Etsi semper intentio sit finis, non tamen oportet quod semper sit ultimi finis, quia terminus habet rationem ultimi, sed non semper ultimi respectu totius, sed quandoque respectu alicuius partis.
Though intention is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end, because a terminus has the formal aspect of something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
Sicut in motu quo itur de a in c per b, c est terminus ultimus, b autem est terminus, sed non ultimus. Et utriusque potest esse intentio.
Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both.
Fruitio importat quietem in fine, quod pertinet solum ad ultimum finem. Sed intentio importat motum in finem, non autem quietem.
Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end, not rest.
Intentio cordis dicitur clamor ad Deum, non quod Deus sit obiectum intentionis semper, sed quia est intentionis cognitor. Vel quia, cum oramus, intentionem nostram ad Deum dirigimus, quae quidem intentio vim clamoris habet.
The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry.