Monday, January 11, 2010

1a 2ae q11 a1: Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power? Yes.

Frui est actus appetitivae potentiae quia finis et bonum est obiectum appetitivae potentiae.

To enjoy is an act of the appetitive power because the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power.

Fruitio pertinere videtur ad amorem vel delectationem quam aliquis habet de ultimo expectato, quod est finis.

Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end.

Perfectio et finis cuiuslibet potentiae, inquantum est quoddam bonum, pertinet ad appetitivam. Propter quod appetitiva potentia movet alias ad suos fines, et ipsa consequitur finem, quando quaelibet aliarum pertingit ad finem.

The perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends, and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.

Nihil prohibet unum et idem, secundum diversas rationes, ad diversas potentias pertinere. Ipsa igitur visio Dei, inquantum est visio, est actus intellectus, inquantum autem est bonum et finis, est voluntatis obiectum. Et hoc modo est eius fruitio. Et sic hunc finem intellectus consequitur tanquam potentia agens, voluntas autem tanquam potentia movens ad finem, et fruens fine iam adepto.

Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and enjoying the end attained.