Frui potest esse etiam finis non habiti quia perfecta est fruitio finis iam habiti realiter, sed imperfecta est etiam finis non habiti realiter, sed in intentione tantum.
It is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed because perfect enjoyment is of the end already possessed, but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.
Quies voluntatis dupliciter impeditur: uno modo, ex parte obiecti, quia scilicet non est ultimus finis, sed ad aliud ordinatur; alio modo, ex parte appetentis finem qui nondum adipiscitur finem.
The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest: first, on the part of the object, by reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to something else; secondly, on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it.
Obiectum autem est quod dat speciem actui, sed ab agente dependet modus agendi, ut sit perfectus vel imperfectus, secundum conditionem agentis.
Now it is the object that gives the specifies to an act, but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that [the act] may be perfect or imperfect, according to the actual circumstances of the agent.
Et ideo eius quod non est ultimus finis, fruitio est impropria, quasi deficiens a specie fruitionis. Finis autem ultimi non habiti, est fruitio propria quidem, sed imperfecta, propter imperfectum modum habendi ultimum finem.
Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is enjoyment improperly speaking, as falling short of the formal nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.
"Frui est amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam", ut Augustinus dicit.
"To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4).