facit.
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel".
Monday, July 26, 2010
1a 2ae q44 a1: Whether fear causes contraction? Yes.
Quantum autem ad animalem motum appetitus, timor contractionem quandam importat, quia timor provenit ex phantasia alicuius mali imminentis quod difficile repelli potest, ut supra dictum est; quod autem aliquid difficile possit repelli, provenit ex debilitate virtutis, ut supra dictum est; virtus autem, quanto est debilior, tanto ad pauciora se potest extendere: et ideo ex ipsa imaginatione quae causat timorem, sequitur quaedam contractio in appetitu.
As to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain contraction, because fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above (q41 a2); but that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above (q43 a2); and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends: wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite.
In passionibus animae est sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem materiale transmutatio corporalis, quorum unum alteri proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio.
In the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance to—and the formal aspect of—the appetitive movement.
Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod timor est virtus secundum systolen, idest secundum contractionem.
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to systole," i.e. contraction.
Et inde est quod timentes mortem pallescunt, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.
Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9).
As to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain contraction, because fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above (q41 a2); but that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above (q43 a2); and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends: wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite.
In passionibus animae est sicut formale ipse motus appetitivae potentiae, sicut autem materiale transmutatio corporalis, quorum unum alteri proportionatur. Unde secundum similitudinem et rationem appetitivi motus, sequitur corporalis transmutatio.
In the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance to—and the formal aspect of—the appetitive movement.
Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod timor est virtus secundum systolen, idest secundum contractionem.
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to systole," i.e. contraction.
Et inde est quod timentes mortem pallescunt, ut dicitur in IV Ethic.
Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9).
Saturday, July 24, 2010
1a 2ae q43 a2: Whether defect is the cause of fear? Yes.
Defectus, per se loquendo, est causa timoris, quia ex aliquo defectu virtutis contingit quod non possit aliquis de facili repellere imminens malum.
Some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear, because it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil.
Some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear, because it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil.
Friday, July 23, 2010
1a 2ae q43 a1: Whether love is the cause of fear? Yes.
Amor est causa timoris quia omnis timor causatur ex hoc quod aliquid amamus: amor est causa eius per modum materialis dispositionis.
Love is the cause of fear because all fear is caused by our loving something: i.e., love causes fear by way of material disposition.
Obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa obiecti, est causa passionis.
The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of the passion.
Contingit autem aliquid esse causam obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum.
Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition according to which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.
Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis.
Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition.
Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris: ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.
And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an evil.
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for."
Love is the cause of fear because all fear is caused by our loving something: i.e., love causes fear by way of material disposition.
Obiecta passionum animae se habent ad eas tanquam formae ad res naturales vel artificiales, quia passiones animae speciem recipiunt ab obiectis, sicut res praedictae a suis formis. Sicut igitur quidquid est causa formae, est causa rei constitutae per ipsam; ita etiam quidquid, et quocumque modo, est causa obiecti, est causa passionis.
The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of the passion.
Contingit autem aliquid esse causam obiecti vel per modum causae efficientis, vel per modum dispositionis materialis. Sicut obiectum delectationis est bonum apparens conveniens coniunctum, cuius causa efficiens est illud quod facit coniunctionem, vel quod facit convenientiam vel bonitatem, vel apparentiam huiusmodi boni; causa autem per modum dispositionis materialis, est habitus, vel quaecumque dispositio secundum quam fit alicui conveniens aut apparens illud bonum quod est ei coniunctum.
Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition according to which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.
Sic igitur, in proposito, obiectum timoris est aestimatum malum futurum propinquum cui resisti de facili non potest. Et ideo illud quod potest inferre tale malum, est causa effectiva obiecti timoris, et per consequens ipsius timoris. Illud autem per quod aliquis ita disponitur ut aliquid sit ei tale, est causa timoris, et obiecti eius, per modum dispositionis materialis.
Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition.
Et hoc modo amor est causa timoris: ex hoc enim quod aliquis amat aliquod bonum, sequitur quod privativum talis boni sit ei malum, et per consequens quod timeat ipsum tanquam malum.
And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an evil.
Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium quaest., "nulli dubium est non aliam esse metuendi causam, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for."
Thursday, July 22, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a6: Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy? Yes.
Mala autem quae, postquam advenerint, non possunt habere remedium, vel non de facili, maxime redduntur timenda quia accipiuntur ut perpetua vel diuturna.
Those evils which, after they have come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, inspire the greatest fear because they are considered as lasting forever or for a long time.
Obiectum timoris est malum; unde illud quod facit ad augmentum mali, facit ad augmentum timoris. Malum autem augetur non solum secundum speciem ipsius mali, sed etiam secundum circumstantias, ut ex supra dictis apparet. Inter ceteras autem circumstantias, diuturnitas, vel etiam perpetuitas, magis videtur facere ad augmentum mali. Ea enim quae sunt in tempore, secundum durationem temporis quodammodo mensurantur.
The object of fear is evil; consequently, whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above (q18 a3). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil, because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration of time.
Unde si pati aliquid in tanto tempore est malum, pati idem in duplo tempore apprehenditur ut duplatum. Et secundum hanc rationem, pati idem in infinito tempore, quod est perpetuo pati, habet quodammodo infinitum augmentum.
Wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And according this argument, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length of time, i.e. forever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "omnia timenda sunt terribiliora quaecumque, si peccaverint, corrigi non contingit; aut quorum auxilia non sunt; aut non facilia".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy".
Those evils which, after they have come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, inspire the greatest fear because they are considered as lasting forever or for a long time.
Obiectum timoris est malum; unde illud quod facit ad augmentum mali, facit ad augmentum timoris. Malum autem augetur non solum secundum speciem ipsius mali, sed etiam secundum circumstantias, ut ex supra dictis apparet. Inter ceteras autem circumstantias, diuturnitas, vel etiam perpetuitas, magis videtur facere ad augmentum mali. Ea enim quae sunt in tempore, secundum durationem temporis quodammodo mensurantur.
The object of fear is evil; consequently, whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above (q18 a3). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil, because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration of time.
Unde si pati aliquid in tanto tempore est malum, pati idem in duplo tempore apprehenditur ut duplatum. Et secundum hanc rationem, pati idem in infinito tempore, quod est perpetuo pati, habet quodammodo infinitum augmentum.
Wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And according this argument, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length of time, i.e. forever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "omnia timenda sunt terribiliora quaecumque, si peccaverint, corrigi non contingit; aut quorum auxilia non sunt; aut non facilia".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy".
Wednesday, July 21, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a5: Whether sudden things are especially feared? Yes.
Augustinus dicit, in II Confess., "timor insolita et repentina exhorrescit, rebus quae amantur adversantia, dum praecavet securitati," quia obiectum timoris est malum imminens quod non de facili repelli potest. Hoc autem ex duobus contingit, scilicet ex magnitudine mali, et ex debilitate timentis. Ad utrumque autem horum operatur quod aliquid sit insolitum et repentinum.
Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their safety," because the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both of these causes.
Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius appareat. Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per Tullium in III de Tusculanis quaest., ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur timor futuri mali.
First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand.
Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.
Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him that fears, insofar as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.
Illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex improviso advenit. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales magis timentur.
Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger, wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, since it may be foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger, wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.
Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their safety," because the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both of these causes.
Primo quidem, facit ad hoc quod malum imminens maius appareat. Omnia enim corporalia, et bona et mala, quanto magis considerantur, minora apparent. Et ideo, sicut propter diuturnitatem dolor praesentis mali mitigatur, ut patet per Tullium in III de Tusculanis quaest., ita etiam ex praemeditatione minuitur timor futuri mali.
First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand.
Secundo, aliquid esse insolitum et repentinum facit ad debilitatem timentis, inquantum subtrahit remedia quae homo potest praeparare ad repellendum futurum malum, quae esse non possunt quando ex improviso malum occurrit.
Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him that fears, insofar as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.
Illi qui habent iram acutam, non occultant eam, et ideo nocumenta ab eis illata non ita sunt repentina, quin praevideantur. Sed homines mites et astuti occultant iram, et ideo nocumentum quod ab eis imminet, non potest praevideri, sed ex improviso advenit. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod tales magis timentur.
Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger, wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, since it may be foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger, wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.
Tuesday, July 20, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a4: Whether fear itself can be feared? Yes.
Potest aliquis timere timorem (ne scilicet immineat ei necessitas timendi, propter ingruentiam alicuius excellentis mali), quia provenit ex causa extrinseca, inquantum est passio quaedam consequens phantasiam imminentis mali.
It is possible for fear to be the object of fear (i.e., a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil), because it is due to an extrinsic cause, insofar as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil.
Illud solum habet rationem terribilis, quod ex causa extrinseca provenit; non autem quod provenit ex voluntate nostra. Timor autem partim provenit ex causa extrinseca, et partim subiacet voluntati.
Nothing has the formal aspect of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will.
Subiacet autem voluntati, inquantum appetitus inferior obedit rationi: unde homo potest timorem repellere. Et secundum hoc, timor non potest timeri, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.
It is subject to the will, insofar as the lower appetite obeys reason: wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33).
It is possible for fear to be the object of fear (i.e., a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil), because it is due to an extrinsic cause, insofar as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil.
Illud solum habet rationem terribilis, quod ex causa extrinseca provenit; non autem quod provenit ex voluntate nostra. Timor autem partim provenit ex causa extrinseca, et partim subiacet voluntati.
Nothing has the formal aspect of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will.
Subiacet autem voluntati, inquantum appetitus inferior obedit rationi: unde homo potest timorem repellere. Et secundum hoc, timor non potest timeri, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest.
It is subject to the will, insofar as the lower appetite obeys reason: wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33).
Monday, July 19, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a3: Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear? No.
Malum culpae proprie non habet rationem terribilis, quia malum culpae propriam causam habet voluntatem humanam.
The evil of sin, properly speaking, does not display the formal aspect of fear, because human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin.
Timor est de malo futuro arduo quod non potest de facili vitari. Ex quo potest accipi quod id quod omnino subiacet potestati et voluntati nostrae, non habet rationem terribilis, sed illud solum est terribile, quod habet causam extrinsecam.
The object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, does not have the formal aspect of fear, and that nothing gives rise to fear, save what is due to an external cause.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "non omnia mala timentur, puta si aliquis erit iniustus, aut tardus".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow".
The evil of sin, properly speaking, does not display the formal aspect of fear, because human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin.
Timor est de malo futuro arduo quod non potest de facili vitari. Ex quo potest accipi quod id quod omnino subiacet potestati et voluntati nostrae, non habet rationem terribilis, sed illud solum est terribile, quod habet causam extrinsecam.
The object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, does not have the formal aspect of fear, and that nothing gives rise to fear, save what is due to an external cause.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "non omnia mala timentur, puta si aliquis erit iniustus, aut tardus".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow".
Sunday, July 18, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a2: Whether an evil of nature is an object of fear? Yes.
De malo naturae potest esse timor quia sicut contristativum malum est quod contrariatur voluntati, ita corruptivum malum est quod contrariatur naturae: et hoc est malum naturae.
An evil of nature can be the object of fear because just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a destructive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature.
Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus.
But it must be observed that an evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause, and then it is called an evil of nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
Aliquando vero malum naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus, illud quod removet futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem.
But sometimes an evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause, such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case, an evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also.
Quod autem non appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans: hoc enim, propter distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., "quae valde longe sunt non timentur; sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur, sed quia non prope est, nihil curant".
Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not."
Alio modo aestimatur aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "illi qui iam decapitantur non timent", videntes sibi necessitatem mortis imminere; sed "ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam spem salutis".
Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him."
Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe evasionis, tunc timebitur.
Consequently, an evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future. But if an evil of nature that is destructive be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
An evil of nature can be the object of fear because just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a destructive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature.
Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus.
But it must be observed that an evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause, and then it is called an evil of nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
Aliquando vero malum naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus, illud quod removet futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem.
But sometimes an evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause, such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case, an evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also.
Quod autem non appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans: hoc enim, propter distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., "quae valde longe sunt non timentur; sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur, sed quia non prope est, nihil curant".
Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not."
Alio modo aestimatur aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "illi qui iam decapitantur non timent", videntes sibi necessitatem mortis imminere; sed "ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam spem salutis".
Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him."
Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe evasionis, tunc timebitur.
Consequently, an evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future. But if an evil of nature that is destructive be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
Saturday, July 17, 2010
1a 2ae q42 a1: Whether the object of fear is good? No.
Primo et per se respicit malum sicut proprium obiectum, quia timor fugam quandam importat: quicumque autem importat fugam, habet malum pro obiecto.
In the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object, because fear implies an avoidance: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object.
Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo futuro.
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil.
Potest autem respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est privativum boni.
It can, however, regard good also, insofar as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good.
Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne amittatur bonum amatum.
Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.
Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod "nihil timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing, save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for".
Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut causa ipsius: inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato.
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: insofar as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love.
In the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object, because fear implies an avoidance: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object.
Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo futuro.
Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil.
Potest autem respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est privativum boni.
It can, however, regard good also, insofar as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good.
Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne amittatur bonum amatum.
Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.
Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod "nihil timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum".
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing, save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for".
Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut causa ipsius: inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato.
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: insofar as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love.
Friday, July 16, 2010
1a 2ae q41 a4: Whether the six species of fear are suitably assigned? Yes.
Convenienter Damascenus assignet sex species timoris; scilicet, "segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, admirationem, stuporem, agoniam", quia illae species quae supra positae sunt, accipiuntur secundum diversitatem obiecti, et non secundum effectus et secundum quasdam speciales rationes.
Six species of fear are suitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety", because those species are derived from the diversity of objects, and not from the diversity of effects and certain specific formal aspects.
Sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus.
As stated above (q41 a2), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things.
In operatione autem ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris.
In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature. And hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil.
Secundo, turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est verecundia.
Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is "shame."
Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis; cum scilicet aliquis considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non sufficit. Et sic est admiratio.
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three formal aspects. First by the aspect of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is "amazement."
Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis; quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione.
Secondly, by the aspect of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation. And then there is "stupor," which is caused by the imagination of something unwonted.
Tertio modo, ratione improvisionis quia scilicet provideri non potest: sicut futura infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia.
Thirdly, by the aspect of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called "anxiety."
Six species of fear are suitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety", because those species are derived from the diversity of objects, and not from the diversity of effects and certain specific formal aspects.
Sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus.
As stated above (q41 a2), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things.
In operatione autem ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris.
In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature. And hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil.
Secundo, turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est verecundia.
Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is "shame."
Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis; cum scilicet aliquis considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non sufficit. Et sic est admiratio.
On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three formal aspects. First by the aspect of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is "amazement."
Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis; quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione.
Secondly, by the aspect of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation. And then there is "stupor," which is caused by the imagination of something unwonted.
Tertio modo, ratione improvisionis quia scilicet provideri non potest: sicut futura infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia.
Thirdly, by the aspect of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called "anxiety."
Thursday, July 15, 2010
1a 2ae q41 a3: Whether there is a natural fear? No.
Timor non est naturalis quia huiusmodi motus sunt contra rationem inclinationis naturalis: puta quod timor refugit impugnationem mali contrarii, ad quod est inclinatio naturalis.
There is no natural fear because suchlike movements are contrary to the formal aspect of natural inclination: fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil, contrary to the inclination of nature.
There is no natural fear because suchlike movements are contrary to the formal aspect of natural inclination: fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil, contrary to the inclination of nature.
Wednesday, July 14, 2010
1a 2ae q41 a2: Whether fear is a specific passion? Yes.
Timor est specialis passio animae quia passiones animae recipiunt speciem ex obiectis; unde specialis passio est quae habet speciale obiectum: timor autem habet speciale obiectum, sicut et spes; sicut enim obiectum spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile adipisci, ita obiectum timoris est malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest.
Fear is a specific passion of the soul because the passions of the soul derive their species from their objects; hence that is a specific passion, which has a specific object: now fear has a specific object, as hope has; for just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible.
Omnes passiones animae derivantur ex uno principio, scilicet ex amore, in quo habent ad invicem connexionem. Et ratione huius connexionis, remoto timore, removentur aliae passiones animae; non ideo quia sit passio generalis.
All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general passion.
Timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili, non enim respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate, ut ei resisti vix possit. Sed quia passiones irascibilis derivantur a passionibus concupiscibilis et ad eas terminantur, ut supra dictum est, ideo timori attribuuntur ea quae sunt concupiscibilis.
Fear is nowise in the concupiscible, for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (q25 a1), hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear.
Dicitur enim timor esse tristitia, inquantum obiectum, timoris est contristans, si praesens fuerit: unde et philosophus dicit ibidem quod timor procedit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel contristativi.
For fear is called sadness, insofar as the object of fear causes pain when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is either destructive or painful."
Fear is a specific passion of the soul because the passions of the soul derive their species from their objects; hence that is a specific passion, which has a specific object: now fear has a specific object, as hope has; for just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible.
Omnes passiones animae derivantur ex uno principio, scilicet ex amore, in quo habent ad invicem connexionem. Et ratione huius connexionis, remoto timore, removentur aliae passiones animae; non ideo quia sit passio generalis.
All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general passion.
Timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili, non enim respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate, ut ei resisti vix possit. Sed quia passiones irascibilis derivantur a passionibus concupiscibilis et ad eas terminantur, ut supra dictum est, ideo timori attribuuntur ea quae sunt concupiscibilis.
Fear is nowise in the concupiscible, for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (q25 a1), hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear.
Dicitur enim timor esse tristitia, inquantum obiectum, timoris est contristans, si praesens fuerit: unde et philosophus dicit ibidem quod timor procedit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel contristativi.
For fear is called sadness, insofar as the object of fear causes pain when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is either destructive or painful."
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
1a 2ae q41 a1: Whether fear is a passion of the soul? Yes.
Timor verissime sibi competit ratio passionis; tamen post tristitiam, quae est de malo praesenti: nam timor est de malo futuro, quod non ita movet sicut praesens.
Fear most truly has the formal aspect of a passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil.
Ad rationem passionis primo quidem pertinet quod sit motus passivae virtutis, ad quam scilicet comparetur suum obiectum per modum activi moventis: eo quod passio est effectus agentis. Et per hunc modum, etiam sentire et intelligere dicuntur pati.
The formal aspect of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power--i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both "to feel" and "to understand" are passions.
Secundo, magis proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivae virtutis. Et adhuc magis proprie, motus appetitivae virtutis habentis organum corporale, qui fit cum aliqua transmutatione corporali.
Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily transmutation.
Fear most truly has the formal aspect of a passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil.
Ad rationem passionis primo quidem pertinet quod sit motus passivae virtutis, ad quam scilicet comparetur suum obiectum per modum activi moventis: eo quod passio est effectus agentis. Et per hunc modum, etiam sentire et intelligere dicuntur pati.
The formal aspect of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power--i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both "to feel" and "to understand" are passions.
Secundo, magis proprie dicitur passio motus appetitivae virtutis. Et adhuc magis proprie, motus appetitivae virtutis habentis organum corporale, qui fit cum aliqua transmutatione corporali.
Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily transmutation.
Monday, July 12, 2010
1a 2ae q40 a8: Whether hope is a help and not a hindrance to action? Yes.
Spes per se habet quod adiuvet operationem, intendendo ipsam. Et hoc ex duobus.
Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons.
Primo quidem, ex ratione sui obiecti, quod est bonum arduum possibile. Existimatio enim ardui excitat attentionem; existimatio vero possibilis non retardat conatum. Unde sequitur quod homo intente operetur propter spem.
First, from the formal aspect of its object, which is a difficult but possible good. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that on account of hope, man is intent on his action.
Secundo vero, ex ratione sui effectus. Spes enim, ut supra dictum est, causat delectationem, quae adiuvat operationem, ut supra dictum est. Unde spes operationem adiuvat.
Secondly, from the formal aspect of its effect. Because hope, as stated above (q32 a3), causes pleasure, which is a help to action, as stated above (q33 a4). Therefore hope is conducive to action.
Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons.
Primo quidem, ex ratione sui obiecti, quod est bonum arduum possibile. Existimatio enim ardui excitat attentionem; existimatio vero possibilis non retardat conatum. Unde sequitur quod homo intente operetur propter spem.
First, from the formal aspect of its object, which is a difficult but possible good. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that on account of hope, man is intent on his action.
Secundo vero, ex ratione sui effectus. Spes enim, ut supra dictum est, causat delectationem, quae adiuvat operationem, ut supra dictum est. Unde spes operationem adiuvat.
Secondly, from the formal aspect of its effect. Because hope, as stated above (q32 a3), causes pleasure, which is a help to action, as stated above (q33 a4). Therefore hope is conducive to action.
Sunday, July 11, 2010
1a 2ae q40 a7: Whether hope is a cause of love? Yes.
Amor causatur a spe quia inquantum spes respicit illum per quem fit aliquid nobis possibile, sic amor causatur ex spe, et non e converso.
Love is caused by hope because insofar as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa.
Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum speratum, spes ex amore causatur, non enim est spes nisi de bono desiderato et amato.
But insofar as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love, since we do not hope, save for that which we desire and love.
Ex hoc enim quod per aliquem speramus nobis posse provenire bona, movemur in ipsum sicut in bonum nostrum; et sic incipimus ipsum amare.
By the very fact that we hope that goods will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him.
Ex hoc autem quod amamus aliquem, non speramus de eo, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet credimus nos redamari ab ipso.
Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, except accidentally, that is, insofar as we think that he returns our love.
Unde amari ab aliquo facit nos sperare de eo, sed amor eius causatur ex spe quam de eo habemus.
Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in him, but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
Love is caused by hope because insofar as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa.
Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum speratum, spes ex amore causatur, non enim est spes nisi de bono desiderato et amato.
But insofar as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love, since we do not hope, save for that which we desire and love.
Ex hoc enim quod per aliquem speramus nobis posse provenire bona, movemur in ipsum sicut in bonum nostrum; et sic incipimus ipsum amare.
By the very fact that we hope that goods will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him.
Ex hoc autem quod amamus aliquem, non speramus de eo, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet credimus nos redamari ab ipso.
Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, except accidentally, that is, insofar as we think that he returns our love.
Unde amari ab aliquo facit nos sperare de eo, sed amor eius causatur ex spe quam de eo habemus.
Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in him, but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.
Saturday, July 10, 2010
1a 2ae q40 a6: Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards? Yes.
Iuventus et ebrietas sunt causa spei quia omnes stulti, et deliberatione non utentes, omnia tentant, et sunt bonae spei.
Youth and drunkenness are causes of hope because all foolish persons not making use of deliberation attempt everything and are full of good hope.
In iuvenibus et in ebriis licet non sit firmitas secundum rei veritatem, est tamen in eis secundum eorum aestimationem, reputant enim se firmiter assecuturos illud quod sperant.
Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.
Iuvenes enim multum habent de futuro, et parum de praeterito. Et ideo, quia memoria est praeteriti, spes autem futuri, parum habent de memoria, sed multum vivunt in spe.
For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past. And therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope.
Similiter etiam illi qui non sunt passi repulsam, nec experti impedimenta in suis conatibus, de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Unde et iuvenes, propter inexperientiam impedimentorum et defectuum, de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Et ideo sunt bonae spei.
Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible. And consequently they are of good hope.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "inebriati sunt bene sperantes". Et in II Rhetoric. dicitur quod "iuvenes sunt bonae spei".
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope."
Youth and drunkenness are causes of hope because all foolish persons not making use of deliberation attempt everything and are full of good hope.
In iuvenibus et in ebriis licet non sit firmitas secundum rei veritatem, est tamen in eis secundum eorum aestimationem, reputant enim se firmiter assecuturos illud quod sperant.
Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.
Iuvenes enim multum habent de futuro, et parum de praeterito. Et ideo, quia memoria est praeteriti, spes autem futuri, parum habent de memoria, sed multum vivunt in spe.
For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past. And therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope.
Similiter etiam illi qui non sunt passi repulsam, nec experti impedimenta in suis conatibus, de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Unde et iuvenes, propter inexperientiam impedimentorum et defectuum, de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Et ideo sunt bonae spei.
Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible. And consequently they are of good hope.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "inebriati sunt bene sperantes". Et in II Rhetoric. dicitur quod "iuvenes sunt bonae spei".
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope."
Friday, July 09, 2010
1a 2ae q40 a5: Whether experience is a cause of hope? Yes.
Experientia est causa spei quia experientia in operabilibus non solum causat scientiam; sed etiam causat quendam habitum, propter consuetudinem, qui facit operationem faciliorem.
Experience is a cause of hope because experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom, which renders the action easier.
Sed et ipsa virtus intellectualis facit ad potestatem facile operandi, demonstrat enim aliquid esse possibile. Et sic causat spem.
Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease, because it shows something to be possible. And thus is a cause of hope.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "aliqui sunt bonae spei, propter multoties et multos vicisse", quod ad experientiam pertinet.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents", which seems to pertain to experience.
Experience is a cause of hope because experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom, which renders the action easier.
Sed et ipsa virtus intellectualis facit ad potestatem facile operandi, demonstrat enim aliquid esse possibile. Et sic causat spem.
Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease, because it shows something to be possible. And thus is a cause of hope.
Philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod "aliqui sunt bonae spei, propter multoties et multos vicisse", quod ad experientiam pertinet.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents", which seems to pertain to experience.
Thursday, July 08, 2010
1a 2ae q40 a4: Whether despair is contrary to hope? Yes.
Desperatio contrariatur ei solum secundum contrarietatem accessus et recessus, quia importat motum cuiusdam recessus.
Despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety of approach and withdrawal, because it implies a movement of withdrawal.
Obiectum autem spei, quod est bonum arduum, habet quidem rationem attractivi, prout consideratur cum possibilitate adipiscendi: et sic tendit in ipsum spes, quae importat quendam accessum.
The object of hope, which is the arduous good, has the formal aspect of attraction, if it be considered in the light of something attainable: and thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach.
Sed secundum quod consideratur cum impossibilitate obtinendi, habet rationem repulsivi, quia, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cum ventum fuerit ad aliquid impossibile, tunc homines discedunt.
But insofar as it is considered as unobtainable, it has the formal aspect of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an impossibility, they disperse."
Desperatio nominatur per contrarium spei.
The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes].
Despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety of approach and withdrawal, because it implies a movement of withdrawal.
Obiectum autem spei, quod est bonum arduum, habet quidem rationem attractivi, prout consideratur cum possibilitate adipiscendi: et sic tendit in ipsum spes, quae importat quendam accessum.
The object of hope, which is the arduous good, has the formal aspect of attraction, if it be considered in the light of something attainable: and thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach.
Sed secundum quod consideratur cum impossibilitate obtinendi, habet rationem repulsivi, quia, ut dicitur in III Ethic., cum ventum fuerit ad aliquid impossibile, tunc homines discedunt.
But insofar as it is considered as unobtainable, it has the formal aspect of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an impossibility, they disperse."
Desperatio nominatur per contrarium spei.
The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes].
Wednesday, July 07, 2010
1a 2ae q40 a3: Whether hope is in dumb animals? Yes.
Interiores passiones animalium ex exterioribus motibus deprehendi possunt: ex quibus apparet quod in animalibus brutis est spes, quia si canis videat leporem, aut accipiter avem, nimis distantem, non movetur ad ipsam, quasi non sperans se eam posse adipisci, si autem sit in propinquo, movetur, quasi sub spe adipiscendi.
The internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb animals, because if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it; whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching it.
Spes est passio irascibilis. Sed in brutis animalibus est irascibilis. Ergo et spes.
Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.
In operibus brutorum animalium, et aliarum rerum naturalium, apparet similis processus sicut et in operibus artis. Et per hunc modum in animalibus brutis est spes et desperatio.
In the actions of irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions of art. And in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals.
The internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb animals, because if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it; whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching it.
Spes est passio irascibilis. Sed in brutis animalibus est irascibilis. Ergo et spes.
Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.
In operibus brutorum animalium, et aliarum rerum naturalium, apparet similis processus sicut et in operibus artis. Et per hunc modum in animalibus brutis est spes et desperatio.
In the actions of irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions of art. And in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals.
Tuesday, July 06, 2010
1a 2ae q40 a2: Whether hope is in the apprehensive power? No.
Spes non pertinet ad cognitivam, sed ad appetitivam virtutem quia cum spes importet extensionem quandam appetitus in bonum, manifeste pertinet ad appetitivam virtutem: motus enim ad res pertinet proprie ad appetitum; actio vero virtutis cognitivae perficitur non secundum motum cognoscentis ad res, sed potius secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente.
Hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power because since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power: since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite; whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower.
Sed quia vis cognitiva movet appetitivam, repraesentando ei suum obiectum, secundum diversas rationes obiecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi motus in vi appetitiva. Alius enim motus sequitur in appetitu ex apprehensione boni, et alius ex apprehensione mali; et similiter alius motus ex apprehensione: praesentis et futuri; absoluti et ardui; possibilis et impossibilis.
But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it, there arise in the appetite various movements according to various formal aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another; in like manner various movements arise from the apprehension: of something present and of something future; of something considered subjectively, and of something considered as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible.
Et secundum hoc, spes est motus appetitivae virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri, ardui possibilis adipisci: scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi obiectum.
And accordingly, hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain: namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good.
Illud quod homo desiderat, et aestimat se posse adipisci, credit se adepturum; et ex tali fide in cognitiva praecedente, motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur. Denominatur enim motus appetitivus a cognitione praecedente: sicut effectus ex causa magis nota; magis enim cognoscit vis apprehensiva suum actum quam actum appetitivae.
When a man desires a thing, and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it: as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite.
Hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power because since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power: since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite; whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower.
Sed quia vis cognitiva movet appetitivam, repraesentando ei suum obiectum, secundum diversas rationes obiecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi motus in vi appetitiva. Alius enim motus sequitur in appetitu ex apprehensione boni, et alius ex apprehensione mali; et similiter alius motus ex apprehensione: praesentis et futuri; absoluti et ardui; possibilis et impossibilis.
But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it, there arise in the appetite various movements according to various formal aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another; in like manner various movements arise from the apprehension: of something present and of something future; of something considered subjectively, and of something considered as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible.
Et secundum hoc, spes est motus appetitivae virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri, ardui possibilis adipisci: scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi obiectum.
And accordingly, hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain: namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good.
Illud quod homo desiderat, et aestimat se posse adipisci, credit se adepturum; et ex tali fide in cognitiva praecedente, motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur. Denominatur enim motus appetitivus a cognitione praecedente: sicut effectus ex causa magis nota; magis enim cognoscit vis apprehensiva suum actum quam actum appetitivae.
When a man desires a thing, and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it: as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite.
Monday, July 05, 2010
1a 2ae q40 a1: Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity? No.
Spes differt specie a desiderio seu cupiditate quia spes differt a desiderio, sicut differunt passiones irascibilis a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et propter hoc, spes praesupponit desiderium, sicut et omnes passiones irascibilis praesupponunt passiones concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est.
Hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity because hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (q25 a1).
Species passionis ex obiecto consideratur circa obiectum autem spei quatuor conditiones attenduntur. Primo quidem, quod sit bonum, non enim, proprie loquendo, est spes nisi de bono. Et per hoc differt spes a timore, qui est de malo.
The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil.
Secundo, ut sit futurum, non enim spes est de praesenti iam habito. Et per hoc differt spes a gaudio, quod est de bono praesenti.
Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy which regards a present good.
Tertio, requiritur quod sit aliquid arduum cum difficultate adipiscibile, non enim aliquis dicitur aliquid sperare minimum, quod statim est in sua potestate ut habeat. Et per hoc differt spes a desiderio vel cupiditate, quae est de bono futuro absolute, unde pertinet ad concupiscibilem, spes autem ad irascibilem.
Thirdly, that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty.
Quarto, quod illud arduum sit possibile adipisci, non enim aliquis sperat id quod omnino adipisci non potest. Et secundum hoc differt spes a desperatione.
Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair.
Obiectum spei non est bonum futurum absolute, sed cum arduitate et difficultate adipiscendi, ut dictum est.
The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above.
Hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity because hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (q25 a1).
Species passionis ex obiecto consideratur circa obiectum autem spei quatuor conditiones attenduntur. Primo quidem, quod sit bonum, non enim, proprie loquendo, est spes nisi de bono. Et per hoc differt spes a timore, qui est de malo.
The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil.
Secundo, ut sit futurum, non enim spes est de praesenti iam habito. Et per hoc differt spes a gaudio, quod est de bono praesenti.
Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy which regards a present good.
Tertio, requiritur quod sit aliquid arduum cum difficultate adipiscibile, non enim aliquis dicitur aliquid sperare minimum, quod statim est in sua potestate ut habeat. Et per hoc differt spes a desiderio vel cupiditate, quae est de bono futuro absolute, unde pertinet ad concupiscibilem, spes autem ad irascibilem.
Thirdly, that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty.
Quarto, quod illud arduum sit possibile adipisci, non enim aliquis sperat id quod omnino adipisci non potest. Et secundum hoc differt spes a desperatione.
Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair.
Obiectum spei non est bonum futurum absolute, sed cum arduitate et difficultate adipiscendi, ut dictum est.
The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above.
Sunday, July 04, 2010
1a 2ae q39 a4: Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil? No.
Tristitia seu dolor non est summum malum hominis quia hoc ipsum quod est voluntatem repugnare malo, est quoddam bonum: et propter hoc, tristitia vel dolor non potest esse summum malum, quia habet aliquam permixtionem boni.
Sadness or pain is not man's greatest evil because the very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good: and for this reason, sadness or pain cannot be the greatest evil, because it has an admixture of good.
Duo bona sunt communia et delectationi et tristitiae: scilicet iudicium verum de bono et malo; et ordo debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum.
Pleasure and sadness have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil.
Et sic patet quod in dolore vel tristitia est aliquod bonum per cuius privationem potest fieri deterius. Sed non in omni delectatione est aliquod malum, per cuius remotionem possit fieri melius.
Thus it is clear that in pain or sadness there is a good, by the removal of which they become worse. And yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better.
Unde delectatio aliqua potest esse summum hominis bonum, eo modo quo supra dictum est, tristitia autem non potest esse summum hominis malum.
Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated (q34 a3), whereas sadness cannot be man's greatest evil.
Peius est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet peiori. Malum autem dicitur quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. Unde maius malum est quod est malum animae, quam quod est malum corporis.
That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body.
Sadness or pain is not man's greatest evil because the very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good: and for this reason, sadness or pain cannot be the greatest evil, because it has an admixture of good.
Duo bona sunt communia et delectationi et tristitiae: scilicet iudicium verum de bono et malo; et ordo debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum.
Pleasure and sadness have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil.
Et sic patet quod in dolore vel tristitia est aliquod bonum per cuius privationem potest fieri deterius. Sed non in omni delectatione est aliquod malum, per cuius remotionem possit fieri melius.
Thus it is clear that in pain or sadness there is a good, by the removal of which they become worse. And yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better.
Unde delectatio aliqua potest esse summum hominis bonum, eo modo quo supra dictum est, tristitia autem non potest esse summum hominis malum.
Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated (q34 a3), whereas sadness cannot be man's greatest evil.
Peius est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet peiori. Malum autem dicitur quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. Unde maius malum est quod est malum animae, quam quod est malum corporis.
That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body.
Saturday, July 03, 2010
1a 2ae q39 a3: Whether sadness can be a useful good? Yes.
Tristitia est utilis quia aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali: dum vel homo nimis inhaeret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc praecipitatur in aliquod malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus.
Sadness is useful because a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil: either through one's being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods.
Et secundum hoc, tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis; sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, "melius est ire ad domum luctus, quam ad domum convivii: in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum".
And, in this respect, sadness for temporal goods may be useful; according to Ecclesiastes 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of all."
Sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, "cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia".
According to Ecclesiastes 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is sadness, and the heart of fools where there is mirth".
Sadness is useful because a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil: either through one's being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods.
Et secundum hoc, tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis; sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, "melius est ire ad domum luctus, quam ad domum convivii: in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum".
And, in this respect, sadness for temporal goods may be useful; according to Ecclesiastes 7:3: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of all."
Sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, "cor sapientum ubi tristitia, et cor stultorum ubi laetitia".
According to Ecclesiastes 7:5, "the heart of the wise is where there is sadness, and the heart of fools where there is mirth".
Friday, July 02, 2010
1a 2ae q39 a2: Whether sadness can be a virtuous good? Yes.
Secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum, potest esse bonum honestum, quia dictum est quod tristitia est bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali.
According to that formal aspect by which sadness is a good, sadness can be a virtuous good, because it has been said above (q39 a1) that sadness is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil.
Omne autem bonum honestum ex his duobus procedit: scilicet ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis.
Every virtuous good results from these two things: the rectitude of the reason and the will.
Sicut tristitia de malo procedit ex voluntate et ratione recta, quae detestatur malum, ita tristitia de bono procedit ex ratione et voluntate perversa, quae detestatur bonum. Et ideo talis tristitia impedit laudem vel meritum boni honesti: sicut cum quis facit cum tristitia eleemosynam.
Just as sadness for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sadness for a good is due to a perverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sadness is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good: for instance, when a man gives alms with sadness.
According to that formal aspect by which sadness is a good, sadness can be a virtuous good, because it has been said above (q39 a1) that sadness is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil.
Omne autem bonum honestum ex his duobus procedit: scilicet ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis.
Every virtuous good results from these two things: the rectitude of the reason and the will.
Sicut tristitia de malo procedit ex voluntate et ratione recta, quae detestatur malum, ita tristitia de bono procedit ex ratione et voluntate perversa, quae detestatur bonum. Et ideo talis tristitia impedit laudem vel meritum boni honesti: sicut cum quis facit cum tristitia eleemosynam.
Just as sadness for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sadness for a good is due to a perverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sadness is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good: for instance, when a man gives alms with sadness.
Thursday, July 01, 2010
1a 2ae q39 a1: Whether all sadness is evil? No.
Supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat, quia quod non tristaretur vel non doleret, non posset esse nisi quia vel non sentiret, vel quia non reputaret sibi repugnans, et utrumque istorum est malum manifeste.
Supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sadness or pain on account of this present evil, because if he were not to be in sadness or pain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils.
Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut, supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor.
Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sadness or pain should ensue.
Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., "adhuc est bonum quod dolet amissum bonum: nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena".
Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, he could not be punished by the loss of good."
Supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sadness or pain on account of this present evil, because if he were not to be in sadness or pain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils.
Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut, supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor.
Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sadness or pain should ensue.
Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., "adhuc est bonum quod dolet amissum bonum: nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena".
Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, he could not be punished by the loss of good."
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
1a 2ae q38 a5: Whether pain and sadness are assuaged by sleep and baths? Yes.
Huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum, causatur ex his delectatio, quia hoc est quod delectationem facit, ut supra dictum est.
Such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure, because this is precisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above (q31 a1).
Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.
Therefore, since every pleasure assuages sadness, sadness is assuaged by such like bodily remedies.
Such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure, because this is precisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above (q31 a1).
Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.
Therefore, since every pleasure assuages sadness, sadness is assuaged by such like bodily remedies.
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
1a 2ae q38 a4: Whether pain and sadness are assuaged by the contemplation of truth? Yes.
In contemplatione veritatis maxima delectatio consistit, quia omnis delectatio dolorem mitigat, ut supra dictum est, et ideo contemplatio veritatis mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius aliquis est amator sapientiae.
The greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth because every pleasure assuages pain, as stated above (q38 a1), and hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sadness, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom.
In viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu.
In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses.
Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., "videbatur mihi, si se ille mentibus nostris veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut non me sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilo toleraturum."
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me."
The greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth because every pleasure assuages pain, as stated above (q38 a1), and hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sadness, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom.
In viribus animae fit redundantia a superiori ad inferius. Et secundum hoc, delectatio contemplationis, quae est in superiori parte, redundat ad mitigandum etiam dolorem qui est in sensu.
In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses.
Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., "videbatur mihi, si se ille mentibus nostris veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut non me sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilo toleraturum."
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me."
Monday, June 28, 2010
1a 2ae q38 a3: Whether pain or sadness are assuaged by the sympathy of friends? Yes.
Naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis, est consolativus, quia per hoc quod amici contristantur ei, percipit se ab eis amari: quod est delectabile, ut supra dictum est.
When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation, because when a man's friends console him, he sees that he is loved by them: and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (q32 a5).
Unde, cum omnis delectatio mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus condolens tristitiam mitiget.
Consequently, since every pleasure assuages pain, as stated above (q38 a1), it follows that pain is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.
Philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod in tristitiis amicus condolens consolatur.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.
When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation, because when a man's friends console him, he sees that he is loved by them: and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (q32 a5).
Unde, cum omnis delectatio mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus condolens tristitiam mitiget.
Consequently, since every pleasure assuages pain, as stated above (q38 a1), it follows that pain is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.
Philosophus dicit, in IX Ethic., quod in tristitiis amicus condolens consolatur.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.
Sunday, June 27, 2010
1a 2ae q38 a2: Whether pain or sadness is assuaged by tears? Yes.
Lacrimae et gemitus naturaliter mitigant tristitiam, quia omne nocivum interius clausum magis affligit, quia magis multiplicatur intentio animae circa ipsum; sed quando ad exteriora diffunditur, tunc animae intentio ad exteriora quodammodo disgregatur, et sic interior dolor minuitur. (Et propter hoc, quando homines qui sunt in tristitiis, exterius suam tristitiam manifestant vel fletu aut gemitu, vel etiam verbo, mitigatur tristitia.)
Tears and groans naturally assuage sadness, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it; whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on outward things, so that the inward pain is lessened. (This is why when men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sadness, by tears or groans or even by words, their sadness is assuaged.)
Secundo, quia semper operatio conveniens homini secundum dispositionem in qua est, sibi est delectabilis. Fletus autem et gemitus sunt quaedam operationes convenientes tristato vel dolenti. Et ideo efficiuntur ei delectabiles. Cum igitur omnis delectatio aliqualiter mitiget tristitiam vel dolorem, ut dictum est, sequitur quod per planctum et gemitum tristitia mitigetur.
Secondly, because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a man who is in sadness or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above (q38 a1), every pleasure assuages sadness or pain somewhat, it follows that sadness is assuaged by weeping and groans.
Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod quando dolebat de morte amici, "in solis gemitibus et lacrimis erat ei aliquantula requies".
Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some little refreshment".
Tears and groans naturally assuage sadness, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it; whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on outward things, so that the inward pain is lessened. (This is why when men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sadness, by tears or groans or even by words, their sadness is assuaged.)
Secundo, quia semper operatio conveniens homini secundum dispositionem in qua est, sibi est delectabilis. Fletus autem et gemitus sunt quaedam operationes convenientes tristato vel dolenti. Et ideo efficiuntur ei delectabiles. Cum igitur omnis delectatio aliqualiter mitiget tristitiam vel dolorem, ut dictum est, sequitur quod per planctum et gemitum tristitia mitigetur.
Secondly, because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a man who is in sadness or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above (q38 a1), every pleasure assuages sadness or pain somewhat, it follows that sadness is assuaged by weeping and groans.
Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., quod quando dolebat de morte amici, "in solis gemitibus et lacrimis erat ei aliquantula requies".
Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some little refreshment".
Saturday, June 26, 2010
1a 2ae q38 a1: Whether pain or sadness is assuaged by every pleasure? Yes.
Ex parte dispositionis subiecti, quaelibet tristitia per quamlibet delectationem mitigari potest, quia licet non omnis delectatio contrarietur omni tristitiae secundum speciem, contrariatur tamen secundum genus, ut supra dictum est.
On the part of the disposition of the subject, any sadness can be assuaged by any delight, because although not every delight is specifically contrary to every sadness, yet it is generically, as stated above (q35, a4).
Delectationes malorum non causant tristitiam in praesenti, sed in futuro, inquantum scilicet mali poenitent de malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt. Et huic tristitiae subvenitur per contrarias delectationes.
The delights of the wicked are not a cause of sadness while they are enjoyed, but afterwards; that is to say, insofar as the wicked repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sadness is healed by contrary delights.
Delectatio est quaedam quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod repugnat appetitui.
Delight is a kind of repose of the appetite in a befitting good; while sadness arises from something unsuited to the appetite.
Philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod "expellit delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si sit fortis".
The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sadness is driven forth by delight, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense."
On the part of the disposition of the subject, any sadness can be assuaged by any delight, because although not every delight is specifically contrary to every sadness, yet it is generically, as stated above (q35, a4).
Delectationes malorum non causant tristitiam in praesenti, sed in futuro, inquantum scilicet mali poenitent de malis de quibus laetitiam habuerunt. Et huic tristitiae subvenitur per contrarias delectationes.
The delights of the wicked are not a cause of sadness while they are enjoyed, but afterwards; that is to say, insofar as the wicked repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sadness is healed by contrary delights.
Delectatio est quaedam quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod repugnat appetitui.
Delight is a kind of repose of the appetite in a befitting good; while sadness arises from something unsuited to the appetite.
Philosophus dicit, in VII Ethic., quod "expellit delectatio tristitiam, et quae contraria, et quae contingens, si sit fortis".
The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sadness is driven forth by delight, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense."
Friday, June 25, 2010
1a 2ae q37 a4: Whether sadness is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul? Yes.
Tristitia, inter omnes animae passiones, magis corpori nocet, quia tristitia repugnat humanae vitae quantum ad speciem sui motus, et non solum quantum ad mensuram seu quantitatem, sicut aliae animae passiones.
Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body, because sorrow is repugnant to human life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul.
Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis: sicut in omnibus materia proportionatur formae.
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form.
Illae ergo animae passiones quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare secundum quantitatem: ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi. Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed propter excessum possunt nocere.
Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it.
Passiones autem quae important motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent: sicut timor et desperatio, et prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti, cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.
On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sadness which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil.
Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body, because sorrow is repugnant to human life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul.
Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis: sicut in omnibus materia proportionatur formae.
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form.
Illae ergo animae passiones quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare secundum quantitatem: ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi. Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed propter excessum possunt nocere.
Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it.
Passiones autem quae important motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent: sicut timor et desperatio, et prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti, cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.
On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sadness which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil.
Wednesday, June 23, 2010
1a 2ae q37 a3: Whether sadness or pain weakens all activity? Yes.
Tristitia quamlibet operationem impedit, nunquam enim illud quod cum tristitia facimus, ita bene facimus sicut illud quod facimus cum delectatione, vel sine tristitia, quia voluntas est causa operationis humanae, unde quando operatio est de qua aliquis contristatur, necesse est quod actio debilitetur.
Sadness hinders any action, for we never do that which we do with sadness as well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sadness, because the will is the cause of human action, and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened in consequence.
Philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit operationem, sed e contrario tristitia impedit.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sadness hinders it" (Ethic. x, 5).
Sadness hinders any action, for we never do that which we do with sadness as well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sadness, because the will is the cause of human action, and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened in consequence.
Philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod delectatio perficit operationem, sed e contrario tristitia impedit.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sadness hinders it" (Ethic. x, 5).
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
1a 2ae q37 a2: Whether the effect of sadness or pain is to burden the soul? Yes.
Tristitia contingit ex aliquo malo praesenti, quod quidem, ex hoc ipso quod repugnat motui voluntatis, aggravat animum, inquantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo quod vult.
Sadness is caused by a present evil, and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy.
Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult, remanet tamen motus ad repellendum nocivum contristans.
And if the evil which is the cause of sadness be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed insofar as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for, yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil.
Si vero superexcrescat vis mali intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac divertere valeat.
If, on the other hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that.
Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.
Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied.
Sadness is caused by a present evil, and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy.
Et si quidem non sit tanta vis mali contristantis ut auferat spem evadendi, licet animus aggravetur quantum ad hoc, quod in praesenti non potitur eo quod vult, remanet tamen motus ad repellendum nocivum contristans.
And if the evil which is the cause of sadness be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed insofar as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for, yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil.
Si vero superexcrescat vis mali intantum ut spem evasionis excludat, tunc simpliciter impeditur etiam interior motus animi angustiati, ut neque hac neque illac divertere valeat.
If, on the other hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that.
Et quandoque etiam impeditur exterior motus corporis, ita quod remaneat homo stupidus in seipso.
Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied.
Monday, June 21, 2010
1a 2ae q37 a1: Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn? Yes.
Si sit dolor intensus, impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid addiscere possit (et tantum potest intendi, quod nec etiam, instante dolore, potest homo aliquid considerare etiam quod prius scivit) quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicantur: necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione alterius, unius enim animae non potest esse nisi una intentio.
If the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from learning anything (indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that which he knew already) because all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul: it must needs happen, when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power, because the soul, being one, can only have one intention.
Et propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod magnam attentionem requirat.
The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible therewith.
In hoc tamen attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.
However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning or for considering, because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.
Tam delectatio quam dolor, inquantum ad se trahunt animae intentionem, impediunt considerationem rationis, unde in VII Ethic. dicitur quod "impossibile est in ipsa delectatione venereorum, aliquid intelligere". Sed tamen dolor magis trahit ad se intentionem animae quam delectatio.
Both pleasure and pain, insofar as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does.
Si ergo dolor seu tristitia fuerit moderata, per accidens potest conferre ad addiscendum, inquantum aufert superabundantiam delectationum. Sed per se impedit, et si intendatur, totaliter aufert.
If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, insofar as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.
Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., "quanquam acerrimo dolore dentium his diebus torquerer, non quidem sinebar animo volvere nisi ea quae iam forte didiceram. A discendo autem penitus impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat."
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required undivided attention."
If the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from learning anything (indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that which he knew already) because all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul: it must needs happen, when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power, because the soul, being one, can only have one intention.
Et propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod magnam attentionem requirat.
The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible therewith.
In hoc tamen attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.
However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning or for considering, because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.
Tam delectatio quam dolor, inquantum ad se trahunt animae intentionem, impediunt considerationem rationis, unde in VII Ethic. dicitur quod "impossibile est in ipsa delectatione venereorum, aliquid intelligere". Sed tamen dolor magis trahit ad se intentionem animae quam delectatio.
Both pleasure and pain, insofar as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does.
Si ergo dolor seu tristitia fuerit moderata, per accidens potest conferre ad addiscendum, inquantum aufert superabundantiam delectationum. Sed per se impedit, et si intendatur, totaliter aufert.
If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, insofar as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.
Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., "quanquam acerrimo dolore dentium his diebus torquerer, non quidem sinebar animo volvere nisi ea quae iam forte didiceram. A discendo autem penitus impediebar, ad quod mihi tota intentione animi opus erat."
Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required undivided attention."
Sunday, June 20, 2010
1a 2ae q36 a4: Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow? Yes.
Potestas maior ponitur causa doloris quia exteriora agentia possunt esse causa motuum appetitivorum, inquantum causant praesentiam obiecti.
A greater power is reckoned to be the cause of pain because external agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, insofar as they cause the presence of the object.
Id ergo quod est causa coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae.
Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or sadness.
Maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu: dum scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.
A greater power causes pain, as acting not potentially but actually: i.e., by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.
Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non sequitur dolor vel tristitia; sed tunc solum sequitur, quando remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium.
If some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain or sadness will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains.
Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat dolorem; si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.
And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that pain is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power"; for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not pain but pleasure.
Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, "in animo dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori".
Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Pain in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power; while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."
A greater power is reckoned to be the cause of pain because external agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, insofar as they cause the presence of the object.
Id ergo quod est causa coniunctionis mali, debet poni causa doloris vel tristitiae.
Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or sadness.
Maior potestas dolorem causat, non secundum quod est agens in potentia, sed secundum quod est agens actu: dum scilicet facit coniunctionem mali corruptivi.
A greater power causes pain, as acting not potentially but actually: i.e., by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.
Sic igitur si aliqua potestas maior intantum invalescat quod auferat inclinationem voluntatis vel appetitus sensitivi, ex ea non sequitur dolor vel tristitia; sed tunc solum sequitur, quando remanet inclinatio appetitus in contrarium.
If some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain or sadness will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains.
Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit quod voluntas resistens potestati fortiori, causat dolorem; si enim non resisteret, sed cederet consentiendo, non sequeretur dolor, sed delectatio.
And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that pain is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power"; for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not pain but pleasure.
Augustinus dicit, in libro de natura boni, "in animo dolorem facit voluntas resistens potestati maiori; in corpore dolorem facit sensus resistens corpori potentiori".
Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Pain in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power; while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body."
Saturday, June 19, 2010
1a 2ae q36 a3: Whether the craving for unity is a cause of pain? Yes.
Eo modo quo concupiscentia vel cupiditas boni est causa doloris, etiam appetitus unitatis, vel amor, causa doloris ponendus est quia bonum uniuscuiusque rei in quadam unitate consistit, prout scilicet unaquaeque res habet in se unita illa ex quibus consistit eius perfectio.
Inasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of pain, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted as causing pain, because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements of which its perfection consists.
Unde et Platonici posuerunt unum esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc, sicut amor vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus unitatis.
Wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything naturally craves unity, just as it desires goodness. And therefore, just as love or craving for good is a cause of pain, so also is the love or craving for unity.
Non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam, non cuiuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiae, ut quidam opinabantur. Quorum opinionem ibi philosophus excludit per hoc, quod quaedam repletiones non sunt delectabiles: sicut repleti cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio, sive unio, magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum constitueret.
Not every kind of union perfects the formal aspect of the good, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither does the craving of any kind of unity cause pain or sadness, as some have maintained, whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant: for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating; because repletion, or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being.
Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cuiuslibet unitatis, sed eius in qua consistit perfectio naturae.
Consequently pain is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists.
Separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur, inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem. Unde appetitus huiusmodi separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus unitatis.
Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is craved, insofar as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the craving for this sort of separation is not the first cause of pain, whereas the craving for unity is.
Augustinus dicit, in III de libero arbitrio, "quod ex dolore quem bestiae sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animae appetentes unitatis. Quid enim est aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens?"
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a certain feeling of not wanting to suffer division or corruption?"
Inasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of pain, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted as causing pain, because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements of which its perfection consists.
Unde et Platonici posuerunt unum esse principium, sicut et bonum. Unde naturaliter unumquodque appetit unitatem, sicut et bonitatem. Et propter hoc, sicut amor vel appetitus boni est causa doloris, ita etiam amor vel appetitus unitatis.
Wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. Hence everything naturally craves unity, just as it desires goodness. And therefore, just as love or craving for good is a cause of pain, so also is the love or craving for unity.
Non omnis unio perficit rationem boni, sed solum illa a qua dependet esse perfectum rei. Et propter hoc etiam, non cuiuslibet appetitus unitatis est causa doloris vel tristitiae, ut quidam opinabantur. Quorum opinionem ibi philosophus excludit per hoc, quod quaedam repletiones non sunt delectabiles: sicut repleti cibis non delectantur in ciborum sumptione. Talis enim repletio, sive unio, magis repugnaret ad perfectum esse, quam ipsum constitueret.
Not every kind of union perfects the formal aspect of the good, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither does the craving of any kind of unity cause pain or sadness, as some have maintained, whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant: for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating; because repletion, or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being.
Unde dolor non causatur ex appetitu cuiuslibet unitatis, sed eius in qua consistit perfectio naturae.
Consequently pain is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists.
Separatio nocivorum et corrumpentium appetitur, inquantum tollunt debitam unitatem. Unde appetitus huiusmodi separationis non est prima causa doloris, sed magis appetitus unitatis.
Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is craved, insofar as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the craving for this sort of separation is not the first cause of pain, whereas the craving for unity is.
Augustinus dicit, in III de libero arbitrio, "quod ex dolore quem bestiae sentiunt, satis apparet in regendis animandisque suis corporibus, quam sint animae appetentes unitatis. Quid enim est aliud dolor, nisi quidam sensus divisionis vel corruptionis impatiens?"
Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a certain feeling of not wanting to suffer division or corruption?"
Friday, June 18, 2010
1a 2ae q36 a2: Whether desire is a cause of sadness? Yes.
Concupiscentia est causa doloris quia omne quod impedit motum ne perveniat ad terminum, est contrarium motui.
Desire is a cause of pain because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement.
Illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus, est contristans. Et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa tristitiae, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali ablatione, tristamur.
Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sadness. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sadness, insofar as we are sad for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal.
Universalis autem causa doloris esse non potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum praesentium, in quibus iam delectamur, quam futurorum, quae concupiscimus.
But it cannot be a universal cause of pain, because we are pained more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.
Concupiscentia est delectabilis, quandiu manet spes adipiscendi quod concupiscitur. Sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.
Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire causes pain.
Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., "subintrantibus ignorantia agendarum rerum, et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites subinferuntur error et dolor".
Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their way in, then error and pain stole an entrance in their company."
Desire is a cause of pain because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement.
Illud autem quod est contrarium motui appetitus, est contristans. Et sic per consequens concupiscentia fit causa tristitiae, inquantum de retardatione boni concupiti, vel totali ablatione, tristamur.
Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sadness. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sadness, insofar as we are sad for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal.
Universalis autem causa doloris esse non potest, quia magis dolemus de subtractione bonorum praesentium, in quibus iam delectamur, quam futurorum, quae concupiscimus.
But it cannot be a universal cause of pain, because we are pained more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.
Concupiscentia est delectabilis, quandiu manet spes adipiscendi quod concupiscitur. Sed, subtracta spe per impedimentum appositum, concupiscentia dolorem causat.
Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire causes pain.
Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., "subintrantibus ignorantia agendarum rerum, et concupiscentia noxiarum, comites subinferuntur error et dolor".
Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their way in, then error and pain stole an entrance in their company."
Thursday, June 17, 2010
1a 2ae q36 a1: Whether sadness is caused by the loss of good rather than by the presence of evil? No.
Expectatum malum timorem constituit, praesens vero tristitiam quia tristitia est motus appetitus apprehensionem sequentis; in apprehensione autem ipsa privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur "ens rationis".
The dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow, because sadness is a movement of the appetite following upon an apprehension; and even a privation, as apprehended, has the formal aspect of a certain being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason".
Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum.
And in this way evil, since it is a privation, is a kind of "contrary". Accordingly, inasmuch as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.
Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita tristitia respicit malum coniunctum.
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sadness is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while delight is a kind of pursuit or approach; just as delight regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sadness regards the evil that is present.
Sed causa delectationis et tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum amissum.
On the other hand, love, which is the cause of delight and sadness, first regards good rather than evil. And therefore, inasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sadness or pain, than the good which is lost.
The dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow, because sadness is a movement of the appetite following upon an apprehension; and even a privation, as apprehended, has the formal aspect of a certain being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason".
Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum.
And in this way evil, since it is a privation, is a kind of "contrary". Accordingly, inasmuch as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.
Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita tristitia respicit malum coniunctum.
Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sadness is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while delight is a kind of pursuit or approach; just as delight regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sadness regards the evil that is present.
Sed causa delectationis et tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum amissum.
On the other hand, love, which is the cause of delight and sadness, first regards good rather than evil. And therefore, inasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sadness or pain, than the good which is lost.
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