Audacia, quae insequitur malum, est post spem, quae insequitur bonum, quia malum habet aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio habitu.
Daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good, because evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit.
Prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio mali terribilis pertinet ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinet ad desperationem.
Pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair.
Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc audacter insequitur ipsum.
It follows, therefore, that daring results from hope, since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly.
Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa bonum sperandum.
But despair results from fear, since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.
Audacia, licet sit circa malum cui coniunctum est bonum victoriae secundum aestimationem audacis, tamen respicit malum, bonum vero adiunctum respicit spes.
Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined, yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good.
Et similiter desperatio respicit bonum directe, quod refugit, malum vero adiunctum respicit timor. Unde, proprie loquendo, audacia non est pars spei, sed eius effectus, sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed eius effectus. Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non potest.
In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect, just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.