Tristitia seu dolor non est summum malum hominis quia hoc ipsum quod est voluntatem repugnare malo, est quoddam bonum: et propter hoc, tristitia vel dolor non potest esse summum malum, quia habet aliquam permixtionem boni.
Sadness or pain is not man's greatest evil because the very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good: and for this reason, sadness or pain cannot be the greatest evil, because it has an admixture of good.
Duo bona sunt communia et delectationi et tristitiae: scilicet iudicium verum de bono et malo; et ordo debitus voluntatis approbantis bonum et recusantis malum.
Pleasure and sadness have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil.
Et sic patet quod in dolore vel tristitia est aliquod bonum per cuius privationem potest fieri deterius. Sed non in omni delectatione est aliquod malum, per cuius remotionem possit fieri melius.
Thus it is clear that in pain or sadness there is a good, by the removal of which they become worse. And yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better.
Unde delectatio aliqua potest esse summum hominis bonum, eo modo quo supra dictum est, tristitia autem non potest esse summum hominis malum.
Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated (q34 a3), whereas sadness cannot be man's greatest evil.
Peius est quod nocet meliori, quam quod nocet peiori. Malum autem dicitur quia nocet, ut dicit Augustinus in Enchirid. Unde maius malum est quod est malum animae, quam quod est malum corporis.
That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body.