Sed concupiscentia non naturalis omnino est infinita, quia sequitur rationem, ut dictum est, rationi autem competit in infinitum procedere; unde qui concupiscit divitias, potest eas concupiscere, non ad aliquem certum terminum, sed simpliciter: se divitem esse, quantumcumque potest.
Non-natural desire is altogether infinite, because, it follows from aspectual apprehension, as stated above (q30 a3), and it belongs to formal aspect to proceed to infinity; hence he that desires riches, is able to desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but [to desire] simply: that he is to be rich, as much as possible.
Ratio quodammodo est virtutis infinitae, inquantum potest in infinitum aliquid considerare (ut apparet in additione numerorum et linearum). Unde infinitum aliquo modo sumptum, est proportionatum rationi. Nam et universale, quod ratio apprehendit, est quodammodo infinitum, inquantum in potentia continet infinita singularia.
Formal aspect, in a certain sense, is possessed of infinite power, insofar as it can consider a thing infinitely (for example, [in mathematics] in the addition of numbers and lines). Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to formal aspect. In fact the universal, which formal aspect apprehends, is, in a way, infinite, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of singulars.
Omne quod concupiscitur, accipitur ut quoddam finitum: vel quia est finitum secundum rem, prout semel concupiscitur in actu; vel quia est finitum secundum quod cadit sub apprehensione. Non enim potest sub ratione infiniti apprehendi, quia infinitum est, "cuius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est aliquid extra sumere", ut dicitur in III Physic.
Every object of desire is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in the thing, as being once actually desired; or because it is finite inasmuch as it falls under apprehension. For it cannot be apprehended under the formal aspect of the infinite, since the infinite is that "from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken" (Phys. iii, 6).
Duplex est concupiscentia: una naturalis; et alia non naturalis. Naturalis quidem igitur concupiscentia non potest esse infinita in actu. Est enim eius quod natura requirit; natura vero semper intendit in aliquid finitum et certum. Unde nunquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum, vel infinitum potum.
Desire is twofold: one is natural; the other is not natural. Natural desire cannot be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink.
Sed sicut in natura contingit esse infinitum in potentia per successionem, ita huiusmodi concupiscentiam contingit infinitam esse per successionem; ut scilicet, post adeptum cibum, iterum alia vice desideret cibum; vel quodcumque aliud quod natura requirit: quia huiusmodi corporalia bona, cum adveniunt, non perpetuo manent, sed deficiunt. Unde dixit dominus Samaritanae, Ioan. IV, "qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum".
But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of desire be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (John 4:13): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again."
Philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod, "in infinitum concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant".
The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since desire is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things."
Potest et alia ratio assignari, secundum philosophum in I Polit., quare quaedam concupiscentia sit finita, et quaedam infinita: Semper enim concupiscentia finis est infinita, finis enim per se concupiscitur (ut sanitas); unde maior sanitas magis concupiscitur, et sic in infinitum; sicut, si album per se disgregat, magis album magis disgregat.
Another formal aspect may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain desire is finite, and another infinite: Because desire of the end is always infinite, since the end is desired for its own sake (e.g., health); and thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more.
Concupiscentia vero eius quod est ad finem, non est infinita, sed secundum illam mensuram appetitur qua convenit fini. Unde qui finem ponunt in divitiis, habent concupiscentiam divitiarum in infinitum; qui autem divitias appetunt propter necessitatem vitae, concupiscunt divitias finitas, sufficientes ad necessitatem vitae, ut philosophus dicit ibidem. Et eadem est ratio de concupiscentia, quarumcumque aliarum rerum.
On the other hand, desire of the means is not infinite, because the desire of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an infinite desire of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same formal aspect of desire applies to any other things.
Ad hoc quod aliquis delectetur, non requiritur quod omnia consequatur quae concupiscit, sed in quolibet concupito quod consequitur, delectatur.
In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to attain all that he desires, for he delights in the attainment of each desired object.
"It is because the contemporary alternatives seem so one-sided and are not more evidently solutions to the problems which Thomas faced, and partly solved, that we return to him and to the tradition of theology and philosophy in which his Summa Theologiae appears: theology as the science of the first principle and this as the total knowledge of reality in its unity." -- Wayne J. Hankey, God in Himself (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.159.
Saturday, May 15, 2010
Friday, May 14, 2010
1a 2ae q30 a3: Whether some desires are natural, and some not natural? Yes.
Diversitas concupiscentiarum naturalium a non naturalibus, non est materialis tantum; sed etiam quodammodo formalis, inquantum procedit ex diversitate obiecti activi, quia obiectum appetitus est bonum apprehensum, unde ad diversitatem activi pertinet diversitas apprehensionis: prout scilicet apprehenditur aliquid ut conveniens absoluta apprehensione, ex qua causantur concupiscentiae naturales, quas philosophus in Rhetoric. vocat irrationales; et prout apprehenditur aliquid cum deliberatione, ex quo causantur concupiscentiae non naturales, quae propter hoc in Rhetoric. dicuntur cum ratione.
The difference between those desires that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; it is also, in a way, formal, insofar as it arises from a difference in the active object, because the object of the appetite is the apprehended good, and hence diversity of the active [object] follows from diversity of apprehension: either inasmuch as something is [apprehended as] befitting, by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural desires, which the Philosopher calls "non-aspectual" (Rhet. i, 11); or inasmuch as something is apprehended together with deliberation, whence arise those desires that are not natural, and which accordingly the Philosopher calls "aspectual" (Rhet. i, 11).
In homine non solum est ratio universalis, quae pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis, quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut in primo libro dictum est. Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscentia quae est cum ratione, potest ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere. Et praeterea appetitus sensitivus potest etiam a ratione universali moveri, mediante imaginatione particulari.
In humans, there is not only universal formal aspect, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular aspect pertaining to the sensitive faculty (as stated in I, q78, a4; I, q81, a3). Accordingly, even aspectual desire may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by a universal formal aspect also, through the medium of the particular imagination.
The difference between those desires that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; it is also, in a way, formal, insofar as it arises from a difference in the active object, because the object of the appetite is the apprehended good, and hence diversity of the active [object] follows from diversity of apprehension: either inasmuch as something is [apprehended as] befitting, by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural desires, which the Philosopher calls "non-aspectual" (Rhet. i, 11); or inasmuch as something is apprehended together with deliberation, whence arise those desires that are not natural, and which accordingly the Philosopher calls "aspectual" (Rhet. i, 11).
In homine non solum est ratio universalis, quae pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis, quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut in primo libro dictum est. Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscentia quae est cum ratione, potest ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere. Et praeterea appetitus sensitivus potest etiam a ratione universali moveri, mediante imaginatione particulari.
In humans, there is not only universal formal aspect, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular aspect pertaining to the sensitive faculty (as stated in I, q78, a4; I, q81, a3). Accordingly, even aspectual desire may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by a universal formal aspect also, through the medium of the particular imagination.
Thursday, May 13, 2010
1a 2ae q30 a2: Whether concupiscence is a specific passion? Yes.
Concupiscentia est passio differens specie et ab amore et a delectatione quia ipsum delectabile secundum sensum, inquantum appetitum sibi adaptat quodammodo et conformat, causat amorem; inquantum vero absens attrahit ad seipsum, causat concupiscentiam; inquantum vero praesens quietat in seipso, causat delectationem.
Desire is a passion differing in species from both love and delight because the [object] itself delectable to sense causes love, inasmuch as, in a certain way, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes desire, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws [the concupiscible faculty] to itself; and it causes delight, inasmuch as, when present, it makes [the concupiscible faculty] to find rest in itself.
Est autem alia ratio virtutis motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, et secundum quod est absens, nam secundum quod est praesens, facit in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad seipsum moveri.
Now the formal aspect of the motive power of the end (i.e., of the good), differs according as it is really present, or absent, because, according as it is present, it causes [the concupiscible faculty] to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes [the concupiscible faculty] to be moved towards it.
Bonum delectabile non est absolute obiectum concupiscentiae, sed sub ratione absentis, sicut et sensibile sub ratione praeteriti, est obiectum memoriae. Huiusmodi enim particulares conditiones diversificant speciem passionum, vel etiam potentiarum sensitivae partis, quae respicit particularia.
The delectable good is the object of [the passion of] desire, not absolutely, but considered under the formal aspect of absence, just as the sensible, considered under the formal aspect of the past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers of the sensitive part, which regards particular things.
Desire is a passion differing in species from both love and delight because the [object] itself delectable to sense causes love, inasmuch as, in a certain way, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes desire, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws [the concupiscible faculty] to itself; and it causes delight, inasmuch as, when present, it makes [the concupiscible faculty] to find rest in itself.
Est autem alia ratio virtutis motivae ipsius finis vel boni, secundum quod est realiter praesens, et secundum quod est absens, nam secundum quod est praesens, facit in seipso quiescere; secundum autem quod est absens, facit ad seipsum moveri.
Now the formal aspect of the motive power of the end (i.e., of the good), differs according as it is really present, or absent, because, according as it is present, it causes [the concupiscible faculty] to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes [the concupiscible faculty] to be moved towards it.
Bonum delectabile non est absolute obiectum concupiscentiae, sed sub ratione absentis, sicut et sensibile sub ratione praeteriti, est obiectum memoriae. Huiusmodi enim particulares conditiones diversificant speciem passionum, vel etiam potentiarum sensitivae partis, quae respicit particularia.
The delectable good is the object of [the passion of] desire, not absolutely, but considered under the formal aspect of absence, just as the sensible, considered under the formal aspect of the past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers of the sensitive part, which regards particular things.
Wednesday, May 12, 2010
1a 2ae q30 a1: Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only? Yes.
Concupiscentia, proprie loquendo, est in appetitu sensitivo, et in vi concupiscibili, quae ab ea denominatur, quia unicuique potentiae animae competit appetere proprium bonum appetitu naturali, qui non sequitur apprehensionem; sed appetere bonum appetitu animali, qui sequitur apprehensionem, pertinet solum ad vim appetitivam: appetere autem aliquid sub ratione boni delectabilis secundum sensum, quod proprie est concupiscere, pertinet ad vim concupiscibilem.
Properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in its concupiscible power, which takes its name from it, because while it belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension, the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone: and to crave something under the formal aspect of a good that is delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.
Sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis. Est autem duplex delectatio, ut infra dicetur: una quae est in bono intelligibili, quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est in bono secundum sensum.
As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on (q31, a3,a4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good apprehended by formal aspect; the other is in good perceptible to the senses.
Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animae tantum. Secunda autem est animae et corporis, quia sensus est virtus in organo corporeo; unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius coniuncti. Talis autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen concupiscentiae sonat.
The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone, whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body, because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ; wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "con-cupiscentia." [="a together-desire"]
Properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in its concupiscible power, which takes its name from it, because while it belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension, the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone: and to crave something under the formal aspect of a good that is delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.
Sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., concupiscentia est appetitus delectabilis. Est autem duplex delectatio, ut infra dicetur: una quae est in bono intelligibili, quod est bonum rationis; alia quae est in bono secundum sensum.
As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on (q31, a3,a4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good apprehended by formal aspect; the other is in good perceptible to the senses.
Prima quidem delectatio videtur esse animae tantum. Secunda autem est animae et corporis, quia sensus est virtus in organo corporeo; unde et bonum secundum sensum est bonum totius coniuncti. Talis autem delectationis appetitus videtur esse concupiscentia, quae simul pertineat et ad animam et ad corpus, ut ipsum nomen concupiscentiae sonat.
The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone, whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body, because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ; wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "con-cupiscentia." [="a together-desire"]
Tuesday, May 11, 2010
1a 2ae q29 a6: Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred? Yes.
Odium sensitivae partis potest respicere aliquid in universali, quia ex natura communi aliquid adversatur animali, et non solum ex eo quod est particularis: sicut lupus ovi; unde ovis odit lupum generaliter.
Hatred, in the sensitive faculty of a soul, can regard something universally, because something, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as a particular individual, may be hostile to the animal: for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep; hence a sheep hates the wolf universally.
De universali dupliciter contingit loqui: uno modo, secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur; alia est enim consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo.
There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as it considered under the intention of universality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which such an intention is ascribed; for it is one thing to consider "the human" as universal, and another to consider "the human" as it is in him who is a human.
Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri potest in universale, quia universale fit per abstractionem a materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva.
If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no power of the sensitive faculty of a soul, neither the power of apprehension nor of appetite, can attain the universal, because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, in which every sensitive ability takes root.
Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod obiectum visus est color secundum genus; non quia visus cognoscat colorem universalem, sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est color simpliciter.
Nevertheless some sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight cognizes universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizable by the sight, as is fitting for color, not so much as it is this [particular] color, but inasmuch it is simply color [i.e., color universally considered].
Sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est universale; apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit universalitas.
The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such; but they apprehend something to which [the formal aspect of] universality is given by abstraction.
Id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum.
That which is common to all cannot be the formal aspect of hatred. But nothing hinders something from being common to many, but yet at variance with others, so as thus to be hateful to them [under the formal aspect of hatred].
Sed ira semper causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse ad aliquid in genere.
On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular, because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from particular individuals. And because of this, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that anger is always directed to something singular; whereas hatred can be directed to something in general.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "ira semper fit inter singularia, odium autem etiam ad genera; furem enim odit et calumniatorem unusquisque".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger always arises between singular things, whereas hatred is also directed to general things; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."
Sed odium, secundum quod est in parte intellectiva (cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem intellectus), potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.
But hatred, because it is [possible for it to be not just in the sensitive faculty of a soul but also] in the intellectual faculty of the soul (since it can arise from a universal apprehension of the intellect), is able to be in regard of the universal in both ways [(i.e., in the intention, intellectually, and in the object of intentionality, sensitively)].
Hatred, in the sensitive faculty of a soul, can regard something universally, because something, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as a particular individual, may be hostile to the animal: for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep; hence a sheep hates the wolf universally.
De universali dupliciter contingit loqui: uno modo, secundum quod subest intentioni universalitatis; alio autem modo, de natura cui talis intentio attribuitur; alia est enim consideratio hominis universalis, et alia hominis in eo quod homo.
There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as it considered under the intention of universality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which such an intention is ascribed; for it is one thing to consider "the human" as universal, and another to consider "the human" as it is in him who is a human.
Si igitur universale accipiatur primo modo, sic nulla potentia sensitivae partis, neque apprehensiva neque appetitiva, ferri potest in universale, quia universale fit per abstractionem a materia individuali, in qua radicatur omnis virtus sensitiva.
If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no power of the sensitive faculty of a soul, neither the power of apprehension nor of appetite, can attain the universal, because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, in which every sensitive ability takes root.
Potest tamen aliqua potentia sensitiva, et apprehensiva et appetitiva, ferri in aliquid universaliter. Sicut dicimus quod obiectum visus est color secundum genus; non quia visus cognoscat colorem universalem, sed quia quod color sit cognoscibilis a visu, non convenit colori inquantum est hic color, sed inquantum est color simpliciter.
Nevertheless some sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight cognizes universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizable by the sight, as is fitting for color, not so much as it is this [particular] color, but inasmuch it is simply color [i.e., color universally considered].
Sensus non apprehendit universale, prout est universale; apprehendit tamen aliquid cui per abstractionem accidit universalitas.
The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such; but they apprehend something to which [the formal aspect of] universality is given by abstraction.
Id quod commune est omnibus, non potest esse ratio odii. Sed nihil prohibet aliquid esse commune multis, quod tamen dissonat ab aliis, et sic est eis odiosum.
That which is common to all cannot be the formal aspect of hatred. But nothing hinders something from being common to many, but yet at variance with others, so as thus to be hateful to them [under the formal aspect of hatred].
Sed ira semper causatur ex aliquo particulari, quia ex aliquo actu laedentis; actus autem particularium sunt. Et propter hoc philosophus dicit quod ira semper est ad aliquid singulare; odium vero potest esse ad aliquid in genere.
On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular, because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from particular individuals. And because of this, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that anger is always directed to something singular; whereas hatred can be directed to something in general.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "ira semper fit inter singularia, odium autem etiam ad genera; furem enim odit et calumniatorem unusquisque".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger always arises between singular things, whereas hatred is also directed to general things; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter."
Sed odium, secundum quod est in parte intellectiva (cum consequatur apprehensionem universalem intellectus), potest utroque modo esse respectu universalis.
But hatred, because it is [possible for it to be not just in the sensitive faculty of a soul but also] in the intellectual faculty of the soul (since it can arise from a universal apprehension of the intellect), is able to be in regard of the universal in both ways [(i.e., in the intention, intellectually, and in the object of intentionality, sensitively)].
Monday, May 10, 2010
1a 2ae q29 a5: Whether a man can hate the truth? Yes.
Sed in particulari nihil prohibet quoddam ens et quoddam verum odio haberi, inquantum habet rationem contrarii et repugnantis, quia contrarietas et repugnantia non adversatur rationi entis et veri, sicut adversatur rationi boni.
Nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an object of hatred, insofar as it is considered under the formal aspect of being hurtful and repugnant, because hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with the formal aspect of being and truth, as they are with the formal aspect of good.
Bonum et verum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt ratione. Bonum enim habet rationem appetibilis, non autem ens vel verum, quia bonum est "quod omnia appetunt". Et ideo bonum, sub ratione boni, non potest odio haberi, nec in universali nec in particulari.
Good, true and being are the same in a thing, but differ in their formal aspect. For good has the formal aspect of something desirable, while being and true are not so considered, since the good is "what all things seek". Wherefore a good, considered under the formal aspect of good, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular.
Dicit Augustinus, in X Confess., quod homines "amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem".
Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that humans "love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it reproves".
Cognoscere veritatem secundum se est amabile; propter quod dicit Augustinus quod amant eam lucentem. Sed per accidens cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, inquantum impedit ab aliquo desiderato.
The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself; hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful, insofar as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "homines amant non fictos".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward".
Ex hoc procedit quod non ficti amantur, quod homo amat secundum se cognoscere veritatem, quam homines non ficti manifestant.
The reason why those who are straightforward are loved, is that a man loves the knowledge of the truth in itself, which is what is displayed by men who are straightforward.
Nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an object of hatred, insofar as it is considered under the formal aspect of being hurtful and repugnant, because hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with the formal aspect of being and truth, as they are with the formal aspect of good.
Bonum et verum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt ratione. Bonum enim habet rationem appetibilis, non autem ens vel verum, quia bonum est "quod omnia appetunt". Et ideo bonum, sub ratione boni, non potest odio haberi, nec in universali nec in particulari.
Good, true and being are the same in a thing, but differ in their formal aspect. For good has the formal aspect of something desirable, while being and true are not so considered, since the good is "what all things seek". Wherefore a good, considered under the formal aspect of good, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular.
Dicit Augustinus, in X Confess., quod homines "amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem".
Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that humans "love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it reproves".
Cognoscere veritatem secundum se est amabile; propter quod dicit Augustinus quod amant eam lucentem. Sed per accidens cognitio veritatis potest esse odibilis, inquantum impedit ab aliquo desiderato.
The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself; hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful, insofar as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire.
Philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod "homines amant non fictos".
The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward".
Ex hoc procedit quod non ficti amantur, quod homo amat secundum se cognoscere veritatem, quam homines non ficti manifestant.
The reason why those who are straightforward are loved, is that a man loves the knowledge of the truth in itself, which is what is displayed by men who are straightforward.
Sunday, May 09, 2010
1a 2ae q29 a4: Whether a man can hate himself? No.
Impossibile est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat seipsum quia naturaliter unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni; nam "malum est praeter voluntatem", ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.
Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself, because everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the formal aspect of good; for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi inquantum apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt seipsos, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni, inquantum est terminativum alicuius miseriae vel doloris.
No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the formal aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself under the formal aspect of good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain.
Avaritia odiosos facit aliis, non autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore, secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam debeat.
Avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should.
Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself, because everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the formal aspect of good; for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi inquantum apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt seipsos, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni, inquantum est terminativum alicuius miseriae vel doloris.
No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the formal aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself under the formal aspect of good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain.
Avaritia odiosos facit aliis, non autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore, secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam debeat.
Avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should.
Saturday, May 08, 2010
1a 2ae q29 a3: Whether hatred is stronger than love? No.
Amor est fortior odio quia impossibile est effectum sua causa esse fortiorem; omne autem odium procedit ex aliquo amore sicut ex causa.
Love is stronger than hatred because it is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause; but every hatred arises from some love as its cause.
Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo, sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem, quam in ea quae sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, fortior est motus animae in bonum quam in malum.
And furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil.
Bonum est fortius quam malum, quia malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de Div. Nom.
Good is stronger than evil, because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Love is stronger than hatred because it is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause; but every hatred arises from some love as its cause.
Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo, sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem, quam in ea quae sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, fortior est motus animae in bonum quam in malum.
And furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil.
Bonum est fortius quam malum, quia malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de Div. Nom.
Good is stronger than evil, because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
Friday, May 07, 2010
1a 2ae q29 a2: Whether love is a cause of hatred? Yes.
Omne odium ex amore causatur quia nihil odio habeatur, nisi per hoc quod contrariatur convenienti quod amatur.
Every hatred is caused by love because nothing is hated save through being contrary to a fitting thing which is loved.
Amor autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem, sed non realiter.
Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous according to formal aspect but not really.
Every hatred is caused by love because nothing is hated save through being contrary to a fitting thing which is loved.
Amor autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem, sed non realiter.
Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous according to formal aspect but not really.
Thursday, May 06, 2010
1a 2ae q29 a1: Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred? Yes.
Sicut bonum est obiectum amoris, ita malum est obiectum odii, quia sicut omne conveniens, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem boni, ita omne repugnans, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem mali.
Just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred, because just as whatever is fitting as such bears the formal aspect of good, so whatever is repugnant as such bears the formal aspect of evil.
Ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia conveniunt in ente. Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per comparationem ad alterum.
Being, as be-ing, has not the formal aspect of repugnance, but only of fittingness, because all things are fitting in their be-ing. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has a formal aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil, although not in itself, but by comparison with something else.
Sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est vere bonum, ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni, esse bonum.
Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good, so a thing may be apprehended as evil, when it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil, nor love of good, is good.
Contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri.
To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful, in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally fitted to one thing, and naturally opposed to another.
In appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod sibi convenit (quae est amor naturalis), ita ad id quod est ei repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem (quae est odium naturale).
With regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which befits it (wherein consists natural love), so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it (and this is natural hatred).
Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens; odium vero est dissonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum.
So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as fitting; while hatred is a certain dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as opposed and harmful.
Just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred, because just as whatever is fitting as such bears the formal aspect of good, so whatever is repugnant as such bears the formal aspect of evil.
Ens, inquantum ens, non habet rationem repugnantis, sed magis convenientis, quia omnia conveniunt in ente. Sed ens inquantum est hoc ens determinatum, habet rationem repugnantis ad aliquod ens determinatum. Et secundum hoc, unum ens est odibile alteri, et est malum, etsi non in se, tamen per comparationem ad alterum.
Being, as be-ing, has not the formal aspect of repugnance, but only of fittingness, because all things are fitting in their be-ing. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has a formal aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil, although not in itself, but by comparison with something else.
Sicut aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum, quod non est vere bonum, ita aliquid apprehenditur ut malum, quod non est vere malum. Unde contingit quandoque nec odium mali, nec amorem boni, esse bonum.
Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good, so a thing may be apprehended as evil, when it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil, nor love of good, is good.
Contingit idem esse amabile et odibile diversis, secundum appetitum quidem naturalem, ex hoc quod unum et idem est conveniens uni secundum suam naturam, et repugnans alteri.
To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful, in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally fitted to one thing, and naturally opposed to another.
In appetitu autem naturali hoc manifeste apparet, quod sicut unumquodque habet naturalem consonantiam vel aptitudinem ad id quod sibi convenit (quae est amor naturalis), ita ad id quod est ei repugnans et corruptivum, habet dissonantiam naturalem (quae est odium naturale).
With regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which befits it (wherein consists natural love), so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it (and this is natural hatred).
Sic igitur et in appetitu animali, seu in intellectivo, amor est consonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut conveniens; odium vero est dissonantia quaedam appetitus ad id quod apprehenditur ut repugnans et nocivum.
So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as fitting; while hatred is a certain dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as opposed and harmful.
Wednesday, May 05, 2010
1a 2ae q28 a6: Whether love is cause of all that the lover does? Yes.
Omne agens, quodcumque sit, agit quamcumque actionem ex aliquo amore, quia omne agens agit propter finem aliquem, ut supra dictum est. Finis autem est bonum desideratum et amatum unicuique.
Every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind, because every agent acts for an end, as stated above (q1 a2); but the end is the good desired and loved by each one.
Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem.
Here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love.
Omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa. Unde non superfluunt aliae passiones, quae sunt causae proximae.
Every act proceeding from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause; and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.
Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "propter amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt".
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."
Every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind, because every agent acts for an end, as stated above (q1 a2); but the end is the good desired and loved by each one.
Nos autem loquimur nunc de amore communiter accepto, prout comprehendit sub se amorem intellectualem, rationalem, animalem, naturalem.
Here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love.
Omnis actio quae procedit ex quacumque passione, procedit etiam ex amore, sicut ex prima causa. Unde non superfluunt aliae passiones, quae sunt causae proximae.
Every act proceeding from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause; and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.
Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod "propter amorem boni omnia agunt quaecumque agunt".
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."
Tuesday, May 04, 2010
1a 2ae q28 a5: Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover? No.
Amor non est passio laesiva, sed magis conservativa et perfectiva, quia amor significat coaptationem quandam appetitivae virtutis ad aliquod bonum; nihil autem quod coaptatur ad aliquid quod est sibi conveniens, ex hoc ipso laeditur: sed magis, si sit possibile, proficit et melioratur.
Love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects, because love denotes a certain fitting adapting of the appetitive power to some good; but nothing is hurt by being fittingly adapted to that which befits it: rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered.
Et hoc quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis: sicut accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per aliquam immutationem organi corporalis.
And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love may be hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ.
Love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects, because love denotes a certain fitting adapting of the appetitive power to some good; but nothing is hurt by being fittingly adapted to that which befits it: rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered.
Et hoc quidem dictum sit de amore, quantum ad id quod est formale in ipso, quod est scilicet ex parte appetitus. Quantum vero ad id quod est materiale in passione amoris, quod est immutatio aliqua corporalis, accidit quod amor sit laesivus propter excessum immutationis: sicut accidit in sensu, et in omni actu virtutis animae qui exercetur per aliquam immutationem organi corporalis.
And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love may be hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ.
Monday, May 03, 2010
1a 2ae q28 a4: Whether zeal is an effect of love? Yes.
Zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intensione amoris provenit, quia quanto aliqua virtus intensius tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel repugnans.
Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love, because the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance.
Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici; unde quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bono amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo repellere studet.
Love of friendship seeks the friend's good; wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good.
Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare pro Deo, quando ea quae sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, repellere secundum posse conatur.
In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of God.
Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love, because the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance.
Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici; unde quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bono amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo repellere studet.
Love of friendship seeks the friend's good; wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good.
Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare pro Deo, quando ea quae sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, repellere secundum posse conatur.
In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of God.
Sunday, May 02, 2010
1a 2ae q28 a3: Whether ecstasy is an effect of love? Yes.
In amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amicum.
In the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply, because he wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.
Extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur.
Someone is said to suffer ecstasy when he is placed outside himself.
Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum.
As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were.
In the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply, because he wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.
Extasim pati aliquis dicitur, cum extra se ponitur.
Someone is said to suffer ecstasy when he is placed outside himself.
Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra seipsum.
As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were.
Saturday, May 01, 2010
1a 2ae q28 a2: Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love? Yes.
Mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur, quia eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso.
Mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love, inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another, because by the same formal aspect, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.
Iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis.
This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the love.
Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscentiae, vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae: non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa (sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid aliud) sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis.
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of fitting pleasure, causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the fitting pleasure in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity."
Mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love, inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another, because by the same formal aspect, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.
Iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis.
This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the love.
Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eius affectu, ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praesentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscentiae, vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae: non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa (sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid aliud) sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis.
As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of fitting pleasure, causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the fitting pleasure in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity."
Friday, April 30, 2010
1a 2ae q28 a1: Whether union is an effect of love? Yes.
Amor quilibet est virtus unitiva quia amor vero et in absentia et in praesentia.
Every love is a unitive love because love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
Unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est.
Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (q27 a3).
Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui.
There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence.
Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., "Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi", quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur.
Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union--to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things.
Duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem.
The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension.
Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse.
Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being.
Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi.
In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, insofar, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself.
Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., "bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae".
Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."
Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinentis.
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him.
Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod "amor est quasi vita quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur". Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.
The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.
Every love is a unitive love because love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.
Unio tripliciter se habet ad amorem. Quaedam enim unio est causa amoris. Et haec quidem est unio substantialis, quantum ad amorem quo quis amat seipsum, quantum vero ad amorem quo quis amat alia, est unio similitudinis, ut dictum est.
Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (q27 a3).
Quaedam vero unio est essentialiter ipse amor. Et haec est unio secundum coaptationem affectus. Quae quidem assimilatur unioni substantiali, inquantum amans se habet ad amatum, in amore quidem amicitiae, ut ad seipsum; in amore autem concupiscentiae, ut ad aliquid sui.
There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence.
Quaedam vero unio est effectus amoris. Et haec est unio realis, quam amans quaerit de re amata. Et haec quidem unio est secundum convenientiam amoris, ut enim philosophus refert, II Politic., "Aristophanes dixit quod amantes desiderarent ex ambobus fieri unum, sed quia ex hoc accideret aut ambos aut alterum corrumpi", quaerunt unionem quae convenit et decet; ut scilicet simul conversentur, et simul colloquantur, et in aliis huiusmodi coniungantur.
Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union--to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things.
Duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem.
The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension.
Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illud quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse.
Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being.
Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi.
In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, insofar, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself.
Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., "bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae".
Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul."
Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia movet ad desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinentis.
The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him.
Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in VIII de Trin., quod "amor est quasi vita quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur". Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.
The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union.
Thursday, April 29, 2010
1a 2ae q27 a4: Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love? No.
Nulla alia passio animae est quae non praesupponat aliquem amorem, quia omnis alia passio animae vel importat motum ad aliquid, vel quietem in aliquo; omnis autem motus in aliquid, vel quies in aliquo, ex aliqua connaturalitate vel coaptatione procedit, quae pertinet ad rationem amoris.
There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind, because every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something; but every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from some connaturality or fitting aptness, which pertains to love's formal aspect.
Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius.
Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love, just as one good is the cause of another.
Cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur, nisi in re aliquo modo amata.
When someone loves something for the pleasure it affords, love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for nobody takes pleasure, save in that which is loved in some way.
There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind, because every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something; but every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from some connaturality or fitting aptness, which pertains to love's formal aspect.
Unde impossibile est quod aliqua alia passio animae sit causa universaliter omnis amoris. Contingit tamen aliquam aliam passionem esse causam amoris alicuius, sicut etiam unum bonum est causa alterius.
Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love, just as one good is the cause of another.
Cum aliquis amat aliquid propter delectationem, amor quidem ille causatur ex delectatione, sed delectatio illa iterum causatur ex alio amore praecedente; nullus enim delectatur, nisi in re aliquo modo amata.
When someone loves something for the pleasure it affords, love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for nobody takes pleasure, save in that which is loved in some way.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
1a 2ae q27 a3: Whether likeness is a cause of love? Yes.
Similitudo, proprie loquendo, est causa amoris quia in amore concupiscentiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum quod concupiscit.
Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love, because in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires.
Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod amat, efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus.
But a man loves himself more than another, because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good.
Et propter hoc figuli corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia, quam concupiscunt.
This is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain, and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
Ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum.
He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to that which he loves, as what is in potency [bears a likeness] to its act.
Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love, because in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires.
Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in participatione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod amat, efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus.
But a man loves himself more than another, because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good.
Et propter hoc figuli corrixantur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia, quam concupiscunt.
This is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain, and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.
Ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum.
He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to that which he loves, as what is in potency [bears a likeness] to its act.
Tuesday, April 27, 2010
1a 2ae q27 a2: Whether knowledge is a cause of love? Yes.
Amor requirit aliquam apprehensionem boni quod amatur quia bonum est causa amoris per modum obiecti, sed bonum non est obiectum appetitus, nisi prout est apprehensum.
Love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved because good is the cause of love, as being its object, but good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended.
Augustinus probat, in X de Trin., quod "nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum."
Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know."
Aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt coniuncta, et componere (quodammodo) ea quae sunt diversa, unum alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re (sicut partes et virtutes et proprietates).
Something is required for the perfection of cognition, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For cognition is oriented towards formal aspect, whose [function] it is to distinguish between aspects which in the thing are united, and to unite together (in some sort of way) aspects that are distinct, by comparing one [aspect] with another. Consequently the perfection of cognition requires that a man should cognize one by one whatever is in a thing (such as its parts, powers, and properties).
Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur, quia potest perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur.
On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing according to what it is in itself. Wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved as far as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that something is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known.
Love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved because good is the cause of love, as being its object, but good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended.
Augustinus probat, in X de Trin., quod "nullus potest amare aliquid incognitum."
Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know."
Aliquid requiritur ad perfectionem cognitionis, quod non requiritur ad perfectionem amoris. Cognitio enim ad rationem pertinet, cuius est distinguere inter ea quae secundum rem sunt coniuncta, et componere (quodammodo) ea quae sunt diversa, unum alteri comparando. Et ideo ad perfectionem cognitionis requiritur quod homo cognoscat singillatim quidquid est in re (sicut partes et virtutes et proprietates).
Something is required for the perfection of cognition, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For cognition is oriented towards formal aspect, whose [function] it is to distinguish between aspects which in the thing are united, and to unite together (in some sort of way) aspects that are distinct, by comparing one [aspect] with another. Consequently the perfection of cognition requires that a man should cognize one by one whatever is in a thing (such as its parts, powers, and properties).
Sed amor est in vi appetitiva, quae respicit rem secundum quod in se est. Unde ad perfectionem amoris sufficit quod res prout in se apprehenditur, ametur. Ob hoc ergo contingit quod aliquid plus amatur quam cognoscatur, quia potest perfecte amari, etiam si non perfecte cognoscatur.
On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing according to what it is in itself. Wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved as far as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that something is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known.
Monday, April 26, 2010
1a 2ae q27 a1: Whether good is the only cause of love? Yes.
Bonum est propria causa amoris quia amoris proprium obiectum est bonum; quia, ut dictum est, amor importat quandam connaturalitatem vel complacentiam amantis ad amatum; unicuique autem est bonum id quod est sibi connaturale et proportionatum.
Good is the proper cause of love because the proper object of love is the good; since, as stated above (q26, a1,a2), love implies a certain connaturalness, or fitting pleasure, of the lover for the thing beloved; and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and [fittingly] proportionate to it.
Amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum.
Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object.
Malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum.
Evil is never loved except under the formal aspect of good, that is to say, insofar as it is good in some respect, but is [instead] considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, insofar as it tends to that which is not simply a true good.
Pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus; sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus.
The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in formal aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the formal aspect of good is that which calms the appetite; while the formal aspect of the beautiful is that which calms the appetite by its [merely] being seen or known.
Unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt: scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes.
Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive: viz. sight and hearing, as [the senses that are foremost in] attaining the formal aspect.
Dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores.
For we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other formal objects of (i.e., the other specific things sensed by) the other senses, we do not [customarily] use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors.
Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam: ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.
Thus it is evident that beauty adds, on top of goodness, a certain ordination towards cognitive power: thus results the [customary] fact that "good" is spoken of that which simply pleases the appetite; while "beautiful" is spoken of that about which [merely] the apprehension itself is pleasing.
Good is the proper cause of love because the proper object of love is the good; since, as stated above (q26, a1,a2), love implies a certain connaturalness, or fitting pleasure, of the lover for the thing beloved; and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and [fittingly] proportionate to it.
Amor ad appetitivam potentiam pertinet, quae est vis passiva. Unde obiectum eius comparatur ad ipsam sicut causa motus vel actus ipsius. Oportet igitur ut illud sit proprie causa amoris quod est amoris obiectum.
Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object.
Malum nunquam amatur nisi sub ratione boni, scilicet inquantum est secundum quid bonum, et apprehenditur ut simpliciter bonum. Et sic aliquis amor est malus, inquantum tendit in id quod non est simpliciter verum bonum.
Evil is never loved except under the formal aspect of good, that is to say, insofar as it is good in some respect, but is [instead] considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, insofar as it tends to that which is not simply a true good.
Pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus; sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus.
The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in formal aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the formal aspect of good is that which calms the appetite; while the formal aspect of the beautiful is that which calms the appetite by its [merely] being seen or known.
Unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt: scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes.
Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive: viz. sight and hearing, as [the senses that are foremost in] attaining the formal aspect.
Dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. In sensibilibus autem aliorum sensuum, non utimur nomine pulchritudinis, non enim dicimus pulchros sapores aut odores.
For we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other formal objects of (i.e., the other specific things sensed by) the other senses, we do not [customarily] use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors.
Et sic patet quod pulchrum addit supra bonum, quendam ordinem ad vim cognoscitivam: ita quod bonum dicatur id quod simpliciter complacet appetitui; pulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet.
Thus it is evident that beauty adds, on top of goodness, a certain ordination towards cognitive power: thus results the [customary] fact that "good" is spoken of that which simply pleases the appetite; while "beautiful" is spoken of that about which [merely] the apprehension itself is pleasing.
Thursday, April 22, 2010
1a 2ae q26 a4: Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence? Yes.
Alius est amor concupiscentiae, et alius est amor amicitiae, quia ad illud bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscentiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae.
Love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship because man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.
Amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.
Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good, while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.
In amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiae, deficit a ratione verae amicitiae.
When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good, and in this respect the formal aspect of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, insofar as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the formal aspect of true friendship.
Love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship because man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.
Amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui aliquod bonum volumus, illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis.
Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good, while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.
Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatur amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatur, quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatur aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.
Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.
In amicitia utilis et delectabilis, vult quidem aliquis aliquod bonum amico, et quantum ad hoc salvatur ibi ratio amicitiae. Sed quia illud bonum refert ulterius ad suam delectationem vel utilitatem, inde est quod amicitia utilis et delectabilis, inquantum trahitur ad amorem concupiscentiae, deficit a ratione verae amicitiae.
When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good, and in this respect the formal aspect of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, insofar as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the formal aspect of true friendship.
Wednesday, April 21, 2010
1a 2ae q26 a3: Whether love is the same as dilection? No.
Obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio.
The object of love is more general than the object of dilection because love extends to more than dilection does.
Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio, supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit, supra amorem, perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.
For love has a wider signification among these words, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes. And therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the formally aspectual nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].
Ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio.
Thus some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than "dilection," because love denotes a kind of passion, especially insofar as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of formal aspect. But it is more possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his aspectual apprehension, which pertains to the formal aspect of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.
The object of love is more general than the object of dilection because love extends to more than dilection does.
Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio, supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit, supra amorem, perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.
For love has a wider signification among these words, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes. And therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the formally aspectual nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].
Ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio.
Thus some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than "dilection," because love denotes a kind of passion, especially insofar as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of formal aspect. But it is more possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his aspectual apprehension, which pertains to the formal aspect of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
1a 2ae q26 a2: Whether love is a passion? Yes.
Amor et passio (proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate) quia amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili.
Love is a passion (properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will) because love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object.
Passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam.
Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient, for in the first place it gives it the form, and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form.
Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile.
In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.
Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium.
The first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy."
Philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est passio.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion."
Unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus, amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod "amor est virtus unitiva", et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio est opus amoris.
Union belongs to love insofar as by the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself, or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.
Love is a passion (properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will) because love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object.
Passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam.
Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient, for in the first place it gives it the form, and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form.
Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile.
In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object.
Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium.
The first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy."
Philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est passio.
The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion."
Unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus, amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod "amor est virtus unitiva", et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio est opus amoris.
Union belongs to love insofar as by the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself, or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.
Monday, April 19, 2010
1a 2ae q26 a1: Whether love is in the concupiscible power? Yes.
Amor pertinet ad concupiscibilem, quia dicitur per respectum ad bonum absolute, non per respectum ad arduum, quod est obiectum irascibilis.
Love belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.
Amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis.
The name "love" is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite, the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love".
Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivo.
In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite, or of the will, to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite.
Philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod "amor est in concupiscibili".
The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power".
Love belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.
Amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum. In appetitu autem naturali, principium huiusmodi motus est connaturalitas appetentis ad id in quod tendit, quae dici potest amor naturalis.
The name "love" is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite, the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called "natural love".
Et similiter coaptatio appetitus sensitivi, vel voluntatis, ad aliquod bonum, idest ipsa complacentia boni, dicitur amor sensitivus, vel intellectivus seu rationalis. Amor igitur sensitivus est in appetitu sensitivo, sicut amor intellectivus in appetitu intellectivo.
In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite, or of the will, to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite.
Philosophus dicit, in II Topic., quod "amor est in concupiscibili".
The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power".
Sunday, April 18, 2010
1a 2ae q25 a4: Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear? Yes.
Hae quatuor passiones communiter principales esse dicuntur quia
de bono praesenti est gaudium;
de malo praesenti est tristitia;
de bono vero futuro est spes;
de malo futuro est timor.
These four are commonly called the principal passions because
joy relates to present good,
sadness relates to present evil;
hope regards future good, and
fear, future evil.
Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur.
Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end.
Desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi per accidens; et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur audaciam.
Despair implies movement away from good, and this is, as it were, accidental; and daring implies movement towards evil, and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions, because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.
Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum futurum.
Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, insofar as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.
de bono praesenti est gaudium;
de malo praesenti est tristitia;
de bono vero futuro est spes;
de malo futuro est timor.
These four are commonly called the principal passions because
joy relates to present good,
sadness relates to present evil;
hope regards future good, and
fear, future evil.
Quarum duae, scilicet gaudium et tristitia, principales dicuntur, quia sunt completivae et finales simpliciter respectu omnium passionum, unde ad omnes passiones consequuntur.
Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end.
Desperatio importat recessum a bono, quod est quasi per accidens; et audacia importat accessum ad malum, quod etiam est per accidens. Et ideo hae passiones non possunt esse principales, quia quod est per accidens, non potest dici principale. Et sic etiam nec ira potest dici passio principalis, quae consequitur audaciam.
Despair implies movement away from good, and this is, as it were, accidental; and daring implies movement towards evil, and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions, because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.
Augustinus ponit desiderium vel cupiditatem loco spei, inquantum ad idem pertinere videntur, scilicet ad bonum futurum.
Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, insofar as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.
Saturday, April 17, 2010
1a 2ae q25 a3: Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions? Yes.
Spes est prior inter omnes passiones irascibilis quia spes est motus in bonum secundum rationem boni quod de sua ratione est attractivum, et ideo est motus in bonum per se; desperatio autem est recessus a bono, qui non competit bono secundum quod est bonum, sed secundum aliquid aliud, unde est quasi per accidens.
Hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty because hope is a movement towards a good according to the formal aspect of the good, which is attractive [simply] by its own formal aspect, so that hope tends to the good in itself; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were.
Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare (secundum quod Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus).
And by the same formal aspect, fear, since it is a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the appetite for the good is the aspectual apprehension by which evil is avoided, so hope and despair are aspectually apprehended by fear and daring, because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring, for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself (as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics).
Quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a manifestiori, denominatur potentia.
Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio irae.
The presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (q23, a3,a4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est prior desperatione.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair.
Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus,
primo occurrunt amor et odium;
secundo, desiderium et fuga;
tertio, spes et desperatio;
quarto, timor et audacia;
quinto, ira;
sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia,
quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation,
love and hatred are first;
desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third;
fear and daring, fourth;
anger, fifth;
sixth and last, joy and sadness,
which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Ita tamen quod
amor est prior odio,
et desiderium fuga,
et spes desperatione,
et timor audacia,
et gaudium quam tristitia,
ut ex praedictis colligi potest.
Yet so that
love precedes hatred;
desire precedes aversion;
hope precedes despair;
fear precedes daring; and
joy precedes sadness,
as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
Hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty because hope is a movement towards a good according to the formal aspect of the good, which is attractive [simply] by its own formal aspect, so that hope tends to the good in itself; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were.
Et eadem ratione, timor, cum sit recessus a malo, est prior quam audacia. Quod autem spes et desperatio sint naturaliter priores quam timor et audacia, ex hoc manifestum est, quod, sicut appetitus boni est ratio quare vitetur malum, ita etiam spes et desperatio sunt ratio timoris et audaciae, nam audacia consequitur spem victoriae, et timor consequitur desperationem vincendi. Ira autem consequitur audaciam, nullus enim irascitur vindictam appetens, nisi audeat vindicare (secundum quod Avicenna dicit, in sexto de naturalibus).
And by the same formal aspect, fear, since it is a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the appetite for the good is the aspectual apprehension by which evil is avoided, so hope and despair are aspectually apprehended by fear and daring, because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring, for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself (as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics).
Quia ira causatur ex aliis passionibus sicut effectus a causis praecedentibus, ideo ab ea, tanquam a manifestiori, denominatur potentia.
Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.
Et quidem ex praesentia boni non causatur aliqua passio in irascibili, ut dictum est, sed ex praesentia mali causatur passio irae.
The presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (q23, a3,a4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Quia igitur in via generationis seu consecutionis, proportio vel aptitudo ad finem praecedit consecutionem finis; inde est quod ira, inter omnes passiones irascibilis, est ultima, ordine generationis. Inter alias autem passiones irascibilis, quae important motum consequentem amorem vel odium boni vel mali, oportet quod passiones quarum obiectum est bonum, scilicet spes et desperatio, sint naturaliter priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, scilicet audacia et timore. Ita tamen quod spes est prior desperatione.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair.
Et si ordinem omnium passionum secundum viam generationis, scire velimus,
primo occurrunt amor et odium;
secundo, desiderium et fuga;
tertio, spes et desperatio;
quarto, timor et audacia;
quinto, ira;
sexto et ultimo, gaudium et tristitia,
quae consequuntur ad omnes passiones, ut dicitur in II Ethic.
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation,
love and hatred are first;
desire and aversion, second;
hope and despair, third;
fear and daring, fourth;
anger, fifth;
sixth and last, joy and sadness,
which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Ita tamen quod
amor est prior odio,
et desiderium fuga,
et spes desperatione,
et timor audacia,
et gaudium quam tristitia,
ut ex praedictis colligi potest.
Yet so that
love precedes hatred;
desire precedes aversion;
hope precedes despair;
fear precedes daring; and
joy precedes sadness,
as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
Friday, April 16, 2010
1a 2ae q25 a2: Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions? Yes.
Amor est prima passionum concupiscibilis quia omne quod tendit ad finem aliquem, primo quidem habet aptitudinem seu proportionem ad finem, nihil enim tendit in finem non proportionatum; secundo, movetur ad finem; tertio, quiescit in fine post eius consecutionem. Ipsa autem aptitudo sive proportio appetitus ad bonum est amor, qui nihil aliud est quam complacentia boni; motus autem ad bonum est desiderium vel concupiscentia; quies autem in bono est gaudium vel delectatio.
Love is the first of the concupiscible passions because whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.
Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.
Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse, because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (q11, a3, ad 3).
Hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio; quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia. Unde inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.
We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now, in most cases, we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure; when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence. And, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most. And for this reason the power is named after it.
Obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio boni. Unde et omnes passiones, quarum obiectum est bonum, naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita: quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo refutatur oppositum malum.
Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil, since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: for because a good is sought, therefore an opposite evil is shunned.
Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad finem.
Now good has the formal aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end.
Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones ex amore causantur, "amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est".
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy."
Love is the first of the concupiscible passions because whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.
Et ideo secundum hunc ordinem, amor praecedit desiderium, et desiderium praecedit delectationem. Sed secundum ordinem intentionis, est e converso, nam delectatio intenta causat desiderium et amorem. Delectatio enim est fruitio boni, quae quodammodo est finis sicut et ipsum bonum, ut supra dictum est.
Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse, because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (q11, a3, ad 3).
Hoc modo nominatur aliquid, secundum quod nobis innotescit, voces enim sunt signa intellectuum, secundum philosophum. Nos autem, ut plurimum, per effectum cognoscimus causam. Effectus autem amoris, quando quidem habetur ipsum amatum, est delectatio; quando vero non habetur, est desiderium vel concupiscentia. Ut autem Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., amor magis sentitur, cum eum prodit indigentia. Unde inter omnes passiones concupiscibilis, magis sensibilis est concupiscentia. Et propter hoc, ab ea denominatur potentia.
We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now, in most cases, we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure; when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence. And, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most. And for this reason the power is named after it.
Obiectum concupiscibilis sunt bonum et malum. Naturaliter autem est prius bonum malo, eo quod malum est privatio boni. Unde et omnes passiones, quarum obiectum est bonum, naturaliter sunt priores passionibus quarum obiectum est malum, unaquaeque scilicet sua opposita: quia enim bonum quaeritur, ideo refutatur oppositum malum.
Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil, since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: for because a good is sought, therefore an opposite evil is shunned.
Bonum autem habet rationem finis, qui quidem est prior in intentione, sed est posterior in consecutione. Potest ergo ordo passionum concupiscibilis attendi vel secundum intentionem, vel secundum consecutionem. Secundum quidem consecutionem, illud est prius quod primo fit in eo quod tendit ad finem.
Now good has the formal aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end.
Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes passiones ex amore causantur, "amor enim inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est; id autem habens, eoque fruens, laetitia est".
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy."
Thursday, April 15, 2010
1a 2ae q25 a1: Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions? No.
Passiones concupiscibilis sunt priores passionibus irascibilis quia bonum simpliciter est prius quam bonum contractum.
The concupiscible passions precede the irascible because the absolute good precedes the restricted good.
Passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum.
The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good.
Passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important motum in bonum vel in malum, et inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo.
The passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and between those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil.
Id in quo iam quiescitur, non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum irascibilis.
When we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as having the formal aspect of the difficult or arduous, whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
De ratione obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.
The formal aspect of the object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.
The concupiscible passions precede the irascible because the absolute good precedes the restricted good.
Passiones concupiscibilis respiciunt bonum absolutum, passiones autem irascibilis respiciunt bonum contractum, scilicet arduum.
The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good.
Passiones irascibilis mediae sunt inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important motum in bonum vel in malum, et inter passiones concupiscibilis quae important quietem in bono vel in malo.
The passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and between those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil.
Id in quo iam quiescitur, non habet rationem difficilis seu ardui, quod est obiectum irascibilis.
When we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as having the formal aspect of the difficult or arduous, whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.
De ratione obiecti irascibilis est quod sit arduum. Sed quia obiectum concupiscibilis est bonum absolute, prius naturaliter est quam obiectum irascibilis, sicut commune proprio.
The formal aspect of the object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
1a 2ae q24 a4: Whether any passion is good or evil in its species? Yes.
Aliquae passiones sunt bonae vel malae secundum suam speciem quia secundum quod appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi, iam bonum et malum rationis non est in passionibus eius per accidens, sed per se.
Some passions are good or evil according to their species because insofar as the sensitive appetite obeys formal aspect, good and evil in their formal aspects are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.
In brutis animalibus, appetitus sensitivus non obedit rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, quae subiicitur rationi superiori (scilicet divinae), est in eis quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.
In irrational animals, the sensitive appetite does not obey formal aspect. Nevertheless, insofar as they are led by a kind of estimative apprehension (+, 0, -) of the natures of things, which [estimative power] is governed by a higher aspectual apprehension (i.e., that of the Divine mind [ratio]), there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.
Species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturae; et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis.
The species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion.
Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione: sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem exterioris actus.
Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and proceeds from a judgment about formal aspect. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, insofar as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with [that object's] formal aspect: as is clear in the case of "shame", which is base fear; and of "envy", which is sorrow for another's good. For thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.
Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod "misericordia pertinet ad virtutem". Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., quod verecundia est passio laudabilis.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion.
Some passions are good or evil according to their species because insofar as the sensitive appetite obeys formal aspect, good and evil in their formal aspects are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.
In brutis animalibus, appetitus sensitivus non obedit rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, quae subiicitur rationi superiori (scilicet divinae), est in eis quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.
In irrational animals, the sensitive appetite does not obey formal aspect. Nevertheless, insofar as they are led by a kind of estimative apprehension (+, 0, -) of the natures of things, which [estimative power] is governed by a higher aspectual apprehension (i.e., that of the Divine mind [ratio]), there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.
Species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturae; et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis.
The species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion.
Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione: sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem exterioris actus.
Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and proceeds from a judgment about formal aspect. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, insofar as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with [that object's] formal aspect: as is clear in the case of "shame", which is base fear; and of "envy", which is sorrow for another's good. For thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.
Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod "misericordia pertinet ad virtutem". Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., quod verecundia est passio laudabilis.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion.
Tuesday, April 13, 2010
1a 2ae q24 a3: Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act? No.
Passio animae non diminuit bonum moris quia ad perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae sint regulatae per rationem.
A passion of the soul does not lessen moral good because it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves should be regulated by formal aspect.
In Deo et in Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, neque etiam membra corporea; et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in nobis.
In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members; and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.
Stoici, sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animae diminuere actus bonitatem; omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus passiones animae solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per rationem.
As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by formal aspect.
A passion of the soul does not lessen moral good because it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves should be regulated by formal aspect.
In Deo et in Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, neque etiam membra corporea; et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in nobis.
In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members; and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.
Stoici, sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animae diminuere actus bonitatem; omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus passiones animae solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per rationem.
As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by formal aspect.
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