Homo potest simul multa intendere, quia est intentio non solum finis ultimi, sed etiam finis medii: simul autem intendit aliquis et finem proximum, et ultimum (sicut confectionem medicinae, et sanitatem).
A man can intend several things at the same time, because intention is not only of the last end, but also of an intermediary end: for a man intends at the same time both the proximate and the last end (as the mixing of a medicine and the giving of health).
Ea quae sunt plura secundum rem, possunt accipi ut unus terminus intentionis, prout sunt unum secundum rationem, vel quia aliqua duo concurrunt ad integrandum aliquid unum (sicut ad sanitatem concurrunt calor et frigus commensurata), vel quia aliqua duo sub uno communi continentur, quod potest esse intentum (puta acquisitio vini et vestis continetur sub lucro, sicut sub quodam communi, unde nihil prohibet quin ille qui intendit lucrum, simul haec duo intendat).
Where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, insofar as the formal aspect takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole (as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health), or because two things are included in one which may be intended (for instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth as in something common to both, wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others).