Saturday, July 17, 2010

1a 2ae q42 a1: Whether the object of fear is good? No.

Primo et per se respicit malum sicut proprium obiectum, quia timor fugam quandam importat: quicumque autem importat fugam, habet malum pro obiecto.

In the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object, because fear implies an avoidance: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object.

Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo futuro.

Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil.

Potest autem respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est privativum boni.

It can, however, regard good also, insofar as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good.

Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne amittatur bonum amatum.

Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.

Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod "nihil timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum".

Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing, save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for".

Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut causa ipsius: inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato.

In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: insofar as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love.