Friday, July 02, 2010

1a 2ae q39 a2: Whether sadness can be a virtuous good? Yes.

Secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum, potest esse bonum honestum, quia dictum est quod tristitia est bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali.

According to that formal aspect by which sadness is a good, sadness can be a virtuous good, because it has been said above (q39 a1) that sadness is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil.

Omne autem bonum honestum ex his duobus procedit: scilicet ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis.

Every virtuous good results from these two things: the rectitude of the reason and the will.

Sicut tristitia de malo procedit ex voluntate et ratione recta, quae detestatur malum, ita tristitia de bono procedit ex ratione et voluntate perversa, quae detestatur bonum. Et ideo talis tristitia impedit laudem vel meritum boni honesti: sicut cum quis facit cum tristitia eleemosynam.

Just as sadness for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sadness for a good is due to a perverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sadness is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good: for instance, when a man gives alms with sadness.