Deus movet voluntatem hominis, sicut universalis motor, ad universale obiectum voluntatis, quod est bonum, quia sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle.
God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good, because without this universal motion, man cannot will anything.
Sed homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud, quod est vere bonum vel apparens bonum. Sed tamen interdum specialiter Deus movet aliquos ad aliquid determinate volendum, quod est bonum, sicut in his quos movet per gratiam, ut infra dicetur.
But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (q109, a2).
Sic ergo hominem, voluntatem habentem, contingit moveri ab aliquo qui non est causa eius, sed quod motus voluntarius eius sit ab aliquo principio extrinseco quod non est causa voluntatis, est impossibile.
Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
Voluntatis autem causa nihil aliud esse potest quam Deus. Et hoc patet dupliciter. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod voluntas est potentia animae rationalis, quae a solo Deo causatur per creationem, ut in primo dictum est. Secundo vero ex hoc patet, quod voluntas habet ordinem ad universale bonum.
Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in Ia, q90, a2. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good.
Unde nihil aliud potest esse voluntatis causa, nisi ipse Deus, qui est universale bonum. Omne autem aliud bonum per participationem dicitur, et est quoddam particulare bonum, particularis autem causa non dat inclinationem universalem. Unde nec materia prima, quae est in potentia ad omnes formas, potest causari ab aliquo particulari agente.
Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.