Sunday, January 24, 2010

1a 2ae q12 a5: Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals? No.

Cum bruta animalia non habeant rationem, videtur quod non intendant finem, quia intendere finem proprie et principaliter est moventis, prout scilicet ordinat motum alicuius (vel sui vel alterius) in finem, quod est rationis tantum.

Since irrational animals do not grasp formal aspect, it seems that they do not intend an end, because to intend properly and principally belongs to the mover, according as he ordains the movement of something (either his own or another's) to an end, which only pertains to formal aspect.

Bruta animalia moventur ad finem, non quasi considerantia quod per motum suum possunt consequi finem (quod est proprie intendentis), sed concupiscentia finem naturali instinctu, moventur ad finem: quasi ab alio mota, sicut et cetera quae moventur naturaliter.

Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement (for this belongs to one that intends), but through desiring the end by natural teleonomy, they are moved to an end: moved, as it were, by another [viz., that which their aestimative capacity must assess as either (+, 0, or -)], just like other things that are moved naturally.

Intendere est in aliud tendere; quod quidem est et moventis et moti. Secundum quidem igitur quod dicitur intendere finem id quod movetur ad finem ab alio: sic natura dicitur intendere finem, quasi mota ad suum finem a Deo, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Et hoc modo etiam bruta animalia intendunt finem, inquantum moventur instinctu naturali ad aliquid.

To intend is to tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to intend the end: thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something by natural teleonomy.

Bruta animalia agunt propter finem: movetur enim animal vel ad cibum quaerendum, vel ad aliquid huiusmodi. Sed fruitio non importat ordinationem alicuius in aliquid, sicut intentio, sed absolutam quietem in fine.

Irrational animals act for an end: for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of the kind. But enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.