Spes differt specie a desiderio seu cupiditate quia spes differt a desiderio, sicut differunt passiones irascibilis a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et propter hoc, spes praesupponit desiderium, sicut et omnes passiones irascibilis praesupponunt passiones concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est.
Hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity because hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (q25 a1).
Species passionis ex obiecto consideratur circa obiectum autem spei quatuor conditiones attenduntur. Primo quidem, quod sit bonum, non enim, proprie loquendo, est spes nisi de bono. Et per hoc differt spes a timore, qui est de malo.
The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil.
Secundo, ut sit futurum, non enim spes est de praesenti iam habito. Et per hoc differt spes a gaudio, quod est de bono praesenti.
Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy which regards a present good.
Tertio, requiritur quod sit aliquid arduum cum difficultate adipiscibile, non enim aliquis dicitur aliquid sperare minimum, quod statim est in sua potestate ut habeat. Et per hoc differt spes a desiderio vel cupiditate, quae est de bono futuro absolute, unde pertinet ad concupiscibilem, spes autem ad irascibilem.
Thirdly, that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty.
Quarto, quod illud arduum sit possibile adipisci, non enim aliquis sperat id quod omnino adipisci non potest. Et secundum hoc differt spes a desperatione.
Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair.
Obiectum spei non est bonum futurum absolute, sed cum arduitate et difficultate adipiscendi, ut dictum est.
The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above.