Supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat, quia quod non tristaretur vel non doleret, non posset esse nisi quia vel non sentiret, vel quia non reputaret sibi repugnans, et utrumque istorum est malum manifeste.
Supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sadness or pain on account of this present evil, because if he were not to be in sadness or pain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils.
Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut, supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor.
Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sadness or pain should ensue.
Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., "adhuc est bonum quod dolet amissum bonum: nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena".
Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, he could not be punished by the loss of good."