Spes non pertinet ad cognitivam, sed ad appetitivam virtutem quia cum spes importet extensionem quandam appetitus in bonum, manifeste pertinet ad appetitivam virtutem: motus enim ad res pertinet proprie ad appetitum; actio vero virtutis cognitivae perficitur non secundum motum cognoscentis ad res, sed potius secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente.
Hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power because since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power: since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite; whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower.
Sed quia vis cognitiva movet appetitivam, repraesentando ei suum obiectum, secundum diversas rationes obiecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi motus in vi appetitiva. Alius enim motus sequitur in appetitu ex apprehensione boni, et alius ex apprehensione mali; et similiter alius motus ex apprehensione: praesentis et futuri; absoluti et ardui; possibilis et impossibilis.
But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it, there arise in the appetite various movements according to various formal aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another; in like manner various movements arise from the apprehension: of something present and of something future; of something considered subjectively, and of something considered as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible.
Et secundum hoc, spes est motus appetitivae virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri, ardui possibilis adipisci: scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi obiectum.
And accordingly, hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain: namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good.
Illud quod homo desiderat, et aestimat se posse adipisci, credit se adepturum; et ex tali fide in cognitiva praecedente, motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur. Denominatur enim motus appetitivus a cognitione praecedente: sicut effectus ex causa magis nota; magis enim cognoscit vis apprehensiva suum actum quam actum appetitivae.
When a man desires a thing, and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it: as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite.