Deus non ex necessitate movet voluntatem hominis quia voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa.
God does not of necessity move man's will because the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things.
Sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus eius contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad quae naturaliter movetur.
God so moves it that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.
Magis repugnaret divinae motioni, si voluntas ex necessitate moveretur, quod suae naturae non competit, quam si moveretur libere, prout competit suae naturae.
It would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature, than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
Sicut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., ad providentiam divinam non pertinet naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare. Unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditione: ita quod ex causis necessariis, per motionem divinam, consequuntur effectus ex necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus, sequuntur effectus contingenter.
As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions: so that from necessary causes, through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently.