Tuesday, April 13, 2010

1a 2ae q24 a3: Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act? No.

Passio animae non diminuit bonum moris quia ad perfectionem moralis sive humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones animae sint regulatae per rationem.

A passion of the soul does not lessen moral good because it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves should be regulated by formal aspect.

In Deo et in Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, neque etiam membra corporea; et ideo bonum in eis non attenditur secundum ordinationem passionum aut corporeorum actuum, sicut in nobis.

In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members; and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.

Stoici, sicut ponebant omnem passionem animae esse malam, ita ponebant consequenter omnem passionem animae diminuere actus bonitatem; omne enim bonum ex permixtione mali vel totaliter tollitur, vel fit minus bonum. Et hoc quidem verum est, si dicamus passiones animae solum inordinatos motus sensitivi appetitus, prout sunt perturbationes seu aegritudines. Sed si passiones simpliciter nominemus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic ad perfectionem humani boni pertinet quod etiam ipsae passiones sint moderatae per rationem.

As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by formal aspect.