Wednesday, August 18, 2010

1a 2ae q48 a3: Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason? Yes.

Ira impedit iudicium rationis quia a ratione est principium irae, quantum ad motum appetitivum, qui est formalis in ira, sed perfectum iudicium rationis passio irae praeoccupat quasi non perfecte rationem audiens, propter commotionem caloris velociter impellentis, quae est materialis in ira.

Anger hinders the judgment of reason because the beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger, but the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger.

Mens vel ratio quamvis non utatur organo corporali in suo proprio actu, tamen, quia indiget ad sui actum quibusdam viribus sensitivis, quorum actus impediuntur corpore perturbato, necesse est quod perturbationes corporales etiam iudicium rationis impediant, sicut patet in ebrietate et somno.

Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason, as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep.

Iracundus dicitur esse manifestus, non quia manifestum sit sibi quid facere debeat, sed quia manifeste operatur, non quaerens aliquam occultationem. Quod partim contingit propter impedimentum rationis, quae non potest discernere quid sit occultandum et quid manifestandum, nec etiam excogitare occultandi vias. Partim vero est ex ampliatione cordis, quae pertinet ad magnanimitatem, quam facit ira: unde et de magnanimo philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod "est manifestus oditor et amator et manifeste dicit et operatur".

An angry man is said to be open, not because it is open to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly."

Concupiscentia autem dicitur esse latens et insidiosa, quia, ut plurimum, delectabilia quae concupiscuntur, habent turpitudinem quandam et mollitiem, in quibus homo vult latere. In his autem quae sunt virilitatis et excellentiae, cuiusmodi sunt vindictae, quaerit homo manifestus esse.

Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.