Aliquae passiones sunt bonae vel malae secundum suam speciem quia secundum quod appetitus sensitivus obedit rationi, iam bonum et malum rationis non est in passionibus eius per accidens, sed per se.
Some passions are good or evil according to their species because insofar as the sensitive appetite obeys formal aspect, good and evil in their formal aspects are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.
In brutis animalibus, appetitus sensitivus non obedit rationi. Et tamen inquantum ducitur quadam aestimativa naturali, quae subiicitur rationi superiori (scilicet divinae), est in eis quaedam similitudo moralis boni, quantum ad animae passiones.
In irrational animals, the sensitive appetite does not obey formal aspect. Nevertheless, insofar as they are led by a kind of estimative apprehension (+, 0, -) of the natures of things, which [estimative power] is governed by a higher aspectual apprehension (i.e., that of the Divine mind [ratio]), there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.
Species actus vel passionis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est in genere naturae; et sic bonum vel malum morale non pertinet ad speciem actus vel passionis.
The species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion.
Alio modo, secundum quod pertinent ad genus moris, prout scilicet participant aliquid de voluntario et de iudicio rationis. Et hoc modo bonum et malum morale possunt pertinere ad speciem passionis, secundum quod accipitur ut obiectum passionis aliquid de se conveniens rationi, vel dissonum a ratione: sicut patet de verecundia, quae est timor turpis; et de invidia, quae est tristitia de bono alterius. Sic enim pertinent ad speciem exterioris actus.
Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and proceeds from a judgment about formal aspect. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, insofar as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with [that object's] formal aspect: as is clear in the case of "shame", which is base fear; and of "envy", which is sorrow for another's good. For thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.
Augustinus dicit, IX de Civ. Dei, quod "misericordia pertinet ad virtutem". Philosophus etiam dicit, in II Ethic., quod verecundia est passio laudabilis.
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion.