Wednesday, July 14, 2010

1a 2ae q41 a2: Whether fear is a specific passion? Yes.

Timor est specialis passio animae quia passiones animae recipiunt speciem ex obiectis; unde specialis passio est quae habet speciale obiectum: timor autem habet speciale obiectum, sicut et spes; sicut enim obiectum spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile adipisci, ita obiectum timoris est malum futurum difficile cui resisti non potest.

Fear is a specific passion of the soul because the passions of the soul derive their species from their objects; hence that is a specific passion, which has a specific object: now fear has a specific object, as hope has; for just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible.

Omnes passiones animae derivantur ex uno principio, scilicet ex amore, in quo habent ad invicem connexionem. Et ratione huius connexionis, remoto timore, removentur aliae passiones animae; non ideo quia sit passio generalis.

All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general passion.

Timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili, non enim respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate, ut ei resisti vix possit. Sed quia passiones irascibilis derivantur a passionibus concupiscibilis et ad eas terminantur, ut supra dictum est, ideo timori attribuuntur ea quae sunt concupiscibilis.

Fear is nowise in the concupiscible, for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (q25 a1), hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear.

Dicitur enim timor esse tristitia, inquantum obiectum, timoris est contristans, si praesens fuerit: unde et philosophus dicit ibidem quod timor procedit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel contristativi.

For fear is called sadness, insofar as the object of fear causes pain when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is either destructive or painful."